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THE  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION: 
A REAPPRAISAL 
Louis Kaplow* 
The  conflict  between  antitrust  law  and  patent  policy  has  incessantly 
perplexed courts and  commentators.  In  this  Article,  Professor Kaplow de- 
velops and analyzes a conceptual solution to the patent-antitrust puzzle.  This 
analysis  is applied in a number of familiar  contexts,  and the resulting con- 
clusions call into question much of the earlier analysis of these issues.  Both 
the development of the model and the attempt to apply the theoreticalframe- 
work  in  practice  indicate  that  the problem is far  more complex than  has 
previously been realized.  This Article is an attempt to clarify the issues,  but 
in  the end it  may reinforce existing pessimism concerning the possibility  of 
untangling the patent-antitrust  intersection.  The discussion  also  illustrates 
the difficulty of applying economic analysis to concrete problems in a manner 
that yields  confident conclusions. 
HE  intersection of antitrust law and patent policy has proved to 
be  a  source  of  perpetual  confusion  and  controversy  since  the 
passage of the Sherman Act nearly a century ago.  In the courts, this 
confusion manifests itself in the continual flux of patent-antitrust doc- 
trine,  the apparent inconsistency  among many segments of that doc- 
trine, and the difficulty courts have in articulating rules and standards. 
Commentators have  continued  the  debate  for decades  but  generally 
have  been unable to agree upon common bases for judgment or even 
to pinpoint the sources of disagreement. 
Approaches  to  the  patent-antitrust conflict fall  into  three general 
categories.  The  first sidesteps the conflict by pretending in one way 
or another that  one  half of  the problem does not exist.  Courts and 
commentators vary regarding which half they emphasize and generally 
do not explain why they effectively ignore the other half.  The second 
approach  resolves  the  conflict  by  invoking  formalistic  constructions 
that  are  indeterminate  and  only  superficially  address  the  issues  at 
stake.  The  third  approach focuses  on  the  relationship  between  the 
reward a patentee receives and the value of the patent.  This approach 
has much in common with the first in that it emphasizes patent policy 
*  Assistant  Professor of  Law,  Harvard  University.  Northwestern  University,  A.B.,  I977; 
Harvard University,  J.D.,  I98I;  A.M.,  I98I.  The  helpful comments and assistance of Lucian 
Bebchuk,  Steven  Meacham,  and Steven  Shavell  are greatly appreciated.  I also benefited from 
the  opportunity  to  present portions of  this  paper to  the Industrial Organization Seminar con- 
ducted by the Harvard University Department of Economics in October I983. 
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at  the  expense  of  antitrust policy,  and with  the second in  that it  is 
often justified  by  appeals to  many of  the  more popular formalisms. 
Part I of this Article describes the patent-antitrust conflict in a manner 
that indicates the weaknesses of the prevalent approaches, and shows 
that the conflict runs even deeper than has generally been recognized. 
Part II develops  and analyzes a conceptual solution to the patent- 
antitrust puzzle.  The  proposed test  examines the  ratio between  the 
reward the  patentee  receives when  permitted to use a particular re- 
strictive  practice  and  the  monopoly  loss  that  results from such  ex- 
ploitation of the patent.  Because reward is assumed to induce inven- 
tive  activity  and thus to produce social benefits, this ratio indirectly 
reflects a relationship between social benefit and social cost (monopoly 
loss).  Thus,  generally speaking,  the greater the ratio, the stronger is 
the  case  for  permitting  the  practice.  Part  III  evaluates  the  more 
prominent previous approaches to the conflict in light of the ratio test 
analysis presented in Part II.  Parts IV through VII apply the analysis 
to  the  problems  of  price-restricted licensing,  agreements  involving 
competing patents,  price discrimination, and patentee control of un- 
patented  end  products.  Although  each  of  these  four  Parts reaches 
conclusions with varying degrees of confidence, the conclusions none- 
theless call into question much of the previous analysis of these issues. 
The  ratio test is conceptually simple,  yet its practical application 
is  quite  complex  for a  number of  reasons.  First,  coherent practical 
conclusions  about  patent-antitrust  doctrine  can  be  reached  only  if 
similar conclusions have  already been made concerning patent policy 
as a whole,  and it is well  known  that the empirical foundations for 
current patent policy are shaky at best.  Second, even given a devel- 
oped  patent  policy,  one  faces  the  difficult  task  of  ascertaining the 
economic  effects  of  a  wide  variety  of  patentee practices.  This  task 
not only raises most of the ongoing disputes concerning the appropriate 
contours of  antitrust policy  generally, but  is  also  subject  to  several 
additional sources of uncertainty peculiar to the patent-antitrust con- 
text.  This Article is an attempt to clarify the issues, but its revelation 
of the unavoidable  complexity of the problem indicates that, in prac- 
tice,  the untangling of the myriad strands in the patent-antitrust con- 
flict might prove impossibly difficult. 
I.  THE  DIRECTNESS  OF THE  PATENT-ANTITRUST  CONFLICT 
AND  SOME  IMPLICATIONS 
Although the conflict between the patent statute1 and the antitrust 
laws has long been thought troublesome, it is in fact even more deep- 
seated than is generally perceived.  Consider a patentee2 that intends 
1 35 U.S.C.  (i982). 
2  The  same analysis is generally applicable for assignees, but see infra subsection II.B.2(b); 
in some instances,  this analysis may also be applicable to practices of licensees. I  984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I8I7 
to  employ  a  particular restriction, practice,  or strategy in exploiting 
its patent.  Limiting the analysis to the antitrust issues,  which  is the 
intended  scope of this  Article,3 one might initially conclude that the 
practice  should  be  held  permissible  only  if  it  does  not  violate  the 
antitrust laws. 
Not  long after the  passage of the Sherman Act,4 however,  courts 
realized  that  this  approach  is  too  facile.5  A  practice  is  typically 
deemed to violate the antitrust laws because it is anticompetitive.  But 
the very purpose of a patent grant is to reward the patentee by limiting 
competition,  in  full  recognition that monopolistic  evils  are the  price 
society will  pay.  Generalizing from this principle, one could reverse 
the  initial  conclusion,  arguing that  any action  by a patentee in  vio- 
lation of the antitrust laws  is privileged under the patent statute. 
Courts subsequently  recognized that this  conclusion was  also too 
simplistic,  because  the  patent  statute  was  plainly  not  intended  to 
bestow  upon  each  patentee  carte blanche  in  all  its  endeavors.  For 
example,  a patentee  who  negotiates a favorable royalty by holding a 
prospective licensee  at gunpoint clearly will  not be relieved from the 
proscriptions  of  either  criminal  or  contract  law.  The  question  is 
whether  one  should  view  antitrust law  any  differently.6  At  a  mini- 
mum,  it  seems  clear  that  a  firm having  one  otherwise  insignificant 
patent may not freely engage in price-fixing, mergers, predatory pric- 
ing,  or anything else it wishes  solely on that account.  The  statutory 
limitation  of the patent grant to seventeen years7 illustrates the posi- 
tion,  now  generally accepted  by commentators,8 that the reward for 
3 Of course, some other categories of patent abuse are not subsumed within antitrust, fraud, 
or other general laws. 
4  Ch.  647,  26  Stat.  209  (I890)  (codified as amended at  I5  U.S.C.  ?? I-7  (I982)). 
5 See,  e.g.,  Bement v.  National  Harrow Co.,  i86  U.S.  70  (I902). 
6  It  is fruitless to  attempt to  resolve  the  patent-antitrust conflict by examining the general 
purposes behind the statutes in the hope of establishing a simple hierarchy that would indicate 
which  policy should  always  prevail; at this level  of generality, arguments can readily be made 
to lead to either result.  First, one could argue that patent policy naturally governs in the event 
of conflict with other laws setting competition policy, such as antitrust law.  One could conclude 
that the patent statute is not intended to displace all fields of law upon which it implicitly relies; 
for example,  patent exploitation requires the enforcement of a wide variety of contracts even if 
no  licensing  is  involved.  In  the  realm  of  competition  policy,  however,  the  patent  statute 
presumably  is  intended  to  govern,  because  it  is  specifically designed  to  change  the  ordinary 
competitive  environment. 
Conversely, one could argue that patent law should naturally give way to other laws setting 
competition  policy.  One might  contend  that the  argument for the  supremacy of patent policy 
is stronger in fields of law  outside competition policy and that the patent statute should govern 
in cases of direct conflict.  For example,  a seller's right to dispose of goods as it wishes  should 
be  overridden  if  production  of  the  goods  infringes  on  another's patent.  But  antitrust law  is 
specifically designed to regulate the  competitive  environment,  and one therefore cannot simply 
assume  that  its  policies  were  meant  to  give  way  in  cases  of  direct  conflict.  This  argument 
appears  particularly  strong  when  one  considers  that  none  of  the  antitrust  statutes  contain 
exceptions for patent exploitation. 
7 See  35 U.S.C.  ? I54  (I982). 
8  See,  e.g.,  sources cited infra note 36. i8i8  HARVARD  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol.  97:I8I3 
inventive  activity  should  not  be unbounded.  This  realization, how- 
ever, does not indicate whether any or all practices in violation of the 
antitrust laws  are out of bounds. 
Most formulations that seek to mediate the patent-antitrust conflict 
begin by asking whether the restrictive practice in question results in 
excessive  profits to  the  patentee  or  merely permits the  patentee  to 
realize part of the reward appropriate to the patent.9  Thus,  although 
the  premise has  never  been fully  explicit,  courts and commentators 
appear to  have  thought  that  patent-antitrust doctrine should be  de- 
termined by  reference to  a  specific level  of  aggregate reward.  The 
following  discussion  demonstrates how  even  this slightly refined for- 
mulation  leads  to  conclusions  quite  different from those  that  courts 
and commentators might expect.  These conclusions motivate the al- 
ternative framework that is constructed in Part II. 
In  considering  the  implications  of  making  a  particular level  of 
reward  the  policy  goal  of  patent-antitrust  doctrine,  it  is  useful  to 
consider two  extreme doctrinal regimes: 
i.  Antitrust  laws  reign  supreme:  A  patentee's  practice  is 
deemed illegal if it violates any aspect of antitrust law; no priv- 
ilege is accorded to patentees.10 
2.  Patent  statute reigns supreme:  The  antitrust laws  cannot 
render the patentee's practice illegal; the patentee has an absolute 
privilege to violate  the antitrust laws.1" 
From  the  perspective  of  antitrust  and  patent  policy,  consider how 
these two  regimes differ.  Under regime i,  the patentee would not be 
allowed,  for example,  to use price-restricted licenses or to enter into 
certain patent pools, but would still be permitted to exploit the patent 
on its own,  to sell all rights under the patent to another entity, or to 
enter into various intermediate arrangements that do not violate any 
provisions  of  the  antitrust laws.  Under regime  2,  however,  the  pa- 
tentee  would  be  permitted to  engage  in  all  of  the  practices barred 
under  regime  i.  Assume  that  the  typical  expected  reward  to  the 
patentee under regime  i  is x.12  Presumably x is not trivial, though it 
9 See  infra subsection II.A.3  and Part III. 
10 This  hypothetical  is  offered  for  heuristic  purposes only; I  make  no  effort here  to  be 
rigorous.  Indeed,  the  statement  of  the  first regime is  internally inconsistent: if  antitrust law 
truly reigned supreme, with no privilege whatsoever accorded to patent exploitation, the patent 
system itself  would  be nullified because the very act of enforcing one's patent involves  mono- 
polization.  This  difficulty in articulating one of the extreme positions results from the attempt 
to specify the framework in formalistic terms, an issue discussed further in Section III.B. 
11 Problems of definition -  including extremism -  similar to those noted in the preceding 
footnote are fully applicable here.  See,  e.g.,  supra p.  I8I7  (insignificant patent should not justify 
wholesale exemption from antitrust prohibitions). 
12  The reward x can be conceived as an amount, a percentage of something, a multidimen- I984]  PATENT-ANTITR  UST  INTERSECTION  I8I9 
is  less  than  the  reward under regime  2,  which  I  will  assume  to  be 
x  +  Io.13 
Which  regime  is  preferable depends  upon  how  much  reward  is 
deemed  appropriate.  If  patent  policy dictated  an outcome less  than 
or equal to x  we  would  prefer regime  I;  if  greater than or equal to 
x +  io,  regime 2.  (Outcomes between x and x +  io will be considered 
momentarily.  14)  But one might ask why legislators would care which 
regime courts15 selected,  because  the legislature could simply  adjust 
the underlying grant.  For example, the legislature need only increase 
or decrease the  patent  life  to  compensate for the  prohibition or au- 
thorization of  anticompetitive  practices.  Therefore,  one  could  argue 
that it is irrelevent which  regime -  or which point in between  -  is 
adopted by the courts. 
There are at least two reservations one might have about such an 
argument.  First,  our patent  policymaker, Congress,  is noted for in- 
action  and  has  not  changed  the  patent  life  in  over  a  century.  This 
suggests  that  Congress  is  not  making  such  ongoing  adjustments.16 
Second,  perhaps  Congress  has  chosen  to  set  the  patent  life17 only 
approximately, leaving to the courts the task of fine-tuning the amount 
of reward in  response to  changes in  technology and the structure of 
the  nation's  economy.  Although  this  second  point  might  not  seem 
sional vector, or anything else thought necessary to capture the relevant incentive aspects of the 
patent system. 
13 The  choice of "io"  is arbitrary, and purely for illustrative purposes.  Any number could 
be selected by simply making the appropriate redefinition of the units in which x is measured. 
14  The  likelihood  that  an  intermediate value  is  desired depends  upon  the  magnitudes  in- 
volved.  For example,  if x were large, so that the range between x and x  +  io  were relatively 
small  -  that  is,  if the  choice  of patent-antitrust doctrine had only a modest impact upon the 
aggregate expected reward -  it seems most likely that the optimal scheme would be one of the 
two  extreme regimes presented.  Cf. infra pp.  I837-38  (discussing Turner's position); infra note 
8i  (showing  that  interaction  between  patent  life  and  patent-antitrust  doctrine  is  minimal  if 
patent-antitrust doctrine has little impact on total reward). 
15 To  the  extent  that  antitrust enforcement is largely determined by actions of government 
prosecutors rather than  in  suits  by  private  parties,  prosecutors' actions  would  presumably be 
viewed  similarly to those of the courts. 
16 This view  may not be especially powerful, because Congress' inaction might be explained 
for other reasons.  Among  these other possible explanations  are that courts have  usually  been 
right, that Congress considers the effect of antitrust law on patent policy insignificant, that the 
patent life has been changed previously, and that Congress has made other changes in the patent 
statute and has actively  considered various modifications in light of decisions in this area, see, 
e.g.,  Stedman,  Patents  and Antitrust -  The Impact of Varying Legal Doctrines,  I973  UTAH  L. 
REV.  588,  6I4  n.6i. 
17  The  patent  life  is  not  the  only  feature  of  patents  and  patentability  established  by  the 
patent statute; it is selected for illustrative purposes because it is the most obvious and straight- 
forward aspect of the patent grant to use as a device for calibrating the magnitude of the typical 
reward.  A related policy instrument that has been studied far less is the breadth of the coverage 
of the patent laws.  See Nordhaus,  The Optimum Life of a Patent: Reply,  62  AM. ECON.  REV. 
428,  429-30  (I972). I820  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
very plausible,18 it is instructive to accept this view of the courts' role 
for a moment to see what conclusions it suggests. 
Suppose,  for example,  that the courts were to determine that the 
appropriate reward is x  +  5.  The resulting patent-antitrust doctrine 
would  thus  be  a  compromise between  regimes  i  and  2;  neither the 
patentee  nor the  government would  always  be the victor.  But  how 
should a court decide any particular case?  As is often true in the law, 
the  decision  in  one  case  will  depend  upon  the  decisions  in  related 
cases.  Yet in this context, the interdependence is extreme: in general, 
it is wholly  indeterminate how any individual case or, similarly, any 
single  component of patent-antitrust doctrine should be decided,  be- 
cause the question is whether the totality of the courts' patent-antitrust 
decisions leads  to  the  appropriate reward of x  +  5.  A  court could 
just  as easily permit a prohibited restriction, as long as it prohibited 
some  other previously  permitted restriction (or group of restrictions) 
yielding the same aggregate reward.  Any pattern of doctrine yielding 
a total reward of x +  5 would be acceptable.  For example, reversing 
all the rules of a given pattern that yields x +  5 -  that is, permitting 
what was  previously prohibited and prohibiting what was previously 
permitted  -  might  also  yield  the  same  total.19  Thus,  a  focus  on 
aggregate reward produces the  conclusion that  patent-antitrust doc- 
trine is indeterminate both in the context of individual cases and when 
one considers the area as a whole. 
Given  the startling implications of this indeterminacy, one might 
wonder  why  courts  and  commentators  have  not  expressed  greater 
concern in  resolving  patent-antitrust cases.  This  problem has never 
fully emerged because neither courts nor commentators have explicitly 
considered the consequences of tacitly relying on aggregate reward as 
a  criterion for decision.  Legal materials on  this  subject reveal that 
efforts have been directed only toward deciding each case on its own 
facts,  in  a  manner that  bears no  resemblance to  a  policy  approach 
focused on aggregate reward in the manner just described.  Once one 
recognizes and understands this indeterminacy problem, however, one 
must undertake a deeper critique of legal discourse in this area and 
its relation to the questions and policies at stake. 
18  Some  possible  reasons for skepticism  are the  incredible complexity of this  area,  which 
leads one to expect delegation to  a regulatory agency; the inefficiency of relying on the courts 
for fine-tuning  because  of  the  substantial  and otherwise unnecessary litigation that  would  be 
required; the lack of  attention Congress has given the issue in passing antitrust laws; and the 
limited bounds of the  apparatus and the difficulty of adjusting it.  See  also infra Section II.C 
(discussing interdependence of Congress and the courts). 
19  It would not necessarily yield the same total,  because the reward induced by a particular 
restriction in  general will  be  affected  by  which  other restrictions are permitted.  For  a  more 
general discussion of this issue,  see infra Section II.C. I 984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I82I 
II.  A FRAMEWORK FOR APPROACHING 
THE  PATENT-ANTITRUST  CONFLICT 
This Part offers partial relief from Part I's discouraging conclusion 
that  patent-antitrust  doctrine,  although  it  addresses  important  con- 
cerns  in  the  aggregate,  has  a  largely  indeterminate  content  in  the 
context of individual  cases.  This  relief derives in part from relaxing 
certain simplifying  assumptions implicit in  the preceding analysis- 
assumptions that have not been expressly articulated in prior attempts 
to address this issue.  An analysis that moves beyond such simplifying 
assumptions yields a far more complicated perspective on the patent- 
antitrust  conflict,  but  one  that  is  unavoidable  if  there is  to  be  any 
hope of clarifying the formidable problems that the conflict raises. 
The  indeterminacy  problem  described  in  Part  I  rests  upon  the 
unstated  assumption  that  the  various  patentee  practices  that  clash 
with  the  antitrust  laws  are fungible.  Part I  assumed  that  the  only 
factor relevant in assessing various practices is the amount of reward 
to the patentee that results from permitting the practice -  two prac- 
tices providing the same reward were considered equivalent and thus 
interchangeable.  But  equal  reward is  not  a  sufficient condition  for 
fungibility; for two practices to be equivalent,  it is also necessary that 
they  cause  equal  detriment.  In  other  words,  the  result  of  Part  I 
depended on the assumption that restrictive practices that are equally 
good as rewards to the patentee are also equally bad in terms of the 
monopolistic  harms  they  cause.  More  precisely,  as  will  be  demon- 
strated implicitly  in  the  derivation  of  the  ratio test  in  Section  B,  it 
was  assumed  that  the  ratio of  good  to  bad  was  the  same  for  each 
practice. 
On its face,  this assumption may seem reasonable.  The patentee's 
reward  is  made  possible  through  monopolistic  restrictions,  and  one 
might  expect  that  the  reward and the  monopoly loss  would  each  be 
roughly proportional to the extent of the restrictions and thus roughly 
proportional to  each  other.  Although  such a tendency will  often  be 
observed,  it does not  hold as a general proposition.  It is simply not 
true that all activities  generating equal profits impose equal damages 
upon society. 
Although  much  of  antitrust commentary (outside the patent-anti- 
trust context) has consisted of debate over which practices should be 
prohibited by the antitrust laws and which should not, little attention 
has  been  given  to  the  question  of how  much profit the  antitrust de- 
fendant  derives  from  a  given  practice  in  proportion  to  the  harm 
caused.  It is not surprising that this issue has been neglected, because 
antitrust intervention  is  predicated upon the the mere existence of  a 
net harm to society.  The magnitude of the harm is irrelevant, except 
perhaps  in  determining  enforcement  priorities.  The  amount  of  the 
defendant's profit is likewise of no special concern, except to the extent I822  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
its profit is deemed to be a component in determining the total social 
cost of a practice.20  But when patent policy is also implicated, profit 
plays a central role, because it serves as a reward -  and, in turn, an 
incentive  -  for the  inventive  activity  that  produces the  benefits of 
the patent system. 
When monopoly loss is viewed as part of the price society pays to 
stimulate  inventive  activity,  the  natural  economic  question  is  how 
society  can  purchase a  given  level  of  inventive  output -  which  re- 
quires a given level of incentive -  for the least cost, or, equivalently, 
how much inventive output society can purchase per unit of monopoly 
loss that it must bear.  This question is intimately related to two policy 
decisions: first,  how  society  should determine which  antitrust prohi- 
bitions to apply to patentees, and second, how society should determine 
the time period over which patentees may exploit their patents.  These 
two decisions -  articulating patent-antitrust doctrine and setting the 
patent  life  -  are  interrelated.  Part  I  has  already  suggested  that 
patent-antitrust doctrine is dependent on the length of the patent life. 
The opposite connection exists as well: the amount of reward provided 
and  the  monopoly  loss  arising in  each  additional year in  which  ex- 
ploitation is permitted (and thus the appropriate length of the patent 
life) depend  upon  what  practices patentees may  employ during that 
time period. 
To untangle this interrelationship and thus clarify the factors rel- 
evant to resolving the patent-antitrust conflict, it is necessary to return 
to first principles.  Section A begins this process by analyzing how the 
optimal patent life should be determined, taking as given the existence 
of a set of rules defining the permissible means of exploiting the patent 
during  that  time  period.2'  Section  B  examines  how  a  given  set  of 
rules governing exploitation should be adjusted -  that is, how patent- 
antitrust doctrine should be articulated  -  taking as given the optimal 
20  For  discussion  of  profit as  a  component  of  social  cost,  see  Kaplow,  The Accuracy  of 
Traditional Market Power  Analysis  and  a  Direct  Adjustment Alternative,  95  HARV.  L.  REV. 
I8I7,  I822-23  (I982);  Posner, The Social  Costs of Monopoly and Regulation,  83 J.  POL. ECON. 
807  (I975); Scherer, The Posnerian  Harvest: Separating Wheat from  Chaff (Book Review),  86 
YALE  L.J.  974,  978-79  (I977).  Profit is  also  a  component of  standard damage  measures in 
private treble damage actions. 
21 The derivation of the optimal patent life is familiar to economists.  See generally SENATE 
SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,  AND COPYRIGHTS,  SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 
85TH  CONG.,  2D SESS.,  AN  ECONOMIC  REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 66-73  (Study  No.  I5, 
Comm.  Print  I958)  (prepared by  F.  Machlup)  (discussing derivation  of  optimal  patent  life) 
[hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC REVIEW]; W. NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH AND WELFARE 
70-90  (i969)  (same); Scherer,  Nordhaus' Theory of Optimal Patent Life: A Geometrical Reinter- 
pretation,  62  AM.  ECON. REv.  422  (I972)  (same).  Often,  however,  the  dependence  of  this 
derivation upon restrictive practices permitted to patentees is not made explicit.  Scherer's  treatise 
seems  to  be  an  exception.  See  F.  SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE  AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE  442 (2d ed.  I980) ("[O]n a more sophisticated plane, the problem is to design a 
system  -  e.g.,  by  adjusting  the  length  or strength  of  patent  grants -  that  will  yield  the 
maximum surplus of benefits over costs." (emphasis added)). i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I823 
patent life derived in Section A.  But as previously suggested, adjust- 
ments to the patent-antitrust rules generally make it necessary to revise 
the length  of the patent life.  Section C explores this feedback effect 
and demonstrates the need in theory to solve simultaneously the prob- 
lems  of  articulating patent-antitrust doctrine and of  determining the 
optimal patent life.  The analysis presents a number of considerations, 
including the derivation of the ratio test,  that are directly relevant to 
the debate over the patent-antitrust conflict.  These considerations are 
summarized briefly in  Section D.  Section E then sketches some dif- 
ficulties in applying this analysis through judicial decisions. 
A. Deriving  the Optimal Patent Life 
i.  The Costs and  Benefits  of  Varying the Patent  Life.  -  Deter- 
mining the optimal patent life22 from an economic point of view23 is 
straightforward once  one has defined the functional relationships be- 
tween the patent life and the costs and benefits of the patent system. 
To perform this task,  however,  one must know  the range of permis- 
sible  means  of  patent  exploitation,  including  the  content  of  patent- 
antitrust doctrine.  Therefore, for the remainder of this Section, I shall 
assume that some such legal regime is in place. 
(a) Benefits  of the Patent  System.  -  There are three links in the 
logical chain connecting the patent life and the benefits of the patent 
system.  A longer patent life increases reward to the patentee,  which 
in  turn encourages  inventive  activity,  which  in  turn produces social 
benefits.  Consider  these  links  in  sequence.  First,  lengthening  the 
patent  life  presumably  increases  the  reward to  the  patentee  by  en- 
hancing  the  opportunity  for monopolistic  exploitation.  The  amount 
that  the  reward  will  increase  depends  upon  a  number  of  factors, 
including  the  market  value  of  the  invention,  the  structure  of  the 
market involving  the patented process or product, and the attributes 
of  the  patentee  (such  as  marketing  and  production  capacities)  that 
determine  its  range  of  options  within  that  market.  24  Second,  the 
22  This  discussion,  like  most of  the  analysis in  this Part, assumes that  a single  patent life 
will  be set for all patents.  Thus,  the relationships to be described refer to the aggregate of all 
inventive  activity  subject  to  the  patent  laws  rather than  to  individual  inventions,  types  of 
inventors,  or particular industries.  See  generally infra subsection II.E.2  (discussing possibility 
of varying rules case by case). 
23  This  Article explicitly  confines its analysis to one based on an economic perspective; the 
economic point of view  represented here is itself a narrow version.  The  reader should keep in 
mind the standard reservations concerning the use of cost-benefit analysis,  including the failure 
to account for distributional effects,  see,  e.g.,  W. NORDHAUS, supra note 2i,  at 76 n.g.  More- 
over, this Article does not address the effects of inventive  activity on the quality of life, whether 
through the speed of technological change, effects on preferences, externalities (such as pollution), 
or increased societal emphasis placed on military activities. 
24  For example, the productive capacity of a patentee might determine whether it can produce 
all of the patented product itself or instead must license the patent in order to supply the entire 
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increase in reward is designed to stimulate inventive  activity.  Deter- 
mining the extent and types of increased activity is a complex process 
whose  outcome  will  vary  substantially from case  to  case.  Relevant 
factors include the potential return from further research and devel- 
opment,  the  risk involved  in  the  undertaking, the  nature of  rivalry 
among firms,  and  the  degree to which  the enhanced reward to suc- 
cessful  patentees  is  anticipated by inventors.  Third,  the increase in 
inventive activity may contribute to social welfare.  To the extent that 
valuable  new  inventions  are discovered  that  otherwise  would  have 
been  developed  more  slowly  or  not  at  all,  social  welfare  might  be 
increased.  25 
Although each of these three connections has received substantial 
attention  in  the  past,  our knowledge  of  the  functional relationships 
between the separate links in the chain connecting patent life to social 
benefits remains quite limited.26  I make no systematic attempt here 
to remedy that deficiency in understanding, although much of the rest 
of  the  Article  does  offer  insights  into  the  first  connection  -  that 
between  patent  life  and  reward.  Rather, I  assume for the  moment 
that  we  have  already  made  our  best  attempt,  in  light  of  existing 
information,  to define the functional relationship between patent life 
and the social benefits generated by the patent system. 
(b) Costs of the Patent  System.  -  The costs of the patent system 
go beyond the direct costs of research and development,  because the 
patentee's reward for inventing the patented item arises from allowing 
monopoly.  Like the magnitude of the reward, the magnitude of the 
loss  arising from the  legally  authorized monopoly depends upon the 
particular invention,  market structure, and attributes of the patentee, 
as well  as the legal  rules regulating patent exploitation.  The  longer 
the  patent  life,  the  greater these  costs.  Moreover,  lengthening  the 
25 Of course,  any benefits of inventive  activity must be evaluated net of their direct costs. 
In addition,  some induced inventive  activity might be duplicative; the net gain in welfare from 
the invention  might thus be less than it otherwise would have been, and the net gain for some 
inventions might even be negative.  See,  e.g.,  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  supra note 2I,  at 5i;  Loury, 
Market  Structure  and  Innovation,  93  Q.J.  ECON.  395,  406-07  (I979);  Usher,  The  Welfare 
Economics  of Invention,  3I  ECONOMICA  279,  286  (I964);  Wright, The Economics  of Invention 
Incentives:  Patents,  Prizes,  and  Research  Contracts,  73  AM.  ECON.  REV.  69I,  69I  (1983). 
Numerous other factors also affect the relationship between inventive activity and social welfare, 
such  as  whether  inventions  are  developed  too  quickly  and  thus  at  greater cost,  see  Barzel, 
Optimal Timing of Innovations,  50  REV.  ECON.  & STATISTICS  348  (I968),  or whether private 
actors are more or less prone to taking risks than seems socially optimal, see Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and  the  Allocation  of  Resources for  Invention,  in  THE  RATE  AND  DIRECTION  OF 
INVENTIVE  ACTIVITY  609,  6II-14  (National Bureau of Economic Research Report I962). 
26  See,  e.g.,  W.  NORDHAUS,  supra note  2I,  at  81-82  (discussing the sensitivity of optimal 
patent life to changes in parameters of the system, which implies that uncertainty over parameter 
estimates results in uncertainty about the optimal patent life); see also sources quoted infra note 
52  (indicating limits in present knowledge of costs and benefits of the patent system).  But  see 
W.  NORDHAUS,  supra note  2I,  at 83-86  (arguing that, although determination of optimal life is 
extremely difficult, welfare effects of departing from the optimal life might be insignificant). I 984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I825 
patent life  in order to induce further inventive  activity  increases the 
period  of  monopolistic  exploitation  for  those  inventions  that  would 
have been created even without lengthening the patent life.  In regard 
to these inventions,  prolonging the patent life results in a social cost 
not offset by any social benefit.27  For present purposes it is assumed 
that the functional relationship between patent life and the social costs 
generated by the patent system is known.  Later analysis will address 
in greater detail how monopoly cost varies in different circumstances. 
Finally,  in defining social costs and benefits, this Article does not 
address the merits of transferring wealth from consumers to producers 
in  general,28 or to  patentees  in  particular.  These  distributional con- 
siderations  bear  directly  on  the  construction  of  the  social  cost  and 
benefit functions,  and  would  be  taken  into  account  in  that  process. 
Only after considering all such factors and deciding that some patentee 
reward is socially  desirable does one undertake further analysis such 
as that offered in this Article. 
2.  Determining  the  Optimum. -  The  optimal  patent life  is  that 
length  of  time  at  which  the  marginal  social  cost  of  lengthening  or 
shortening the patent life equals the marginal social benefit.29 If the 
27  See,  e.g.,  F.  SCHERER, supra note  2I,  at 443-44.  It should be noted, however,  that one 
possible source of social benefit might be greater incentives to invest in the development process. 
See  infra p.  1839  & note  71. 
28  See generally Lande,  Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: 
The Efficiency  Interpretation  Challenged,  34  HASTINGS  L.J.  65  (I982)  (noting importance  of 
distributional effects). 
29  See  W.  NORDHAUS, supra note  2I,  at  76-86;  Markham, Inventive  Activity:  Government 
Controls and the Legal Environment,  in  THE  RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY, 
supra note  25,  at  587,  597. 
Whether such  an  interior solution  exists  depends  upon  the  relative slopes  of  the  marginal 
cost and marginal benefit functions.  It seems plausible, although by no means certain, that the 
marginal cost  function  will  rise and  the  marginal  benefit function  will  fall  as  the  patent  life 
increases.  The  marginal  benefit function  can  be  expected  to  fall,  because one  can  anticipate 
diminishing returns to society as increases in the patent life cause further resources to be devoted 
to  inventive  activity.  For  example,  enhanced  rivalry leading  to  duplicative  investment,  see 
sources cited supra note  25,  might contribute to diminishing returns.  In addition,  risk effects 
relating to inventors' incentives might produce the same result.  Inventive  activity is risky, and 
private entities generally exhibit at least some risk aversion.  Because the risk-deterrence effect 
increases as a function of the scope of the project, larger scale inventions -  those that are more 
costly  but  have  a  prospect  of  greater  returns -  will  require  relatively  more  inducement. 
Inventive  activity  is  a  function  of  rewards,  and,  in  the  case  of  more costly  projects,  higher 
levels  of reward will  on average tend to be decisive  -  that is, higher levels of reward will  be 
necessary to change  a decision  against the project to a decision in its favor.  Combining these 
last  two  points  yields  the  conclusion  that  as  rewards rise,  the  marginal increase in  incentive 
associated  with  a  given  increase in rewards will  decline.  This  is the  relationship that defines 
diminishing  returns in  the  incentive  function.  Because  benefits are a  function  of  incentives, 
total benefits as a function of rewards will have a tendency to exhibit diminishing returns. 
The  basic  reason one  might expect  the marginal cost of increasing the patent life  to be an 
increasing  function  is  that  the  greater the  patent  life,  the  greater is  the  number  of  patents 
already in existence  at  a given  time.  Thus,  the greater the existing patent life,  the  greater is 
the social cost of any further increase in the patent life,  because an ever-increasing number of i826  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
patent life were shorter than the optimum indicated by this rule, the 
marginal benefit of lengthening the patent life would presumably ex- 
ceed  the  marginal  cost;  increasing such  a  patent  life  would  induce 
further inventive  activity that would produce benefits in excess of the 
accompanying social costs.  Similarly, for patent lives longer than the 
optimum,  the  marginal cost presumably would  exceed the  marginal 
benefit; decreasing such a patent life would then reduce costs by more 
than the reduction in benefits. 
Notice  that  equating  costs  and  benefits at  the  margin does  not 
result in equating total costs and benefits.  In fact, equating total costs 
and benefits would be irrational because the result would be a patent 
preexisting patents can be further exploited.  This result, however, does not necessarily follow, 
because it depends upon the curvature of the relationship between the patent life and the level 
of inventive  activity.  Ignoring the effect on the cost function of inventive activity's responsive- 
ness to patent life is equivalent  to assuming,  as a first approximation, that the cost function is 
linear.  Finally,  it  should  be  noted  that,  because  a  number of  inventions  would  still  occur 
without the patent system, even the first year of permitted patent life imposes substantial costs; 
it is therefore possible that the optimal patent life would be zero.  See  F.  SCHERER, supra note 
2 I,  at 443-44. 
A number of qualifications are in order.  First, because costs must be discounted to present 
value,  future costs  are less  detrimental than current ones of the same nominal amount.  This 
fact,  however,  will  not  affect  the  analysis  that  compares the  marginal costs  and  benefits of 
changing the patent life,  because the reward, which feeds into the benefit function, is similarly 
discounted by the  patentee.  See  Nordhaus,  supra note  I7,  at 429.  If the discount rates used 
were  not equal,  however,  there could  be some effect in a direction that depends upon which 
discount rate was  larger.  In  addition,  the fact that the pattern of costs and benefits may not 
match from one year to the next has no direct impact on determining the optimal patent life, 
because  the  patent  policy  decision  involves  extending  the  patent  life  at  the  margin,  which 
compares  costs  and  benefits  in  the  same  year.  Yet  the  marginal extension  may  change  the 
patentee's exploitation  decisions  in  earlier years; thus,  the  assumption that  considerations of 
discounting will not affect the analysis is not completely accurate, although it seems reasonable 
as a first approximation. 
Second,  adding an additional year to the patent life does not simply replicate the previous 
year's experience.  For example,  the  market structure after expiration of the  patent might be 
affected  by the  patent's duration,  especially if there are learning-curve effects over the life of 
the  patent.  Although  such  effects  do  vary  with  the  life  of  the  patent,  there is  no  reason to 
believe  that  the  relationship is  strictly linear.  Third,  other inventive  activity  relevant to  the 
initial patent might occur over the life of the patent and thus change the environment and affect 
both  the  cost  and  benefit functions.  See,  e.g.,  infra Part V.  Finally,  market structure might 
change over time for any number of other reasons. 
It is instructive to compare the assumption that the cost function is roughly linear as a first 
approximation -  ignoring that more patents exist when the patent life is longer -  to the benefit 
function that was  hypothesized to exhibit diminishing returns.  In general, cost and reward (in 
contrast to benefit) to any individual patentee increase in approximately the same proportion as 
the patent life is increased.  This view is consistent with the qualifications concerning the linearity 
of the  cost function  because those same qualifications will  have  roughly similar impacts upon 
profits (rewards).  The  relationship between reward and benefit -  which operates through the 
connections between reward and inventive  activity,  and between inventive activity and benefit 
-  presumably  exhibits  diminishing  returns.  Thus,  it  is  reasonable to  expect  that  equating 
marginal costs  and  benefits would  yield  a unique solution that would  be a maximum,  unless 
marginal  costs  exceed  marginal  benefits  when  patent  life  is  zero,  in  which  case  the  global 
optimum would be a patent life of zero. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I827 
system  that yielded  zero net gain in social welfare.  The  optimum  is 
attained when  the total social benefits exceed the total social costs by 
the greatest possible amount.  Thus,  all that can be known about the 
relationship between total benefits and costs at the optimal patent life 
is that total benefits exceed total costs; if this this were not true, the 
optimization  process  would  have  indicated  that  there should  be  no 
patent system at all. 
3.  Limitations  of the Proportionality Test. -  A careful analysis of 
the  steps  for  determining  the  optimal  patent  life  reveals  the  fallacy 
underlying  the  common  view  that  patent  restrictions should  reward 
the patentee in proportion to the value of its patent.30  This view  has 
superficial appeal  in  two  respects.  First,  as  between  two  patentees, 
the  one  with  the  more valuable  patent  generally should  receive  the 
greater reward,  because  the  more valuable  invention  should  be  en- 
couraged even  if it entails  greater cost.  But  this unrefined notion of 
proportionality provides  no information about what  the specific pro- 
portion between reward and value should be; rather, it merely suggests 
that this proportion should be roughly similar for all patents.3'  More- 
over, even given a particular proportion, this notion of proportionality 
does not help us to decide which  restrictive practices to authorize or 
to prohibit.32  In  some  circumstances,  one patentee might be unable 
to exploit its patent in the manner that others employ without resorting 
to a prohibited practice; permitting the practice would  then promote 
this sort of proportionality.33 In other instances, only some patentees 
would  be  able  to  obtain  most  of  the  rewards  made  possible  by  a 
particular restrictive practice; prohibiting the practice would then en- 
hance this type of proportionality. 
A  more important reason one  might  favor  linking  the  patentee's 
reward to  the  patent's  social  value  is  that  such  a  link  corrects the 
30 This view  is discussed below in Sections III.C  and  III.D. 
31  Even  this  limited  claim  is  subject  to  numerous  qualifications  if  factors  distinguishing 
among  various  patents  and patentees can be used to develop  a more case-specific policy  or if 
variations  in  any  of  the  relevant  factors,  such  as  risk aversion,  are systematically  correlated 
with the value  or cost of inventions.  See  infra subsection II.E.2. 
32 This  fact assists  Bowman  in regarding most restrictive practices to be indistinguishable. 
Thus,  he has no difficulty moving from the generally accepted view that some patent exploitation 
should be permitted to the conclusion that virtually unlimited exploitation should be permitted. 
This  analysis  suggests  that  patent  life  should  also  be  unlimited.  Yet  the  inability  to  make 
distinctions  on  this  ground leads to such  conclusions  only  if  no other distinctions  are deemed 
relevant.  The  analysis  in  Section  B  shows  that  this  is  not  the  case.  Bowman's  views  are 
discussed more completely in Section III.C. 
33 For example,  a small patentee might need various restrictions to accomplish what a large 
or dominant entity  could achieve  through unilateral exploitation.  See  F.  SCHERER, supra note 
2I,  at 449.  Of course,  if restrictions were thought to be undesirable, a  preferable response to 
this situation would  be to limit the scope of permissible exploitation by a single firm.  Although 
it might not always be possible to achieve equality through such an approach, it does not follow 
that  equality  achieved  through  permitting  restrictive  practices  is  preferable.  Two  wrongs, 
although perhaps more equitable,  might not be more desirable. i828  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
market in a manner that induces private actors to develop the appro- 
priate inventions.  Absent patent protection, an inventor might cap- 
ture only a small portion of the value of its inventive  activity.  As a 
result, the inventor in many cases could not expect to receive rewards 
sufficient  to  cover  its  costs,  even  if  those  costs  did  not  exceed  the 
social value  of the invention.  The  appropriate policy would thus be 
to permit the patentee to receive reward equal to the full value of its 
patent.  All reward up to that point induces inventive activity only as 
long  as  the  inventor's  expected  reward,  which  equals  the  expected 
value  of  the  invention,  exceeds  (or  at  least  equals)  the  inventor's 
expected cost in developing the patented item.34 
This  proportionality argument,  however,  has  a  simple  but  fatal 
flaw: it  overlooks the  costs of providing the reward.  The  argument 
suggests, for example, that the optimal policy is to permit an unlimited 
patent life with  no restrictions upon practices of exploitation, as long 
as such practices do not result in reward that exceeds the total value 
of the patent.35  Such a view  incorrectly focuses on total social ben- 
efits,  rather than net social benefits (the excess of total benefits over 
total costs).  Taking into account the costs of the patent system leads 
to the more accurate intuitive view  that the optimal patent life com- 
bined with the optimal set of antitrust restrictions would provide less 
reward than  indicated  by  the  full  value  of  the  patent.36  Thus,  the 
rule that the reward must not exceed the value of the patent is only 
a  necessary  condition  for  the  desirability of  a  restricitive  patentee 
practice.37  It  is  not  a  sufficient condition  not  only  for the  reasons 
suggested  in  Section  B,  but  also  because the  reward would  still  be 
excessive if it were not as much less than the full value of the patent 
as the optimization process suggests it should be.38 
34 Any inventive  activities induced by rewards beyond that point would be those for which 
the expected cost exceeded expected value.  If inventors are risk averse,  however,  it might be 
necessary to offer an expected reward greater than the value of the patent. 
35 This statement is not fully accurate.  For example, rivalry that led to duplicative research 
activity  might justify  reducing the  reward.  Moreover, private benefits might generally exceed 
social benefits even  without  patent protection.  See  Hirschleifer, The Private and Social  Value 
of Information and  the Reward  to  Inventive  Activity,  6i  AM. ECON.  REV.  56I  (I97i).  The 
possibility of adverse effects from long-run changes in market structure occurring over the patent 
life adds another element to aggregate social cost and reinforces this conclusion about the relation 
of private to social benefits.  One offsetting factor is that if spillovers from the patentee's research 
are not included in measuring the value of the patent, there would be a tendency for the reward 
based  on  this  measure of  value  to  be  insufficient.  This  issue is  relevant to  determining the 
appropriate breadth of the  patent grant.  None  of these qualifications affects the argument in 
text,  which  establishes that even  further reductions in reward from the level  suggested by the 
preceding factors will always be appropriate.  Of course, it is possible that after taking all these 
effects into account,  the patent system would be found unnecessary. 
36  See,  e.g.,  ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  supra note  2I,  at  39,  62-66;  W.  NORDHAUS,  supra note 
2 I,  at 88-89;  F.  SCHERER,  supra note  2 I,  at  442. 
37  A qualification would be necessary if spillovers from the inventive process were substantial 
enough to overwhelm all the contrary effects discussed supra note 35. 
38  Optimization through equating marginal cost and benefit will yield some average propor- i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I829 
Once  one  realizes  that  the  proper level  of  reward is  determined 
not  by  simple  deduction  premised  on  the  value  of  the  patent,  but 
implicitly from a process that seeks to maximize net social benefits, it 
becomes obvious that the legal system must regulate not only the total 
reward a patentee receives,  but also the means by which that total is 
realized.  This  observation is generalized in Section B. 
B.  Patent-Antitrust Doctrine  and the Ratio  Test 
i.  Derivation  and Interpretation of the Ratio  Test. -  In deriving 
the  optimal  patent  life,  Section  A  took  as  given  the  existence  of  a 
patent-antitrust doctrine39 indicating the  scope of  permissible patent 
exploitation.  This  Section  considers  how  to  optimize  that  doctrinal 
configuration, taking as given the patent life derived in Section A.40 
(a) Deriving  the Ratio  Test. -  One can assess the desirability of 
permitting a currently forbidden practice41 by comparing the costs it 
imposes  upon  society  with  the  costs  of  adjusting  the  patent  life  to 
achieve  an  equivalent  reward.  The  method  proceeds in  two  steps. 
First,  one  determines whether  permitting the  practice would  impose 
more  cost  per  unit  of  incremental  reward  than  would  result  from 
lengthening  the  patent  life  to  provide  the  same  reward.  If  so,  the 
practice  should  remain  prohibited  because  it  would  be  costlier  to 
provide additional reward by permitting the practice than by length- 
tion  between  reward  to  the  patentee  and  value  of  the  patent.  But  that  relationship,  which 
refers to  average rather than  marginal conditions,  is  an  informational by-product of  the  opti- 
mization  process that  has  no direct relevance in determining the appropriateness of particular 
restrictive  practices.  The  proportionality approach implicitly  begins  by  picking  a  proportion 
between reward and value and then uses the proportion as a decision rule.  This process is both 
conceptually  backwards  and  -  because  the  proportion is  typically  assumed  to  equal  one 
wrong in its outcome. 
Moreover, using a proportion of less than one is of little help.  Such an approach offers no 
answer  to  the  conceptual  question  of  how  such  a  proportion should  be  chosen.  See  infra p. 
I892  (indicating  how  far  removed  such  a  proportion is  from  the  targets of  the  optimization 
process).  In addition,  the proportionality test is easy to apply only when the proportion equals 
one.  The proportionality test is typically used by arguing that a licensee's or buyer's willingness 
to deal with the patentee implies that the reward is less than the value of the patent.  See,  e.g., 
infra subsection III. C. i.  Such an observation demonstrates only that the proportion is less than 
one; it  offers no basis  for the  inference that  the proportion is less  than some number smaller 
than one.  The  latter inference requires far more detailed information concerning not only the 
rewards,  but also the value  of  the patent.  The  value  of the patent could prove most difficult 
to determine.  The problems posed by the lack of information are briefly discussed in subsection 
IL E.  i. 
39  There are other doctrines, such as rules governing patent misuse and aspects of contract 
law,  that regulate patent exploitation.  Although  they are taken as given  in a  literal sense for 
the purposes of this Article,  the analysis here is fully applicable to those issues as well. 
40  This  view  of  the  problem corresponds to  the  situation  facing  the courts: although  they 
have jurisdiction to articulate patent-antitrust doctrine, they must accept the patent life set by 
Congress.  This  view  would,  of  course,  no  longer apply  if  the  patent  life  were  not  taken  as 
given.  For a full analysis of these points,  see Section II.C. 
41  The  analysis  for assessing  the  desirability of  retaining a  currently permitted practice is 
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ening  the  patent  life,  and  if  one  began  with  a  patent life  that  was 
determined to  be  optimal,  lengthening the patent life is itself neces- 
sarily undesirable. 
For  example,  suppose  that  the optimal  patent life  has  been cal- 
culated  to  be  seventeen  years.  Next,  suppose  that  the  patent  life 
would  have  to  be  lengthened  to  eighteen years in  order to  produce 
the same additional reward that the practice in question can offer for 
the  given  seventeen-year  patent  life.42  If  permitting  the  practice 
would  entail  more  loss  than  would  lengthening  the  patent  life  to 
eighteen years, the practice should not be permitted -  permitting the 
practice would  be costlier than extending the patent life to eighteen 
years, and the conclusion that a seventeen-year patent life was optimal 
implies that extending the patent life to eighteen years is itself unde- 
sirable. 
If  the  practice  in  question  would  produce the  same  incremental 
reward as  would  extending  the  patent life  one year, but at  a lower 
cost,  one  proceeds to  step two.  A  second step is necessary because 
extending the  patent  life  was  itself found  to be undesirable.  In  the 
second  step,  one  must  determine  whether  permitting  the  practice 
would impose less cost per unit of incremental reward than would be 
saved by shortening the patent life to diminish the total reward by an 
offsetting amount.  If so,  the practice should be permitted because it 
is  a  less  costly  way  of  providing  reward than  was  adding the  final 
increment in the patent life.43  There is, however, a qualification: the 
42  The  implicit assumption in this analysis, and much to follow,  is that reward is fungible. 
See infra subsection II.B.2(c).  In other words, patentees do not care how they get their profits, 
but simply how  much profit they receive.  Divergences from this assumption are considered in 
subsection II.B.2(c)  (ex ante versus ex post perspective, for example) and in Section IV.A (non- 
profit-maximizing behavior). 
43  The practice might not impose less cost per unit, in which case it would remain unclassified 
after both  steps  of  the  test.  In  this  case  no  firm conclusion is  possible without  the  analysis 
developed in Section II.C. 
This complication is related to the need to make an adjustment in the patent life for practices 
that  satisfy  the  second  step  of  the  test.  Both  concerns arise because  -  although  marginal 
benefits and marginal costs are precisely equal at the optimum -  a one-year change in the life 
of the patent is not a diminutive change, just as an all-or-nothing decision to permit a practice 
previously prohibited is not a diminutive  change.  If one could make infinitesimal increases in 
reward -  for example,  by  allowing  restrictive practices for only  part of the  patent life -  it 
would  be  possible to  edge  slowly  toward the  exact optimum.  Because  all-or-nothing changes 
are not this precise, however,  full adoption of a practice may in the end result in overshooting 
the optimum and thus may leave society worse off than it was previously.  (A technical derivation 
of this  analysis is offered in the Appendix on pp.  I89I-92.)  Thus,  it may be that permitting 
the previously forbidden practice would  be more desirable than extending the patent life by a 
full  year,  but  still  not  low  enough  in  cost  to  warrant implementation.  Any  increase in  the 
amount of the reward reduces the marginal benefit of further increases, because of the dimin- 
ishing returns assumption.  See  supra note  29.  Hence an infinitesimal increase in reward from 
using a particular practice might be desirable (because the change has a favorable proportion 
of  cost  to  benefit),  whereas  full  adoption  of  the  practice,  which  might  be  the  only  practical 
alternative to prohibition, need not be desirable.  Because benefits do not increase proportionally 
with  costs,  the proportion of cost to benefit may no longer be favorable. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I83I 
conclusion that the practice should be permitted rests on the assump- 
tion that the patent life will be correspondingly reduced.  This reduc- 
tion  is  necessary if  we  are to  maintain the  total reward at the  level 
implicit in the original optimal patent life.  It should be noted,  how- 
ever, that this result runs counter to a basic assumption of this Section: 
that the patent life was  to be taken as given.  Thus,  the implications 
of this  qualification require a separate and thorough examination 
an examination provided in Section C. 
The  preceding analysis  can  be cast in terms of a ratio test,  with 
the ratio defined as: 
Patentee Reward 
Monopoly Loss 
In  this  ratio,  "patentee reward" and  "monopoly loss" refer, respec- 
tively,  to the incremental reward and loss resulting from the practice 
in question.  In  general,  the higher the ratio,  the more desirable the 
practice.  In  addition,  the  ratio  test  may  be  used  to  determine  the 
desirability not only of restrictive practices, which  are the subject of 
patent-antitrust doctrine,  but also of changes in the patent life itself. 
Every patent life implies a specific ratio.  The ratio implicit in a given 
patent  life  simply  refers to  the ratio of incremental reward to incre- 
mental loss that results from a marginal adjustment in the patent life. 
The  components  of  the  ratio  test  should  be  contrasted with  the 
central factors used in Section A.  The  ratio here compares marginal 
patentee reward to marginal cost (marginal monopoly loss) rather than 
marginal  social  benefit to  marginal  cost.  The  latter pair  of  factors 
was  used  in  Section  A  to  determine the  optimal  patent  life.44  The 
focus in this  Section is on patentee reward rather than social benefit 
primarily because  the  analysis  here takes  the  optimal  patent  life  as 
given  and  asks  whether  the  total  reward to the  patentee  implicit  in 
the optimal patent life can be achieved at a lower cost.45 
(b) Applying the  Ratio  Test.  -  The  technique  for  assessing  the 
desirability of restrictive practices can be recast in terms of this simple 
ratio as follows.  One first determines the ratio implicit in the optimal 
patent  life  derived  in  Section A.  If  that  patent  life  were  seventeen 
44  Of course,  at the optimum,  the ratio of marginal costs to benefits equals one because the 
two  functions  are equated.  The  difference between  these ratios is most clearly seen  using the 
notation in the Appendix.  See  infra p.  I89I  & note  278. 
The  link  between  reward  and  benefit  is  partially  reconsidered in  subsection  2(C)  of  this 
Section. 
45  One could also ask whether additional reward can be produced at the same cost.  These 
formulations  are  equivalent  in  most  circumstances.  They  would  diverge  only  if,  after  some 
point,  additional reward caused social benefit to decline rather than increase.  Yet because the 
costs of the patent system will  cause the optimal patent life to be short of this point,  see supra 
p.  I828,  the alternative formulation would be valid,  as long as the change in reward caused by 
permitting a previously prohibited restrictive practice was sufficiently small.  For a comparison 
of discrete and infinitesimal changes,  see supra note 43. i832  HARVARD  LAW  REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I813 
years,  for example,  one could determine the amounts of incremental 
patentee reward and monopoly loss that would result from extending 
the patent life to eighteen years and thus compute the ratio of reward 
to loss for the eighteenth year.46 This patent-life ratio could then be 
compared to  the  ratio for any  given  restrictive practice.47  Practices 
with  ratios lower than that for the eighteenth year should be prohib- 
ited,  and  those  with  higher ratios should -  subject to  the  require- 
ments of the second step -  be permitted.48 
This  method  of  analysis is important for determining the desira- 
bility of various restricitive practices because the ratio will not be the 
same  for  all  restrictions.  Two  examples,  to  be  discussed at  length 
later in this Article,  illustrate this point.  At one extreme, consider a 
patentee that, having invented a minor process improvement, arranges 
price-restricted licenses  covering  the  entire  industry and  sets  prices 
substantially  above  those  prevailing  before the  licensing  agreement. 
Assume further that,  because the significance of the patent is rather 
limited,  the  royalty charged by the patentee is rather small.  In this 
46  Instead,  one  could  determine the  ratio for the  I 7th year.  The  complexity addressed at 
pp.  I830-3I  and  in  notes  43  and  45  arises  precisely because  these  two  ratios might  differ. 
Practices that have  a smaller impact on reward than a one-year change in the patent life can 
be unambiguously evaluated -  subject to any necessary adjustment in the patent life -  as long 
as their ratio exceeds or falls short of the ratios for both the  I7th and i8th  years of the patent 
life.  Ambiguity arises if the ratio for the practice in question falls between the two  patent-life 
ratios.  Because the ratios for the two years are probably rather close, this problem is not likely 
to be very significant. 
A further qualification arises with  respect to the assumption that the impact of the practice 
on reward will be less than or equal to the impact of a one-year change in the patent life from 
the optimal life.  If more than one practice is changed from the pattern assumed to have been 
in  place  when  the  optimal  patent life  was  derived,  the  total effects of  all the changes would 
have to fall within the necessary boundary.  This issue is the topic of Section II.C. 
47  Cf. ECONOMIC  REVIEW,  supra note 2I,  at 73 (stating, in discussing compulsory licensing, 
that "both effects,  the different incentive  to search for patentable inventions and the different 
utilization of patented inventions,  have to be analyzed and compared"). 
48  See supra pp.  I830-3I. 
It is also useful to ask what result should obtain in the case of a practice with a high ratio, 
but with  a reward that  exceeds the value  of the patent.  Because there is  such a large effect 
upon the total reward, one must correspondingly reduce the patent life.  The result is to permit 
massive reward, but only for a brief period of time.  As long as the ratio for the practice exceeds 
the ratio implicit in the patent life, even as the patent life is shortened, this trade-off is beneficial. 
This  analysis  might  appear  to  contradict the  earlier point that  a  necessary condition  for the 
desirability of permitting a practice is that the reward not exceed the value of the patent.  See 
supra subsection  ILA.3.  The  apparent paradox is  resolved  by  noting  that  the  value  of  the 
patent is typically viewed statically -  when the reward is said to exceed the value of the patent, 
it  is  usually  meant  that  the  reward for a  given  time  period (say one year) exceeds the  value 
contributed by the  patent during that same time period.  But  this relationship does not imply 
that the reward for the given time period exceeds the total contribution of the patent over the 
entire useful life of the invention.  Hence  rewards that seem excessive may be given for some 
time  periods and no rewards may be given  in others.  The  net result would  be that the total 
reward over the readjusted patent life is less than the value of the invention over its useful life 
(which in this case would have to be longer than the patent life) even though, at any instant of 
time during the brief patent life,  reward would exceed value. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I833 
case,  the  patentee's  incremental  reward  will  consist  of  the  modest 
royalty payments  and  a  share,  in  proportion to  the  patentee's share 
of  the  market,  of  the  excess  profit resulting from the  cartel prices. 
Unless  the  patentee  has  a  very  high  market share,  its  reward from 
being permitted to use this scheme will be moderate in comparison to 
the total loss imposed.  Thus, the resulting ratio will be rather small.49 
In  contrast,  consider  a  patentee  that  charges higher royalties to 
firms in industries in which the patent is more valuable,  rather than 
charging a  uniform royalty at some  average level.  The  use of  such 
discriminatory royalties  has  two  effects.  First,  it  increases total  re- 
ward by transferring surplus to the patentee from those industries in 
which  the  patent is valued  more highly.  Second, it decreases output 
in industries charged an above-average  royalty and increases output 
in  industries  charged  a  below-average  royalty.  Even  if  the  output 
effects produce a net monopoly loss,  it might be quite small because 
the output effects tend to be offsetting.  Thus,  the denominator of the 
reward/cost ratio will be relatively small.  But because all the reward 
goes to the patentee,  the numerator will be undiluted.  Therefore, the 
ratio in this example  might well  be substantially higher than that in 
the first.50 
(c)  Cost-Effectiveness  Analysis:  A  Practical  Restatement  of  the 
Ratio  Test.  -  One  practical  limitation  in  applying  the  preceding 
analysis is that even  if one ascertains the ratios for all relevant prac- 
tices  -  in  itself  a  most  formidable  and  controversial  endeavor- 
there is  still  insufficient information to  determine any component  of 
patent-antitrust doctrine51 unless one also knows the ratio implicit in 
the  optimal  patent  life.  Yet  our knowledge  is  inadequate  to  inspire 
great confidence even  in the desirability of having a patent system at 
all,52 much  less  in  the  ability  to  make  the  subtle  measurements  of 
49 This example is discussed further in subsection II.B.2(b)  and Part IV.  To the extent that 
the  patentee  already enjoys  a  very  high  market share,  its  ability  to  increase price above  the 
competitive  level  will  often  not  be substantially enhanced by such  a cartel arrangement.  See 
generally Landes & Posner, Market Power  in Antitrust Cases,  94 HARV.  L.  REv.  937,  95I-52 
(ig8i)  (comparing market power measures for dominant firms and cartels). 
50 This  example is elaborated in subsection II.B.2(a)  and Part VI.  If perfect price discrim- 
ination were possible,  there would be no deadweight loss from the patent system (subject to the 
reservations indicated earlier in notes 25  and 35).  This suggests that direct price discrimination 
should be viewed  more favorably than other restrictive practices.  Nevertheless,  the reservation 
pertaining to the resulting increase in the total reward, see supra notes 43 and 45,  is applicable. 
51 The  exception  would  arise  when  the  denominator was  zero or negative,  in  which  case 
antitrust considerations alone would  permit the restriction, or when  the numerator was zero or 
negative,  in which  case  permitting the restriction would  impinge upon both patent policy  and 
antitrust  policy.  In  these  exceptional  cases,  there  is  no  direct  conflict  between  patent  and 
antitrust policy.  Even  this exception would have to be qualified if the marginal social benefits 
of increasing the patent reward were negative. 
52  See  generally J. JEWKES,  D.  SAWERS & R.  STILLERMAN, THE  SOURCES OF INVENTION 
253  (I958)  ("It is almost impossible to conceive  of any existing social institution so faulty in so 
many ways.  It survives  only because there seems to be nothing better."); ECONOMIC REVIEW, i834  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
marginal effects that determine the ratio implicit in the optimal patent 
life. 
Even  if  this  patent-life ratio cannot be readily determined, how- 
ever,  some  cost-effectiveness  analysis  is  still  possible.  In  principle, 
one could derive the ratio for all possible restrictions and order them 
from  highest  to  lowest.  Regardless of  the  implicit  patent-life ratio, 
improvements clearly might be made possible by shuffling the extant 
pattern of  restrictions.  For  example,  a  currently permitted practice 
with a low ratio might be exchanged for a currently prohibited practice 
with  a  high  ratio.  If  the  total  reward remained approximately the 
same  after such  exchanges,  one  could  unambiguously conclude  that 
the  changes  as  a  whole  were  beneficial,  even  though  it  might  be 
impossible to know whether any single change was desirable.53 This 
process  essentially  amounts  to  cost-minimization -  the  changes  in 
patent-antitrust doctrine would  provide the given amount of reward 
at the least possible cost.54 
supra note 2i,  at 79-80  ("No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, could possibly state 
with  certainty that  the  patent  system,  as  it  now  operates,  confers a  net  benefit or a  net loss 
upon society.  The best he can do is to state assumptions and make guesses about the extent to 
which  reality corresponds to these assumptions."); Markham, supra note  29,  at 598-99  ("[T]he 
studies  have  developed  relatively little information on the social costs at which  these positive 
benefits of the patent system are obtained."). 
53  In fact,  if the  ratios for two  restrictions were sufficiently close to each other, and to the 
ratio implicit  in  the  optimum  patent  life,  it  would  be  possible that both changes,  if taken in 
isolation of the other, would be undesirable even though exchanging the two would be desirable. 
This  is not surprising because taking either change alone changes the total reward, which can 
be demonstrated to produce this seemingly paradoxical result. 
54  It  might  be  thought  possible  to  go  further if  one  knew  the  optimal  total  reward.  In' 
response to  the  question  in  Part I  of  how  the  courts should go about providing a  reward of 
x  +  5,  there would  be  a  determinate answer.  Courts would  move  down  the  ordered list  of 
ratios,  permitting those  practices with  the highest ratios and stopping when  they reached the 
point  at  which  the  aggregate reward was  x  +  5.  (Of course,  to the  extent that the  decision 
concerning the  permissibility of each  restrictive practice is  an all-or-nothing choice,  see supra 
note 43; infra subsection II.E.2,  this  process could not be done precisely, because the change 
that  moves  the  total  reward  up  to  x  +  5  may  overshoot  somewhat  and  thus  require some 
shuffling of doctrine to get aq close as possible at the least possible cost.)  The conclusions that 
no  restrictive practices are permitted if  that  regime still provides a  reward above  the  target, 
whereas all practices are permitted if it still leaves a reward short of the target, would just be 
special cases of this approach. 
It is, however,  no easier to use the total reward than to use the ratio implicit in the optimal 
patent life.  First,  the total reward implicit in the optimal patent life was not itself the target 
of the optimization process, but rather one of its by-products.  (The discussion of the proportion 
of  reward  to  the  value  of  the  patent  in  subsection  II.A.3  and  on  p.  i892  is  similar.)  For 
example,  whether it is appropriate to permit the  I7th year of exploitation was  not determined 
by asking whether the target total for appropriate reward had already been reached by permitting 
a  i6-year  patent life,  but rather by considering whether permitting a  I7th year increased social 
benefits by more than it increased social costs.  It was this determination that fixed the optimal 
patent  life,  and  that  patent  life  that  implicitly  determined the  total  reward.  Recall  that  the 
social benefit function  connects patent life to reward to inventive  activity to  ultimate benefit. 
The  optimization  process  chooses  a  particular patent  life,  and  the  implicit  total  reward  is 
determined simply by reexamining the functional relationship between patent life and reward. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I835 
2.  Factors  in  Determining  the Ratios  of Particular  Practices. 
As will be demonstrated in Parts IV through VII, there is considerable 
disagreement over the economic effects of various restrictive practices. 
This Article makes only modest attempts to resolve such controversies. 
Instead,  it  focuses  on  how  to  evaluate  the desirability of allowing  a 
practice once  one  has  determined its  effects.  This  Section discusses 
three recurring issues germane to determining the ratio for particular 
practices. 
(a)  How  Much  of  the  Reward  Is  Pure  Transfer? -  Once  one 
determines that a particular practice yields  a reward that is deemed 
appropriate,  one  must  consider  the  cost  of  providing  that  reward. 
Not  all  reward to  the  patentee  need be generated by forcing society 
to  bear  the  full  costs  of  economic  waste  arising from  monopolistic 
exploitation.  In some instances, restrictive practices will in large part 
simply  transfer economic  surplus from consumers to patentees,  with 
little  resulting economic  waste.  For example,  in the hypothetical in 
which  discriminatory  royalties  were  used  to  increase  the  patentee's 
profits,55 we  saw  that  the effects  on output were at least partly off- 
setting;  as  a  result,  the  reward was  achieved  through a  transfer of 
surplus with  little or no accompanying economic loss.  To the extent 
that  the  reward is  accomplished  through a  pure transfer -  that  is, 
with  no  accompanying  misallocation  of  resources or  inefficiency  in 
production -  monopoly cost is avoided.  Thus,  practices in which  a 
greater share of the reward is pure transfer will have a lower denom- 
inator (monopoly loss) for a given  numerator (patentee reward) and, 
accordingly,  a  higher  ratio.  Alternatively,  assuming  we  know  how 
much a given restraint costs society (that is, assuming the denominator 
is  fixed),  the  more  the  restraint  results  in  a  pure  transfer  to  the 
patentee, the greater is the numerator, and thus the higher the ratio.56 
From  either  viewpoint,  restrictions that  are closer to  pure transfers 
are to be preferred to those that are not,  all else being equal. 
(b) What Portion  of the Reward Accrues to the Patentee? -There 
are  two  components  to  the  question  of  what  share  of  the  reward 
accrues to the patentee.  The first focuses on what share of the reward 
accrues to  entities  other than  the  one  that exploits the  patent.57  In 
Second,  the  total  reward  implicitly  generated  by  equating  marginal  costs  with  marginal 
benefits in Section ILA,  and relied upon to determine the cutoff point in moving down the list 
of  ratios in  this  hypothetical,  is  not  the  fully  optimized  total  reward,  but  rather the  optimal 
reward given preexisting patent-antitrust doctrine.  Thus,  the rearrangement of patent-antitrust 
doctrine  achieved  through  this  ordering process yields  precisely  the  same  result  as  the  cost- 
effectiveness  analysis  described  in  text;  both  processes  minimize  costs  by  adjusting  patent- 
antitrust doctrine in order that permitted practices have higher ratios than prohibited practices 
and that the total reward remains fixed. 
55 See  supra p.  I833  & note 50. 
56 A qualification would again be necessary if the marginal benefits were to become negative. 
57  Even  if  a  given  practice results largely in a  pure transfer with  little economic  loss,  the 
beneficial effects discussed above in subsection (a) will be substantially reduced if only a portion 
of that reward is realized by the actual patentee. i836  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
the example in which price-restricted licenses are used to cartelize an 
industry, other firms in  the industry share in the reward roughly in 
proportion to their share of the market.58 To the extent that reward 
accrues to these other firms rather than to the patentee, the numerator 
is smaller for a given denominator and therefore the ratio is lower.59 
The  second  component,  which  has  been  largely  overlooked  by 
courts and commentators alike, focuses on what portion of the reward 
accrues to the patentee in those instances in which the patentee is not 
the  entity  exploiting  the  patent.60  For  example,  if  some  patentees 
must  assign  (sell) their patents  at prices that do not  reflect the  true 
value  of  their inventions,  permitting the  assignees to  reap a  greater 
harvest might do little  to stimulate innovative  activity.61  This  issue 
also  arises  to  some  extent  when  a  patentee  licenses  its  invention, 
because the  return to the  licensee may not all be transmitted to the 
licensor. 
One  might  argue that  it  does  not  matter whether reward to  the 
patentee  or reward to  the  assignee  is  used  in  the  ratio because the 
two  measures  typically  will  be  equivalent.  This  would  be  true  if 
patentees who assigned their rights anticipated, at the time they made 
their decisions to invest in inventive  activity, that they would receive 
a price equal to the value the buyer expected to receive in exploiting 
the patent.  Yet imperfections in the market for the sale of inventions 
can prevent the full  reward from being passed on to the patentee.62 
For many inventions,  there might not be a large number of buyers.63 
58  See  supra pp.  I832-33.  This  will  not be true to the extent of any royalties paid to the 
patentee by other firms in the industry. 
59  The  relevance of this simple principle has been noted by others, although the analysis of 
why  the principle is important generally has been inaccurate or incomplete.  See,  e.g.,  sources 
cited infra note  I55.  The  problem is that commentators generally do not understand precisely 
how  this  principle is  relevant because they rely on proportionality notions rather than on the 
ratio test.  These tests are distinguished in this context in Section IV.B. 
60  This component perhaps has not come to the fore in our legal system because it implies 
that a restriction that is permitted when  practiced by the original inventor could be prohibited 
when  practiced by  a  purchaser.  Such a distinction apparently violates  the  command to treat 
like cases alike by providing different treatment for similarly situated defendants.  This formal- 
istic objection, however, has little force because the phrase "similarly situated" begs the question. 
Nonetheless,  one  can  imagine  that  the  argument might have  inhibited the  inquisitiveness  of 
many courts and commentators. 
61 The desirability of allowing reward to the assignee for the exploitation itself must also be 
addressed.  See  infra p.  I839. 
62 Cf. Caves,  Crookell & Killing, The Imperect Marketfor  Technology Licenses, 45 OXFORD 
BULL.  ECON.  &  STATISTICS  249,  257--58  (I983) (noting that  only  40%  of surplus accrued to 
licensors). 
63 Cf. id.  at  250  (referring to often limited numbers of competent licensees).  This can arise 
for a number of reasons.  First,  a patent might advance the frontiers of an industry in which 
only a few firms are yet capable of successful production or distribution.  Second, patentees will 
profit more if they can reach most markets quickly.  This may encourage or compel a patentee 
to deal with  a limited number of firms.  Third,  a patent might be quite valuable,  but only to 
a  few  buyers.  This  would  be the  case  with  a  product serving a  select group, or if  a  patent I984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I837 
In  addition,  there  might  be  insufficient  information  for  a  seller  to 
evaluate  the potential for exploitation or for a buyer to evaluate  the 
operational value of the patent.  This problem will be compounded if 
the patentee or prospective buyers fear that extensive discussion with 
other prospective buyers that do not ultimately acquire the patent may 
give  those  other buyers advance  information on  the  patent's exploi- 
tation,  and thereby give them a head start in efforts to invent around 
the patent or otherwise diminish its competitive benefit.64 
It  is  quite  difficult  to  determine  the  significance of  such  market 
imperfections, either in any given case or in a broad category of cases 
susceptible  to  more general rules.  For this  reason,  and  because  the 
information relevant to making the inquiry is typically not available, 
I  will  not  pursue  the  point  here.  These  issues  do,  however,  have 
much  in  common  with  the  factor  to  be  considered next,  as  well  as 
with the issue raised in subsection II.E.2. 
(c)  To  What Degree  Is  this  Source  of Reward  an  Incentive? 
Although much commentary over the years has addressed the extent 
to  which  patent  rewards  actually  stimulate  inventive  activity,  few 
conclusions  have  been drawn.65  The  question of incentive  differs in 
kind from  the  factors discussed  in  the  preceding two  subsections  in 
that it moves beyond the terms of the ratio test itself.  Recall that the 
numerator of  the  ratio  focuses  on  reward -  as  distinguished  from 
social benefit, which is relevant in determining the optimal patent life. 
This  subsection examines  the connection between  reward and incen- 
tive  -  one  of  the  links  in  the  chain that  connects  reward to  social 
benefit.  The  examination of this link calls into question the proposi- 
tion that all reward is fungible and concludes that certain sources of 
reward might, for various reasons, act as more or less of an incentive 
than others.66 
Turner  has  advocated  the  position  that,  because  researchers, be 
they individual  or corporate, "can make only the grossest calculation 
of whether the prospective rewards are likely to exceed the costs," the 
incremental reward produced by patent exploitation dependent upon 
improved  on  a  process used  by only a few  entities.  Fourth,  it  might simply  be the  case that 
the  relevant  market  is  highly  concentrated,  leaving  the  patentee  with  few  potential  buyers. 
Finally,  the antitrust laws  might further limit the number of potential buyers.  See,  e.g.,  infra 
Part V. 
A  scarcity of  buyers is problematic only if  the patentee cannot itself exploit the invention, 
either  directly,  as  is  often  true  for  individual  or  small-scale  inventors,  or  by  licensing.  But 
licensing  might  frequently  be  unprofitable because  of  transaction costs  or  limited  because  of 
antitrust concerns.  Moreover, if there were few buyers, there would also likely be few licensees. 
In either case,  all of the problems that arise in negotiating a sale would also arise in negotiating 
a license. 
64  Cf.  Caves,  Crookell & Killing, supra note  62,  at  250,  257  (discussing this problem in the 
context of licensing). 
65 See,  e.g.,  sources quoted supra note 52. 
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restrictive practices is unlikely to have a substantial effect on inventive 
activity.  67  From  this  perspective,  it  is  not  irrational for  Turner to 
tend to focus solely on the denominator of the ratio -  an antitrust- 
oriented approach that concentrates on whether a given practice pro- 
duces monopoly loss.68  As a result, however, Turner does not discuss 
the  possibility  that  different kinds of  restrictions will  yield  different 
rewards, nor does he explore the distinction between the reward pro- 
duced by permitting a restrictive practice and the equivalent amount 
of  reward  that  could  be  produced  by  lengthening  the  patent  life. 
Thus,  his analysis suggests not that reward is irrelevant, but only that 
the connection between reward and incentive might be more complex 
and varied than was implied by the brief discussion in Section A.69 
Although  the  relationship between  reward and incentive  is  com- 
plex,  it would  nonetheless be relevant in comparing restrictive prac- 
tices if the rewards from some practices had a greater incentive effect 
than did the rewards from others.  One simple, although largely unex- 
plored, reason this might be so is that inventors' decisions to undertake 
inventive  activity  are based on their perceptions of potential rewards 
before they  undertake  the  activity,  not  on  the  reward they  in  fact 
receive afterward.  Thus,  for example, the wholesale abolition of pat- 
ent rights would  likely have  a greater negative influence on expecta- 
tions of reward, and hence on innovative activity, than would a severe 
cutback  in  the  range of  permissible licensing  practices,  because,  in 
addition to the greater effect on ultimate reward, many inventors are 
much less likely to be aware of the latter development, or might never 
have  realized  the  potential  benefit from  such  practices  in  the  first 
place. 70  If not all reward has the same incentive effect, ratios cannot 
be  applied  blindly.  Preferences among restrictive practices must  be 
adjusted to reflect the differential impact of the incremental rewards 
that each such practice provides. 
67  Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy,  44 N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  450,  459 (I969); 
see id.  at 463.  Turner states that "[i]t is doubtful that anyone who would be induced to invest 
in research in hopes of a thousand-to-one payoff would be deterred if the potential payoff were 
reduced to eight hundred-to-one."  Id.  at 459.  Of course, depending upon the expected cost of 
the  project and  the  probability of  receiving the  payoff,  this might or might  not be  the  case. 
Moreover,  Turner offers  no  support  for  the  representativeness of  his  hypothetical  numerical 
estimates.  But  given  that I do not believe  that anyone else has been able to demonstrate the 
contrary convincingly,  I cannot say that his hunches are necessarily off track. 
68  See  id.  at 46I  (basing analysis solely on antitrust policy); id.  at 463 (suggesting that his 
analysis  to  follow  derives  solely  from  antitrust  policy).  Turner  is  not  alone  in  taking  this 
approach.  See  infra pp.  I846-47  & notes  I00-03. 
69  See supra pp.  I823-24. 
70 Cf. ECONOMIC REVIEW, supra note  2I,  at 75 ("To be sure, restrictive license agreements 
can increase considerably the profits of a patentee.  But,  much as this might affect the value of 
his patents,  it  would  hardly be taken into account at the stage when he plans his investment 
outlays for industrial research and development work."). i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I839 
It is difficult to derive useful conclusions from the analysis of the 
link  between  reward  and  incentive,  yet  a  few  generalizations  are 
possible.  First,  some  restrictive practices might be most  relevant  in 
the later stages  of  the  development  of  an innovation,  at which  time 
investment or development decisions are being made based upon prac- 
tices  already  in  effect  or  due  to  be  implemented  soon. 71  Second, 
inventors  who  are regularly involved  in  the inventive  process might 
appreciate the value of some practices better than inventors who have 
little  experience  with  patent  exploitation.  On the other hand,  expe- 
rienced inventors  might  realize that antitrust limitations in fact  only 
minimally limit their reward, whereas the less initiated, who are aware 
merely that various antitrust restrictions exist, might have exaggerated 
fears.  To account for this factor, it seems necessary to formulate rules 
that  vary  with  the  identity  of  the patentee,  as was  necessary in  the 
case  of  patentees  who  sell  their  inventions  to  others  for  eventual 
exploitation. 72  The  prospect  of  acquiring  the  relevant  information 
seems equally unpromising in the present context.  In the end,  there- 
fore, fruitful analysis of the patent-antitrust problem may require the 
simplifying assumption that all reward has the same incentive effect. 73 
C. Simultaneous Determination  of Patent-Antitrust Doctrine 
and the Patent Life 
The  technique  described  in  subsection  B. i  for  determining  the 
appropriate structure of patent-antitrust doctrine through comparisons 
to  the  ratio  implicit  in  the  optimal  patent  life  is  incomplete.  The 
optimal  patent  life  was  determined  in  Section  A  by  taking patent- 
antitrust  doctrine as given.  If  Section B's approach for determining 
patent-antitrust doctrine were implemented,  the patent life derived in 
Section A might no longer be optimal.  For example, if the adjustment 
in  patent-antitrust  doctrine resulted' in  a  larger scope for patent  ex- 
ploitation and thus produced greater reward for any given patent life, 
it would  be appropriate to reduce the patent life from the level set in 
Section A. 
That  adjustment,  however,  does  not  end  the  problem.  The  ad- 
justment in the patent life might change some of the conclusions about 
the optimal patent-antitrust doctrine formulated in Section B,  because 
that  doctrine  was  determined  by  reference to  the  reward/loss  ratio 
71  See  generally  F.  SCHERER,  supra  note  2I,  at  440-41  (encouraging development  as  a 
purpose of  patents); Kitch,  The Nature  and Function  of the Patent  System,  20  J.L.  & ECON. 
265  (I977)  (same).  Even  after an  innovation  is  patented  and  licensed,  the  availability  of  an 
exclusive  license  might encourage the licensee to develop  nonpatentable know-how  that would 
enhance the value  of the patent. 
72 See supra pp.  I836-37. 
73  See  generally infra subsections II.E.i  & II.E.2  (discussing problems of  information and 
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implicit in the original optimal patent life.  If the optimal patent life 
changes,  so  might  this  ratio.  The  new  ratio would  then  require a 
further  revision  of  patent-antitrust  doctrine,  which  in  turn  would 
require readjustment of the patent life, and so on.  In general, setting 
the patent life  and determining patent-antitrust doctrine are interde- 
pendent endeavors; in other words,  the system of equations that de- 
fines the optimization process must be solved simultaneously.74 
One might derive this simultaneous solution through the following 
heuristic process.  First,  instead of defining the set of practices to be 
analyzed as only those subject to patent-antitrust doctrine, consider a 
broader definition under which  each  separate year of  patent exploi- 
tation  is  conceived  as  a  "practice."75 Next,  order the  ratios for all 
the practices in this more broadly defined set from highest to lowest. 
There  is  the  complication  that  the  ratio for  each  practice  depends 
upon  which  other  practices  are  assumed  to  be  permitted,  but  this 
problem can  be  addressed to  a  substantial degree by  the  following 
sequential  approach.76  Begin  with  no  exploitation  allowed.77  The 
first practice to be permitted presumably78 is the first year of exploi- 
tation.79  Then,  given  the first year, determine which  practice, be it 
another  year  of  exploitation  or  any  one  of  the  possible  restrictive 
practices subject to patent-antitrust doctrine, offers the highest ratio. 
Add  that  practice to  the list  and similarly select the next,  this time 
assuming that  the first year of exploitation and the practice just  se- 
lected  are taken  as  given  in determining the ratios of the remaining 
possibilities.80  Continuance of  this  process yields  an ordering of  all 
the practices.  It is essential to determine the social benefits and costs 
at each step along the way in order to find the point after which the 
marginal benefit of permitting further practices no longer exceeds the 
marginal cost.  The  combination of practices reached at that point is 
the solution,  which  embodies both an optimal patent life and a cor- 
responding formulation of patent-antitrust doctrine. 
74  The formal solution to this problem is presented in the Appendix. 
75  For  various  reasons,  it  seems  unlikely  that  one  would  permit the  fifth year of  patent 
exploitation and not the fourth.  This need not be of concern to the derivation, because if there 
are indeed good reasons for this conjecture, the earlier years will always have higher ratios than 
the  later years,  with  the  result that later years would  simply never be selected before earlier 
years. 
76  There still might  be reversals in such a process resulting from synergistic effects among 
various practices.  This  complicates the process but does not alter the ability to derive deter- 
minate results.  This issue is discussed in the formal derivation in the Appendix at note  282. 
77  Allowing  no  exploitation  is  equivalent  to  adopting  the  "antitrust laws  reign supreme" 
regime discussed on p.  i8i8,  with the addition that the patent life is set equal to zero. 
78  None  would  be  permitted if  the  patent  system,  for any formulation of  patent-antitrust 
doctrine, were undesirable. 
79  See supra note 75 (concerning the ordering of the years). 
80  As  more practices are added,  the  ratios of  the  remaining practices will  be  continually 
changing.  The Appendix describes how this would be taken into account.  See  infra pp.  I89I- 
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The need for a simultaneous solution has complex implications for 
the courts.  Because the optimal patent life and the content of patent- 
antitrust  doctrine  can  be  determined  only  simultaneously,  the  ideal 
institutional  arrangement would  involve  a  single  entity  with  control 
over  both  policy  instruments.  From this  point  of  view,  the  current 
separation of functions between  Congress and the courts makes little 
sense in this context.  But  in view  of the fact that no major institu- 
tional  rearrangement appears imminent,  it  is useful to consider how 
the existing structure might best be able to confront the issues posed 
by the intersection of patent and antitrust policy. 
A second-best arrangement might involve  careful coordination be- 
tween  Congress and  the  courts,  although this  Section indicates  how 
intimate  such  coordination  would  have  to  be.  Moreover,  even  this 
compromise seems a rather far cry from the  current state of affairs. 
Congress set the patent life over a century ago and has not changed 
it since it passed the antitrust laws.  Thus,  courts probably could not 
count  on  Congress  to  perform its  half  of  the  feedback  loop.81  The 
simplifying  notion that  Congress has in fact set the general contours 
by defining the  patent life  and has left  the details to be  worked out 
by  the  courts  is  therefore problematic.  Because  the  optimal  patent 
life depends upon how  the "details" are worked out,  there can be no 
presumption that the courts will  arrive at sensible overall results by 
relying  upon  the  method  outlined  in  Section  B,  although  the  cost- 
effectiveness  analysis developed  there is nevertheless still valid.82  In- 
stead,  only  a  third-best strategy may be available.  If  courts believe 
based  on  the  analysis  performed  in  evaluating  patent-antitrust 
restrictions -  that the patent life set by Congress is too short or too 
long,  they may find it appropriate to allow more or fewer restrictive 
practices,  respectively,  than  a  strict application  of  the  ratio implicit 
in the current patent life would suggest.83 
81 If courts had articulated the doctrine in the manner Congress predicted, it is conceivable 
that  feedback  might  not  have  been  necessary.  This  is  a  highly  unconvincing  view,  however, 
because  Congress  could  not  have  considered  patent-antitrust  doctrine  before  it  enacted  the 
antitrust laws.  Moreover,  the  courts have  reversed their position on  restrictive practices over 
time, and this presumably would have sparked congressional action.  More plausibly, if Congress 
had perceived the impact of patent-antitrust doctrine on the total reward to patentees to be very 
small  relative  to  the total  reward typically received from exploitation over  the optimal  patent 
life, there would have been little need to adjust the patent life in light of the courts' modifications 
of patent-antitrust doctrine.  There has been no attempt to determine whether this is the case, 
and at least in the instance of price discrimination, see infra Part VI,  it seems unlikely.  If this 
were generally true, however, it would suggest that patent-antitrust doctrine is quite unimportant 
to  the  general  scheme  of  patent  policy,  apart  from  its  proscription of  practices  resulting  in 
massive  monopoly losses. 
82  See supra subsection II.B.i(c). 
83  This strategy is implicit in the discussion at the conclusion of Part I.  See supra pp.  i8i8- 
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D.  Summary of Guidelines 
The conclusions that derive from the analysis in Sections A through 
C are as follows: 
i.  The  ratio  test,  which  compares the  patentee's reward to  the 
monopoly  loss  imposed  on  society,  should  guide  the  evaluation  of 
restrictive practices.  Practices with  higher ratios generally should be 
preferred.  Factors  aiding  in  the  application  of  this  test  to  specific 
practices include the extent to which the reward is pure transfer, the 
portion of the reward that accrues to the patentee, and the degree to 
which the reward serves as an incentive. 
2.  The common view  that restrictive practices should be evaluated 
by determining whether the resulting reward exceeds the value of the 
patent is  misguided.  In  general, the reward should be less than the 
value  of  the  patent,  and  even  this  requirement is  not  a  sufficient 
condition for the desirability of permitting a given practice.  Rather, 
the determinative inquiry is that indicated by the ratio test -  whether 
the resulting marginal increase in reward is substantial by comparison 
to the marginal increase in monopoly loss,  and how  that ratio com- 
pares to the ratios for other restrictive practices and for the existing 
patent life. 
3. Knowledge of the ratios for each practice is alone an insufficient 
basis  for  formulating  a  comprehensive  structure of  patent-antitrust 
doctrine, because these ratios must be compared to the ratio implicit 
in  the  optimal  patent  life.  There  are two  problems in  making  this 
comparison.  First,  the  ratio implicit in  the optimal patent life  may 
be very difficult or even  impossible to determine.  Second, that ratio 
is based upon a patent life that was derived by taking patent-antitrust 
doctrine as  given.  Thus,  there is  an inevitable  and problematic in- 
terdependence between the decision concerning the optimal patent life 
and  the  decision  concerning the  proper structure of  patent-antitrust 
doctrine. 
E.  Limitations  on Practical Application of the Analysis 
As is often the case when one examines a problem in detail, asking 
the right questions begets more questions.  Although the analysis de- 
scribed thus far is complicated, the following discussion indicates three 
respects in which the inquiry is even more intricate.  These difficulties 
go  beyond  the  previously  noted problem of  working out  the  appro- 
priate role for the courts in their interaction with Congress. 
i.  Lack of Information. -  The most obvious difficulty in applying 
the  analysis  developed  in  this  Article  is  that  the  various  kinds  of 
information needed for the analysis will  not generally be available;84 
84  See,  e.g.,  Markham,  The Joint  Effect  of Antitrust and Patent  Laws  Upon Innovation, 
AM. ECON. REv.,  May  I966,  at  29I,  292  ("[T]he linkage between technological change and the I  984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I 843 
thus,  courts' decisions  must inevitably  be speculative.  To  determine 
ratios  for  particular  practices  -  the  subject  of  the  applications  in 
Parts IV  through VII  -  a number of  complicated phenomena  must 
be  measured  and  compared.  And  if  more than  a  minor reshuffling 
through  cost-effectiveness  analysis  is  desired,  it  is  also  necessary  to 
have  information  concerning the  ratio implicit in the  existing patent 
life,  which  in turn requires detailed knowledge  about all the links in 
the relationship between  the patent life and the costs and benefits of 
the  patent  system.85  Moreover,  even  if  the  total  benefits and  total 
costs could  be  easily  approximated,  these approximate values  would 
be  virtually  useless.  It  is  necessary to know  the marginal costs  and 
benefits  and  the  degree  of  reward that  can  be  inferred from them, 
and these marginal effects will  be much harder to estimate.  Finally, 
a  coherent  approach  to  the  interdependency  problem  discussed  in 
Section C requires not merely being able to evaluate such information 
in the present system,  in which the patent life is given,  but also being 
able to gauge how  such measures vary as the aggregate total reward 
is varied.  In the end,  therefore, only the most limited improvements 
may be possible. 
2.  Further  Case-by-Case  Variations  in  the  Applicability  of  the 
Analysis.  -  The  applicability  of  some  of  the  previous analysis  was 
shown  to vary case by case,  depending not only upon the restriction 
employed,  but also upon the nature of the patent, the structure of the 
market,  and  the  attributes  of  the  patentee.  To  make  the  analysis 
tractable,  therefore,  all  of  the  preceding  discussion  referred,  either 
explicitly or implicitly,  to the reward expected by the "typical paten- 
tee"  or  to  the  cost  imposed  in  the  "typical  situation" in  which  a 
restrictive practice is employed.  Clearly, however, a regime that pro- 
vides a reward of x to the typical patentee may provide far more than 
x  to  some  and  far less  than x  to  others; as a  result,  some  activities 
will  be  rewarded  too  generously and  others not  generously enough. 
Moreover,  the  ratio test  implicitly  refers to  some  typical ratio for a 
given  restriction;  this  ratio  may  in  fact  be  much  greater in  some 
instances  than  in  others.  How  much  difficulty this  variance  causes 
depends substantially upon the ex ante perceptions of potential paten- 
tees.  To the extent that prospective inventors are unable to determine 
whether they will  benefit more or less than is typical for the relevant 
practice,  the  average  tendencies  will  be  the most relevant indicators 
of  the  patentee's  reward  (subject  to  the  qualifications  noted 
previously86).  On  the  other  hand,  prospective  inventors  who  know 
patent system and antitrust policy -  only two of the several environmental factors affecting it 
-  would  still  have  to  be  determined.  Again,  the  prospects of  establishing  these  linkages  in 
precise terms seem remote."). 
85  See  supra pp.  I833-34  & notes 52,  54. 
86  See  supra note  29  (risk); supra pp.  I836-37  (when patentee is not the one exploiting the 
patent); supra subsection II.B.2(c)  (extent to which reward is an incentive). i844  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
that they will benefit more or less than the average would presumably 
take that information into account.  It would therefore be desirable if 
the rules could be adjusted accordingly. 
In a parallel fashion,  it was assumed in the previous analysis that 
the policy instruments available to the courts and Congress are quite 
limited.  Congress was assumed to choose a single optimal patent life, 
rather than  a  different life for different industries, different sorts of 
inventions, and different classes of inventors.87 Courts were implicitly 
assumed to permit or prohibit practices according to what essentially 
amounts to  a pattern of  per se rules.  Of course, the rules could be 
further refined to  account  for market conditions,  the  nature of  the 
invention,  and the like.88 
One  could  consider any degree of refinement of any of these as- 
sumptions,  and the  same analysis would  apply.  But  any attempt to 
apply  more  case-specific rules would  further complicate the  already 
difficult problem facing  the  courts.89  In  addition,  the more one  at- 
tempts  to  vary  the  patent life  and the rules of exploitation industry 
by industry and case by case,  the less compelling becomes the justi- 
fication for rewarding invention  through a  patent system at  all.  In 
theory, direct reward systems  are preferable because they  avoid  the 
monopoly costs associated with a general patent system.90  A central 
reason for reliance on a patent system is that it is thought to be too 
difficult to  determine the  appropriate level  of  reward fairly and  ac- 
curately on  a case-by-case basis.91  It  should also be  noted that this 
justification  for the  patent  system  results in  an  unavoidable tension 
because the typical or average measures of marginal costs and benefits 
that are essential in designing both patent policy and patent-antitrust 
doctrine would likewise  be difficult to determine. 
3.  Interdependency Among Cases. -  Even if all the uncertainties, 
complexities,  and  coordination  problems  could  be  overcome,  there 
would  remain  the  problem  that  courts cannot  hope  to  articulate a 
coherent  patent-antitrust  doctrine  by  proceeding  on  a  case-by-case 
basis.  Part I indicated that the appropriate outcomes in different cases 
might be interdependent in ways that transcend the simple desire for 
87  Cf.  Markham,  supra note  29,  at  602  (proposing dual  patent  system  that  distinguishes 
between major breakthroughs and incremental changes). 
88 Moreover, regarding the problem of discrete versus infinitesimal changes, see supra notes 
43,  45,  46 & 54,  courts could in theory -  although it seems incredibly unlikely -  rely upon a 
lottery-like strategy in  which  they  chose  different outcomes with  predetermined probabilities. 
This  would make all of the previous complications vanish because the functions would now be 
continuous.  Of course, in the process, additional risk would be imposed on patentees, in addition 
to the increased administrative costs. 
89 See,  e.g.,  Stedman, The Patent-Antitrust Interace,  58 J. PAT.  OFF.  Soc'y  316,  325 (I976) 
(observing that courts, on the whole,  "have avoided [a case-specific] approach like the plague"). 
90 See,  e.g.,  E.  MANSFIELD,  MICROECONOMICS  492-93  (2d  ed.  I975). 
91 See,  e.g.,  F.  SCHERER, supra note 2i,  at 458. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I845 
consistency  in  doctrine.92  The  discussion  in  this  Part  has  demon- 
strated that the most plausible approach that might be practicable 
the cost-effectiveness analysis presented in subsection B. I(c) -  is itself 
plagued  by  this  problem  of  interdependency;  even  if  it  might  be 
possible to reach decisions in two areas of the doctrine taken together, 
it would  be uncertain whether either change alone were an improve- 
ment.93  Courts thus could  not confidently determine that any  given 
decision produced a net gain unless the determination entailed recon- 
sideration and  revision  of  other components of  patent-antitrust doc- 
trine not presented by the particular case at hand. 
III.  PREVIOUS  SOLUTIONS  TO THE  PATENT-ANTITRUST  CONFLICT 
This Part discusses approaches to the patent-antitrust conflict that 
courts and commentators have  offered in the past.  Section A shows 
that  many  of  the  earliest  reactions  to  this  conflict  involved  simply 
avoiding  it altogether, a tendency that continues to the present.  Al- 
though such avoidance has been a frequent response, other approaches 
have  also  been  suggested.  The  most  popular,  particularly with  the 
courts,  has  been  to  invoke  formalistic tests  that  purport to  indicate 
which  practices are desirable.  Section  B  demonstrates that  all such 
tests are question-begging and thus indeterminate.  Sections C and D 
then consider the tests proposed by Bowman and Baxter, respectively. 
Their work is to date the most extensive and thoughtful; both attempt 
to  develop  a  consistent  framework  and  to  apply  it  in  a  variety  of 
contexts in which  the patent-antitrust conflict arises.  The  discussion 
in these Sections indicates the shortcomings of each of their proposals. 
Some  particular  manifestations  of  these  shortcomings  will  be  illus- 
trated in the later Parts that deal with specific applications. 
A.  Common Confusion Among Courts and Commentators: 
Evading  the Conflict 
The  earliest judicial  decisions  on  patent-antitrust issues -  deci- 
sions  that  addressed  license  provisions  requiring,  for  example,  that 
the licensee adhere to prices set by the patentee,  or purchase various 
supplies  only  from the  patentee  (tying clauses) -  uniformly favored 
the patentee, largely on the theory that the greater power includes the 
lesser.94  Because  patentees  were  legally  entitled  to  refuse to  license 
their patent at all,  the less restrictive practice of licensing the patent 
subject  to  certain conditions  was  deemed unimpeachable.  This  type 
92  See supra p.  I820. 
93  Each taken alone could be undesirable.  See supra p.  I834  & note 53. 
94 See,  e.g.,  Henry v.  A.B.  Dick  Co.,  224  U.S.  I,  32,  35 (I9I2)  (patent misuse challenge to 
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of argument has been rejected in many contexts, typically because the 
lesser  can  indeed  be  more  of  an  evil  than  the  greater or  because 
regulation of the lesser restriction can lead to substantial improvement 
in  light  of  the  unwillingness  of  the  regulated entity to  resort to  the 
greater restriction.95  This  position has gradually fallen into disfavor 
in the patent-antitrust context as well. 
Even  after the  notion of an antitrust immunity for patentees fell 
into disrepute in the  second decade of this century,96 the purpose of 
the patent statute -  providing reward to encourage inventive activity 
continued to be blindly invoked in support of restrictive practices 
by patentees.  The  most famous example is  United States v.  General 
Electric  Co.,  in  which  the  Supreme Court, upholding the patentee's 
right to  issue  price-restricted licenses,  cited as a sufficient argument 
the contention that the patentee's reward was enhanced.97  This ten- 
dency to  resolve  the  conflict by ignoring the antitrust component - 
which  amounts  to  a preoccupation with  the numerator (patentee re- 
ward) and a corresponding disregard of the denominator -  has proved 
durable among courts98 and commentators99  alike. 
As criticism of some of the Supreme Court's permissive rulings on 
restrictive  patentee  practices has  mounted,  so  has  the  tendency  for 
commentators to  make the  opposite mistake of resolving the patent- 
antitrust conflict by invoking antitrust analysis as though patent policy 
were irrelevant to the issue.  Sullivan often exhibits this tendency,100 
95 Early criticism of this argument in the context of patent law can be found in Powell,  The 
Nature of a Patent Right,  I7  COLUM. L.  REV.  663,  678-79,  684 (I9I7).  The  equal protection 
and due process clauses of the Constitution have  accounted for perhaps the most notable,  but 
by  no  means  the  only  additional  examples.  Virtually all  government regulation,  whether  of 
employment conditions or sales of consumer products, takes place in a context in which firms 
have  the  option  of  resorting to  the  greater restriction by  going out  of  business and  thus  not 
hiring or selling at all. 
96  See  Motion Picture Patents Co.  v.  Universal Film Mfg.  Co.,  243 U.S.  502  (I9I7)  (disal- 
lowing  tying  contracts); Bauer  & Cie  v.  O'Donnell,  229  U.S.  I  (I9I3)  (rejecting resale price 
maintenance). 
97 272  U.S.  476  (I926).  The  Court stated  that  a  price-restricted license  was  permissible, 
"provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably adapted to secure pecuniary reward 
for the patentee's monopoly."  Id.  at 490.  This formulation ignores antitrust policy altogether, 
unless one gives a broad reading to "normally and reasonably adapted."  Such a reading renders 
the  Court's test  question-begging.  See  infra Section III.B.  In any event,  however,  the Court 
gave  no indication of any such intent. 
98  See,  e.g.,  SCM  Corp.  v.  Xerox  Corp.,  645  F.2d  II95,  I206  (2d  Cir.  i98i)  ("[W]here  a 
patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under the patent laws cannot 
trigger any liability under the antitrust laws." (citations omitted)), cert. denied,  455 U.S.  ioi6 
(i982). 
99 For  example,  although  Sullivan  makes  a  similar criticism of  General Electric,  see  L. 
SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 542  (I977),  and  explicitly  notes  the  failure  of  such  easy  solutions  to  the 
conflict, see id.  at 505, 527, he makes the same mistake in commenting on field restrictions that 
reserve exclusive  fields to  the  patent  holder.  See  id.  at  56o ("[T]hese are all  advantages  the 
patent holder is plainly entitled to under the patent if it excludes licensees entirely."). 
100 Sullivan  explicitly  states  that  the  conduct  element  of  ? 2  of  the  Sherman Act  is  met i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I847 
and Baxter,101 Gibbons,102 and others103  have on occasion done like- 
wise.  This  approach, which  concentrates on the denominator -  mo- 
nopoly cost -  to the exclusion of the numerator, is as flawed as the 
previous error of focusing exclusively on the numerator, the patentee's 
reward. 
B.  Formalistic  Conceptions Invoked by Courts and Commentators 
Not  all analyses of the patent-antitrust conflict have been marked 
by  the  sort  of  evasion  just  noted.  The  Supreme  Court  has  made 
several  attempts  to  formulate a  rule to  indicate  which  practices are 
permissible.  The  first  such  attempt  was  a  reference in  Bement  v. 
National Harrow Co. to "conditions which are not in their very nature 
illegal.  "104  Next,  the  Court  expressed  the  view  in  Motion  Picture 
"under circumstances  where  it  meets  the  basic  test  for  exclusionary  conduct  laid  down  in 
nonpatent cases."  Id.  at 509.  Under this test 
[a] patent acquisition policy is exclusionary when it is not an 'honestly industrial' expres- 
sion of 'superior skill or industry,' but represents a deliberate effort to preempt others, in 
the  sense that  the defendant  could have  avoided  following  the policy without  acting in 
an economically irrational manner, or in a way inconsistent with its own self-initerest. 
Id.  (footnote  omitted).  A  more clear-cut example  arises in  Sullivan's  discussion  of  territorial 
restrictions, in which  he states that "[t]he higher return to the patent holder [made possible by 
the opportunity to discriminate in price] is,  from the vantage point of the public,  unnecessary 
to the stimulation of any socially desired conduct." Id.  at 540.  This statement is quite remark- 
able,  for  it  directly  assumes  that  there  exists  no  social  policy  favoring  increased  reward  to 
patentees.  See  also  id.  at  55I  (stating,  in  discussing  General Electric,  that  "permitting the 
patentee to fix prices would  be gratuitously to allow an unnecessary competitive restriction"). 
101  See  Baxter,  Legal Restrictions  on Exploitation  of the Patent  Monopoly: An Economic 
Analysis,  76  YALE  L.J.  267,  297  (I966)  (arguing  that  "legality of  the  seller's  monopoly  is 
irrelevant to  .  .  . purpose" of Robinson-Patman Act).  But see infra Part VI. 
102  See  Gibbons,  Price  Fixing  in Patent  Licenses  and the Antitrust Laws,  5I  VA. L.  REv. 
273,  296  (i965)  ("Where the  patents  block  each  other,  restrictive licensing  can  be  prohibited 
with impunity because neither patentee is likely to refuse to license the other in reaction to the 
rule.") [hereinafter cited as Gibbons, Price Restrictions].  To state that price restrictions can be 
prohibited with impunity ignores the fact that restrictions may promote patent policy by increas- 
ing the  reward to the  patentee.  See  also  Gibbons,  Field  Restrictions  in Patent  Transactions: 
Economic Discrimination  and Restraint of Competition, 66 COLUM.  L. REV. 423,  44I-42  (I966) 
(discussing field restrictions) [hereinafter cited  as  Gibbons,  Field  Restrictions]; Gibbons,  Price 
Restrictions,  supra at  297-98  (discussing grant-back provisions). 
103 See,  e.g.,  Burstein,  A  Theory of Full-Line  Forcing,  55 Nw.  U.L.  REv.  62,  93  (i96o). 
Burstein  is fairly criticized  in W. BOWMAN,  PATENT  AND ANTITRUST  LAW I I8  (1973),  for 
finding sufficient support for the proscription against tying in the argument that "it limits the 
potential gains of monopoly power," which directly translates into a limitation of the patentee's 
reward. 
104  i86  U.S.  70,  9I  (I902)  (emphasis added).  After the Court's decisions in Addyston Pipe 
& Steel Co.  v.  United  States,  I75  U.S.  2II  (I899),  and United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight 
Ass'n,  i66  U.S.  290  (I897),  one would have  thought that price restrictions were "in their very 
nature illegal," but the Court concluded otherwise.  See National  Harrow,  I86  U.S.  at 93-94. 
This result is hard to understand unless a metaphysical inquiry into the difference between the 
naturally and unnaturally illegal is thought possible.  See,  e.g.,  Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense 
and the Functional  Approach, 35 COLUM.  L.  REv. 809  (I935). i848  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
Patents  Co. v.  Universal Film Manufacturing Co. that the "scope of 
every patent  is limited  to the invention  described in the claims con- 
tained  in  it."'105  Subsequent  formulations  have  included  the  focus  in 
the  General Electric  case on "the reward which  the patentee by the 
grant of the patent is entitled to secure"106  and the Court's statement 
in Zenith Radio  Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc.  that "the patentee 
[may not] extend  the  monopoly of his patent to derive a benefit not 
attributable to use of the patent's teachings."'107 
In  framing  each  of  these  tests,  the  Court seems  to  assume  that 
there exists some transcendant notion of what constitutes "normal"  or 
"proper" patent  exploitation.  If  there  were  such  a  well-established 
conception,  courts might have little difficulty reaching consistent and 
relatively  uncontroversial  decisions  on  these  issues.  In  light  of  the 
analysis developed in Parts I and II, however, it is plain that the basis 
for any such conception would be extraordinarily complex.  Moreover, 
patent-antitrust doctrine is noted for its indeterminacy and its frequent 
shifts  in  direction.108  These  circumstances suggest  that,  in  reality, 
courts lack any such uniform conception of the appropriate scope of 
a patent. 
Commentators have often invoked formalistic tests no more infor- 
mative  than  those  employed  by  the  courts.  Sullivan,  for example, 
suggests inquiry into whether the "power to fix the prices charged by 
the  licensee  or to  divide  territories among  licensees  [is] part of  the 
patentee's grant."109 This inquiry seems similar to the version of the 
"scope of  the  patent" test  that focuses on the  patent itself.110  Bux- 
baum has discussed the EEC's use of a test upholding practices "in- 
herent  in  the  patent  monopoly."111  Baxter  at  one  point  similarly 
105  243  U.S.  502,  5IO  (I9I7)  (emphasis added) (considering patent misuse challenge).  This 
approach continues to be followed  by courts.  See  Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v.  United States,  309 
U.S.  436,  456 (I940) ("The extent of that right is limited by the definition of his invention,  as 
its  boundaries are marked by  the  specifications and  claims of  the patent."); United  States v. 
Studiengesellschaft Kohle,  m.b.H.,  670  F.2d  II22,  II35  (D.C.  Cir.  i98i)  ("None of the  anti- 
competitive  effects  of  the  challenged restriction .  .  .  exceed the  anticompetitive effects which 
the patent authorized."); SCM Corp. v.  Xerox Corp., 463 F.  Supp. 983,  IOI4 (D.  Conn.  I978) 
("The exercise of [the] prerogative [of unilaterally refusing to license a patent] is a corollary of 
the  explicit  statutory grant of  the  right to  exclude  others from making,  using,  or selling  the 
patented invention."),  aff'd,  645 F.2d  II95  (2d  Cir. i98i),  cert. denied,  455 U.S.  ioi6  (i982). 
It is difficult to understand how careful study of the papers describing a patent can resolve the 
patent-antitrust conflict. 
106  United States v.  General Elec.  Co.,  272 U.S.  476, 489 (I926)  (emphasis added); see also 
id.  (referring to "scope of the patentee's rights"). 
107  395  U.S.  IOO,  I36  (i969)  (emphasis  added). 
108  For  example,  note  the  overruling of  Henry v.  A.B.  Dick  Co.,  224  U.S.  I  (I9I2),  by 
Motion  Picture  Patents  Co.  v.  Universal  Film  Mfg.  Co.,  243  U.S.  502,  5i8  (I9I7),  and  the 
rocky history of General Electric,  see,  e.g.,  L.  SULLIVAN,  supra note 99, at 54I,  543. 
109  L.  SULLIVAN,  supra  note  99,  at  53I. 
110  See  supra  pp.  I847-48. 
111  Buxbaum,  Restrictions  Inherent in  the Patent  Monopoly: A Comparative Critique,  II3 
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phrases  the  issue  as  whether  "the  premium  .  .  .  constitute[s]  income 
of the kind contemplated by the patent system."  112  Perhaps the most 
sweeping  recent  use  of  such  formalistic  tests  appears in  Stedman's 
description of the various legal approaches that he claims are available 
for  resolving  the  patent-antitrust  conflict.  His  typology  relies  upon 
such tests as "full  monopoly power of the patentee" and "scope of his 
patent.  "113  Clearly, the tests advocated by these commentators suffer 
from the  same  weakness  that  the  courts' tests do.  By  assuming the 
existence of a background standard of the appropriate scope of patent 
exploitation,  they simply beg the question of determining which prac- 
tices should be allowed. 114 
C. Bowman's "Competitive Superiority" Test 
i.  Understanding  Bowman's  Test.  -  Bowman  states that his test 
"assumes the  propriety of  allowing  a  patentee to use any method of 
charging what  the traffic will  bear if,  but only if,  the reward to the 
patentee arising from the conditional use measures the patented prod- 
uct's  competitive  superiority  over  substitutes."1115  This  competitive 
superiority approach has two  components.  Primarily, Bowman  relies 
on an objective  test that takes as affirmative evidence of legitimacy a 
licensee's or buyer's willingness  to accept a restriction as a condition 
112 Baxter, supra note  iOi,  at 343. 
113  Stedman,  supra note  i6,  at 595; see also Note,  An Economic Analysis of Royalty Terms 
in Patent  Licenses,  67 MINN. L.  REv.  II98,  1221  (I983)  (patentee "simply . . . extract[s] the 
full  monopoly  return to  which  he  is  entitled").  Stedman's attempt to  apply the  scope-of-the- 
patent test proves difficult, see Stedman, supra note i6,  at 599 (text at note 25), which he later 
acknowledges  to some degree, see id.  at 6oo (text at note  29). 
114  It might also be possible to characterize some of these tests not as empty formalisms, but 
as  variations  on  the  theme  of  "antitrust law  reigns  supreme" discussed  in  Part I.  In  other 
words,  the  phrase "inherent in  the  patent  monopoly" could  be  read to  allow  the  patentee  to 
extract monopoly profits but not to engage in any restrictive practices that violate the antitrust 
laws in furtherance of that monoply.  Such an interpretation seems inconsistent with the intention 
of courts and commentators employing formalistic tests.  Yet to the extent that any such notion 
does underlie any of these tests, it would be subject to the same criticism noted supra pp.  I846- 
47 -  that it involves  applying antitrust policy as though patent policy were irrelevant. 
115  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at x; see  id.  at  88.  Years earlier, Furth  had offered a 
similar test  in  the  context  of  evaluating  price-restricted licenses.  See  Furth,  Price-Restrictive 
Patent  Licenses  Under  the  Sherman Act,  7I  HARV.  L.  REV.  8I5,  8I7  (I958)  ("The patent's 
competitive  superiority should set the bounds of the reward afforded its users regardless of the 
way  the  patentee  chooses  to exploit the patent.").  Nevertheless,  I  choose to associate the test 
with  Bowman  because  he and  his book have  become far more prominent and this analysis is 
more typically associated with  him.  Moreover, Bowman  applies the test in a far wider variety 
of  contexts  and  thus  presents  it  as  a truly general approach.  Others have  since  used  similar 
formulations.  See,  e.g.,  R.  BORK,  THE  ANTITRUST  PARADOX at  x  (I978)  ("Bowman's own 
book, Patent  and Antitrust Law, is so good and so definitive that I have not even attempted in 
this  book to  comment  upon that  branch of the law.  There is nothing more to say." (footnote 
omitted)); Bowes;  The Misapplication  of Antitrust  Theory and  Patent  License  Conditions,  iO 
AKRON L.  REV.  39 (I976). i850  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
to  the  deal."16  Bowman  does  not  completely  limit  himself  to  this 
objective  component,  because it would  potentially immunize any re- 
strictive  practice  by  a  patentee,  even  a  blatant  cartel."17  Instead, 
Bowman  sometimes  proceeds beyond the  objective  test  of  what  the 
market will  bear."18  Therefore,  he  must  be  considering some  addi- 
tional  limitation  when  he  refers to  "competitive superiority."  More- 
over,  this  second  principle must be addressed in every case,  even  if 
the  principle is  rarely dispositive.  In  giving  content to  this  second 
component,  Bowman  seems to rely upon formalistic conceptions such 
as those discussed previously,1"9  for he often resorts to arguments for 
or formulations of  his test  that fall within  the formalistic genre.  In 
his  first chapter,  for  example,  he  reasons that  "evaluating whether 
certain patent licensing practices should be sanctioned will involve the 
proper scope of the legal monopoly.  Is more being monopolized than 
what  the  patent  grants,  or  is  the  practice  merely  maximizing  the 
reward attributable to  the  competitive advantage afforded by a pat- 
ent?"'120  One  reason the  indeterminacy of  the  second component of 
Bowman's test may not readily present itself upon first reading is that 
pure horizontal cartelization is virtually the only behavior he would 
prohibit.  Because almost everyone today agrees with that element of 
his position,  12  the reader might be lulled into accepting it uncritically. 
In  addition to  Bowman's  ambiguous language,  there is a further 
obstacle  to  understanding and analyzing his  test.  In most contexts, 
he finds his test to be satisfied a fortiori, because he believes that most 
allegedly restrictive practices should not be held to violate the antitrust 
laws  even  in  the  absence  of  patent  policy  considerations.122  These 
beliefs, which Bowman shares with others in the "Chicago School,"  123 
derive from criticisms of arguments based upon leverage, foreclosure, 
and exclusionary practices'24 -arguments  that have  generated con- 
siderable controversy.  125  To the extent that Bowman's argument rests 
116 Bowman  also refers to this objective test as profit maximization, see W. BOWMAN, supra 
note  I03,  at  x,  and  applies it  to  numerous situations,  see,  e.g.,  id.  at 55-56  (territorial, use, 
quantity, and price restrictions). 
117  See  infra pp.  I867-68  (discussing Bowman's position on price-fixing cartels). 
118  For  an  example  of  an  apparent departure from his  test,  see  the  discussion in  Priest, 
Cartels and Patent License Arrangements, 20  J.L.  & ECON.  309,  337 n.ioi  (I977),  in which he 
addresses  Bowman's  analysis  of  Standard Sanitary Mfg.  Co.  v.  United  States,  226  U.S.  20 
(I9I2). 
119  See  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at  226  (characterizing the  pure cartel as  a  "scope 
extension"). 
120  Id.  at  8-9  (emphasis  added); see  also  id.  at  54  (referring to  "the 'scope' problem," 
"monopoly beyond  the  patent's proper scope," and the  "advantage properly ascribable to  the 
invention"); supra note  II9. 
121 See  sources cited infra notes  I87,  i88. 
122 See  W. BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at ix-x,  64. 
123 See generally, e.g.,  R.  BORK,  supra note  II5  (applying the Chicago School approach). 
124 See,  e.g.,  W.  BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at 54-6I. 
125  See,  e.g.,  R.  POSNER,  ANTITRUST LAW I77-2II  (I976);  Blake  & Jones,  In  Defense  of i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I85I 
upon  such  beliefs,  his  book  adds  nothing  to  the  resolution  of  the 
patent-antitrust conflict.  This  Article devotes little attention to these 
issues  and  instead  concentrates on  how  the  patent-antitrust conflict 
should  be  resolved  when  some  conflict  is  found  to  exist.  Because 
Bowman so rarely finds anything worthy of concern from the antitrust 
side  of  the  conflict,  most  of  his  discussion  of  the  conflict  is  only 
tangentially relevant if one regards the antitrust issues to be of central 
concern.  Nonetheless,  his  previously  quoted  statement  of  the  com- 
petitive superiority test, combined with his frequent passing references 
to and applications of the test, seem sufficient to allow an understand- 
ing of the rule he intends. 
2.  Criticism  of Bowman's Test. -  Bowman's  competitive  superi- 
ority test fails to resolve the patent-antitrust conflict satisfactorily.  The 
second,  formalistic  component  of  his  test  is  subject  to  the  critique 
developed  in  Section  B.  Even  if  one  leaves  aside  the  problems  of 
defining "competitive superiority," one can readily perceive the short- 
comings  of  his  objective  test,  upon  which  he  normally  relies,  by 
comparing  it  with  the  ratio  test  proposed in  Part  II.126  Bowman's 
test seems to focus solely on the numerator of the ratio -  the paten- 
tee's reward.  From this  perspective,  the test permits any reward to 
the  patentee  that  does  not  exceed  the  bound  set  by  "competitive 
superiority.  "127  The  test  is flawed  because it ignores the  denomina- 
tor.  128  Although  it  was  noted  previously  that  the  numerator  and 
Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 377 (I965);  Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust 
Policy,  65  COLUM. L.  REV.  422  (I965);  Bork, Contrasts in Antitrust Theory (pt.  i),  65 COLUM. 
L.  REV. 40I  (I965);  L.  Kaplow,  Extension  of  Monopoly  Power  Through  Leverage  (Harvard 
Law  School Program in Law  and Economics Discussion Paper No.  4,  May  I984)  (unpublished 
manuscript on file in Harvard Law  School Library). 
126 Bowman  also misunderstands the connection between setting the optimal patent life and 
determining  patent-antitrust  doctrine.  He  states  that  "[l]engthening or  shortening  the  patent 
period seems  a  far better  solution  to  the  rewarding problem than  is  manipulating patent  ex- 
ploitation  standards."  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  103,  at 52; see also id.  at  II5  (remarking on 
"a  political  problem  of  'just  rewards,'  which  .  .  .  is  .  .  .  an  extremely  skewed  and  most 
inappropriate function of antitrust or patent law").  Of course, any given set of patent-antitrust 
doctrines  can  be  termed  a  "manipulation" only  by  reference to  some unbiased starting point. 
Bowman's reference point is, in fact, quite biased in that it is derived from a one-sided analysis, 
as  this  subsection  indicates.  More  fundamentally,  Part II  demonstrated that  the  problem of 
rewarding  patentees  inevitably  combines  analysis  of  the  patent  period  and  patent-antitrust 
doctrine in a manner that undercuts Bowman's position. 
127 Bowman's test,  by permitting any restrictive practice that the licensee or buyer is willing 
to endure, implicitly compares the situation in which the practice is permitted to that in which 
the invention  had never existed,  or, equivalently,  to the situation in which the patentee refuses 
to  practice  the  patent.  See  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at  88;  infra p.  i885.  From  this 
perspective,  Bowman's  test  can  be  seen  as  another version  of  the  argument that  the  greater 
includes  the  lesser,  which  was  seen  to  ignore  the  antitrust side  of  the  conflict.  See  supra p. 
I 845. 
128 Bowman  presents the conclusion that various restrictions "are all means not of creating 
monopoly,  but  rather of maximizing the  return the patent affords."  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note 
I03,  at 55-56.  He is correct that the restrictions probably help maximize the patentee's reward i852  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
denominator -  patentee reward and monopoly loss -  tend to vary 
together,  it  was  established  that  the  connection  is  quite  loose.129 
Moreover, it was noted that even if the connection were perfect, there 
would be no basis for determinately resolving any component of pat- 
ent-antitrust doctrine.  130  Merely knowing that the numerator is not 
too large in any given instance does not allow one to decide whether 
the restriction at issue is better or worse than most others.  At best, 
such knowledge  has  some bearing on the notion that reward should 
be proportional to the value of the patent; this information would be 
sufficient for an application of the proportionality test,  but that test 
was  shown in subsection II.A.3  to be inadequate. 
Of course, the limit imposed by the competitive superiority test 
what the market will bear -  is not totally unrelated to the magnitude 
of the denominator.  If the denominator is sufficiently large, the traffic 
may  not  bear the  restriction.  Even  with  this  refinement, however, 
the competitive superiority test is inadequate.  The buyer's or licensee's 
decision to accept a deal depends simply upon whether it expects to 
derive  a net  profit.  That  decision tells us neither how  much of the 
buyer's or licensee's cost accrues to the patentee as reward nor how 
much detriment results -  for example, in terms of monopoly loss.'31 
The purpose of the ratio test is to incorporate precisely these questions. 
-  the  numerator -  but  the  reference to  "creating monopoly" seems  more germane to  the 
magnitude  of  the  denominator -  monopoly  loss.  Bowman  thus  appears in  this  instance  to 
assert a conclusion concerning the  magnitude of the  denominator based solely upon the mag- 
nitude of the numerator -  in effect treating them as if they were mutually exclusive categories. 
This  is  clearly  incorrect,  because  the  numerator and  denominator  generally  tend  to  move 
together.  See supra p.  I821. 
When discussing the economics of the patent system more generally, Bowman  takes notice 
of both the system's costs and its benefits.  "The problem should thus be recognized as involving 
a trade-off between  the  short-run disadvantages  of  monopoly on  already granted patents and 
the possibly greater advantages of having new or better products not otherwise available."  W. 
BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at  I7.  But  Bowman's test does not take account of this trade-off. 
As a result, he does not compare the costs of various practices with  an eye toward providing 
incentive  at  the  lowest  cost  possible.  In  essence,  his  approach implicitly  (and  erroneously) 
assumes that,  but  for the  reward provided by each  restrictive practice he  advocates,  none of 
the  inventions  that  the  patentees exploit  would  have  been forthcoming.  The  cost component 
thus is ignored when he examines the patent-antitrust conflict. 
129 See supra  pp. I82I,  I832-33. 
130 See supra p.  I82I. 
131  For example,  individuals may accept the conditions knowing that, if they do not, others 
will.  If  the  conditions  are outlawed,  however,  the  patentee may come forward with  a better 
offer.  This  is not to say that under such circumstances the result is always preferable, for the 
patentee no doubt receives less benefit.  The  point instead is that one would have to consider 
all these effects in order to determine the ratio, which in turn would guide the decision concerning 
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D.  Baxter's "Comparability"  Test 
Baxter's test is that 
a patentee is entitled to extract monopoly  income by restricting  utili- 
zation of his invention, notwithstanding  that utilization  of other  goods 
and services are consequently  restricted,  provided that in each case 
he confines  the restriction  to his invention  as narrowly  and specifically 
as the technology  of his situation  and the practicalities  of administra- 
tion permit. 132 
This test seems remarkably similar to the formalistic tests that inquire 
into the "scope of the patent."'133  One possible interpretation of Bax- 
ter's test is that it is concerned primarily with limiting the reward to 
the patentee.  In fact,  Baxter states that his formulation is desirable 
because it provides "a stream of benefits to the patentee .  .  . roughly 
comparable to the ultimate value of the invention."134  This "compar- 
ability" test thus has much in common with  Bowman's  "competitive 
superiority" test.  To  the  extent  that  this  similarity  holds  true,  the 
central criticism of the latter approach developed in subsection ILA.3 
-  that  it  ignores  the  cost  of  providing  the  reward  -  is  likewise 
applicable here.  This  apparent congruence is not too surprising, be- 
cause  Bowman's  test  could  also  be  characterized as simply restating 
the "scope of the patent" formulation. 
Bowman  and  Baxter,  however,  reach strikingly different conclu- 
sions from their similar points of departure.  Baxter's language seems 
more restrictive  in  terms of  the  limits  it  would  place  on  patent  ex- 
ploitation.  Unlike  Bowman's  test,  Baxter's does  not  permit the  pa- 
tentee all that the traffic will bear, but rather requires that restrictions 
be confined as narrowly as possible.  The  basis for this further limi- 
tation is never clear, although arguably it reflects a bias toward min- 
imizing the infringement upon antitrust policy.  135  Even if one assumes 
that  Baxter's  test  is  more  restrictive  than  Bowman's,  the  criticism 
leveled  against  Bowman's  test  remains applicable.'36  At  best,  each 
commentator  offers  a  test  regulating  the  maximum  reward without 
offering any analysis that bears on whether the level  selected is any- 
132 Baxter, supra note  Ioi,  at  3I3.  Gibbons frequently takes a similar approach, see,  e.g., 
Gibbons, Field  Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at 465-66,  as does Buxbaum, see Buxbaum,  supra 
note  iii,  at 649. 
133  See  supra Section III.B. 
134  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at  3I3  (emphasis added). 
135  Of course, one could just as easily take Baxter's test as the starting point and characterize 
Bowman's test as one that is biased against antitrust policy.  This dual possibility highlights the 
emptiness of formalistic attempts to resolve the patent-antitrust conflict. 
136  See supra subsection III.C.2;  see also supra note 38 (discussing proportionality test when 
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where near the appropriate amount or whether that reward is achieved 
in the least costly manner possible.'37 
Because Baxter's focus is on minimizing restriction to the greatest 
extent possible, his test could also -be seen as an approach directed at 
minimizing  monopoly  loss,  the  denominator of  the  ratio.  Baxter's 
analysis of many specific applications supports this interpretation.138 
From this perspective,  Baxter's approach can be characterized as one 
that  tends  toward  results  favoring  the  antitrust side  of  the  conflict 
(which involves  only  the  denominator), whereas Bowman's  tends to 
favor the patent side (which is the basis for the numerator).  Baxter's 
test is therefore subject to essentially the same criticism as that lodged 
against Bowman's  test: concentrating exclusively on the denominator 
is a priori no better than concentrating only on the numerator. 
In  sum,  the concept underlying Baxter's approach is one of limi- 
tation  or minimization.  Yet  he never makes clear whether he seeks 
to limit  reward,  or monopoly loss,  or both.  At only one point does 
Baxter  seem  to  concern  himself  -  at  least  implicitly  -  with  the 
relationship between  reward and  loss.  His  concern can  be  inferred 
from the following  warning: 
The value to  the patentee of licensee conduct may far exceed its 
detriment  to the licensee;  indeed, the conduct  may be as beneficial  to 
the licensee as to the patentee, in which case the licensee has no 
incentive  to resist the demands,  and any expectation  of comparability 
is foolish. 139 
This  refinement seems to  be  a crude version of the factor discussed 
in subsection II.B.2(b)  concerning what portion of the reward accrues 
to  the  patentee.  In  the  context  of  this  statement,  however,  Baxter 
seems more concerned with ensuring that the reward ("[t]he value to 
the patentee") not exceed the value of the patent (which Baxter equates 
with  the  "detriments to  the  licensee").  140  Unlike  Baxter's primary 
formulation,  this  consideration does bear directly on the magnitudes 
of the  ratio's numerator and  denominator.  But  Baxter fails here - 
as  he  does  throughout his  analysis -  to  examine in  any systematic 
way  the  relationship  between  patentee  reward  and  monopoly  loss. 
Baxter simply asserts that his formulation "gives appropriate scope to 
both  antitrust and patent policy."''4'  Yet  he  offers no reason what- 
soever demonstrating that his test yields the correct balance between 
the total reward patentees receive and the total monopoly loss incurred 
137  Moreover, even  if the total reward were approximately correct, it might be achieved in 
an inefficient fashion because no attention is given to whether those restrictions that are permitted 
have the best ratios and thus result in the least cost. 
138  See,  e.g.,  infra Section VII.B. 
139  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at 3I4. 
140  See  id.  at  3I3. 
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by society, nor does he demonstrate why his test reliably assesses the 
desirability of particular restrictions. 
Thus,  analysis under the ratio test shows that past approaches to 
the  patent-antitrust  conflict  have  been  misguided.  By  ignoring  the 
conflict,  by  appealing  to  empty  formalisms,  or  by  concentrating on 
only  one  component  of the  ratio, each  attempt has failed to  address 
fully  the  concerns relevant  to a determination of proper patent-anti- 
trust policy.  In  the following  four Parts,  the  ratio test is applied to 
several prevalent patent-antitrust problems.  These applications dem- 
onstrate how the ratio test can bring such complex issues into sharper 
focus. 
IV.  APPLICATIONS:  PRICE-RESTRICTED  LICENSES 
The  desirability  of  price-restricted licenses'42  -  licenses  under 
which  the  patentee  sets  the  price  at  which  licensees  must  sell  the 
patented item -  depends substantially upon what one believes to be 
their purpose.  Sections  A  through C explore three possible  motiva- 
tions  for  price-restricted licensing:  protecting the  patentee's  market, 
disguising cartelization,  and promoting efficiency through resale price 
maintenance.  Application  of  the  ratio  test  demonstrates  that  price 
restrictions should  be prohibited whenever  the patentee seeks to  use 
such  restrictions to  facilitate  cartelization.  The  issue  becomes  com- 
plicated,  however,  to  the  extent  that  salutary motivations  unrelated 
to  cartelization  are  also  plausible.  In  that  event,  the  appropriate 
approach  depends  upon  whether  it  is  possible  to  distinguish  good 
purposes  from  bad.  If  this  is  not  possible,  one  must  focus  on  the 
significance of  the  contrary effects  and the  likelihood  that  each  will 
occur even  if  the  restrictive practice is prohibited.  These  aspects of 
the  decisionmaking  process  are  included  in  the  discussion  in 
Section C. 
A. Protecting  the Patentee's Market 
Perhaps the earliest and now one of the most enduring explanations 
advanced for price-restricted licensing was articulated by the Supreme 
Court  in  United  States  v.  General Electric  Co.143  In  holding  that 
such restrictions were permissible, the Court relied upon the following 
rationale: 
When the patentee licenses another to make and vend, and retains 
the right to continue  to make and vend on his own account, the price 
142  Most of the analysis in this Part applies equally to output restrictions. 
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at which his licensee  will sell will necessarily  affect the price  at which 
he can sell his own patented  goods. It would seem entirely  reasonable 
that he should  say to the licensee,  "Yes,  you may make  and sell articles 
under my patent, but not so as to destroy the profit that I wish to 
obtain by making  them and selling them myself."'144 
This  argument could  be  extended to  attempt to justify  price re- 
strictions on the ground that they protect the numerator by preventing 
licensees from siphoning off the patentee's reward.  Such an argument, 
however,  is  unconvincing.  Although the  market-protection explana- 
tion finds favor with a number of commentators,145  others have dem- 
onstrated its superficiality.  146  As long as the patentee charges a royalty 
that at least equals the difference between what is believed to be the 
best price and the patentee's own  costs,  the patentee has no obvious 
economic interest in protecting its own sales -  it will receive at least 
as much profit from the royalty income attributable to sales by licen- 
sees.  Moreover,  if  the  patentee believes  that it is less efficient than 
some of its licensees,  it might profit even more by charging a royalty 
greater than the profit it could make per unit, and licensees would in 
any event  be able to make more sales at a given profit margin than 
could the patentee.  Price restriction motivated by a desire to protect 
the market for a patented item is therefore not profit-maximizing, and 
to that extent,  market protection might not appear to be a plausible 
motivation for the licensing practice.'47  This would suggest that the 
144 Id.  at 490. 
145  Furth, after quoting this language from General Electric,  finds that it "aptly summarizes 
the  principle  that  the  proper  measure  of  the  patentee's  reward  is  his  patent's  competitive 
superiority." Furth, supra note  II5,  at 8 I9-20.  He affirmatively advances the market-protection 
rationale later in  his discussion.  Id.  at 830.  Gibbons asserts that "the purpose of the [price] 
restriction is protection of the patentee from competition."  Gibbons, Price Restrictions,  supra 
note  I02,  at  286.  He  advances  the  same explanation for field restrictions, see Gibbons,  Field 
Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at 458,  and this theory seems implicit in his analysis of territorial 
restraints as  well,  see  Gibbons,  Domestic  Territorial Restrictions  in  Patent  Transactions and 
the Antitrust Laws,  34  GEO. WASH. L.  REv. 893,  9II-I2  (I966)  [hereinafter cited as Gibbons, 
Territorial Restrictions]. 
146 See,  e.g.,  W. BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at  I28;  Baxter, supra note  Ioi,  at 3I6,  332-35. 
147 It is possible that market protection would be consistent with profit maximization if the 
licensor were  seeking to  maintain  its  position in the  industry.  Maintaining its position might 
enhance  the  licensor's  bargaining  power  in  any  necessary  renegotiation of  agreements  with 
licensees,  particularly when  licensees are limited in number and may thus have countervailing 
power.  Alternatively, the licensor may hope to retain a strong market position when the license 
expires.  Two  reservations,  however,  should be noted.  First,  to the  extent that such motives 
operate, the restriction would be costly to the licensor because licensees who would receive less 
would  not  be  willing  to  pay  as  much  for the  privilege offered by  the  license.  Second,  both 
objectives  can  probably  be  achieved  equally  well  through  royalty arrangements,  which  can 
protect the licensor's sales while extracting profits from the licensees.  Price or output restrictions 
therefore seem redundant. 
Posner and  Easterbrook argue that  if  the  patentee  has  a  rising marginal cost for its  own 
production  and  is  insufficiently  informed  about  licensees'  costs  of  production,  it  might  be 1984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I857 
alternative  theories  discussed  below  in  Sections  B  and  C  are  more 
relevant for determining antitrust policy for this issue. 
The  market-protection theory's inconsistency  with  profit maximi- 
zation,  however,  does not completely rule it out as an explanation for 
price-restricted licensing.  The  patentee's decision to  protect its  own 
sales might be based "on a misconception of his economic interest or 
on a non-economic consideration.'48  The former explanation is quite 
plausible,  for if the market-protection theory persuaded all members 
of  the  Supreme Court in  I926  and  is  still  advocated  by  some  com- 
mentators today,  it might well  remain a motivating force behind the 
actions  of  some  patentees.  Alternatively,  patentees  might  be  moti- 
vated by noneconomic concerns, such as maintaining the level of their 
own production and sales as an end in itself.149 
If either of these  explanations  were valid,  the question would  be 
whether these theories cut in favor of permitting price-restricted licen- 
sing or prohibiting it.  Baxter does  not find any support for prohibi- 
tion: 
If the explanation  is a misconception  of economic  interest or a non- 
economic  factor, the royalty  structure  may do economic  harm;  but no 
justification  occurs  to me for the general  subordination  of unidentified 
non-economic  objectives to economic  goals or for using the antitrust 
laws  to  assure that  private economic interests are correctly per- 
ceived.  150 
profitable to set a price floor in addition to a royalty rate.  See R.  POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, 
ANTITRUST  269  (2d ed.  I98I).  Although this factual configuration is possible,  it hardly seems 
likely.  The  argument assumes  that patentees  cannot renegotiate the royalty rate and that  the 
output  effect  for  the  industry  as  a  whole  is  less  than  the  rising marginal cost  effect  for  the 
patentee.  Moreover, this argument implies two  somewhat inconsistent premises: first, that the 
patentee's information concerning the comparison of the output effect and marginal cost effect 
is  sufficiently  precise  to  reach  the  hypothesized  conclusion,  and  second,  that  the  patentee's 
information concerning these effects is insufficiently precise to serve as the basis for setting the 
royalty rate. 
148  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at 3I8;  see Priest, supra note  ii8,  at 3I2  ("There is no reason to 
believe  that  company  officials understand the  mechanism by which  any particular practice or 
policy affects profits.").  See generally L.  Kaplow, supra note  I25,  at 54-62. 
149  See  generally W.  BAUMOL,  BUSINESS  BEHAVIOR, VALUE AND  GROWTH (rev. ed.  I967) 
(arguing  that  sales  and  growth  maximization  may  better  explain  the  motivations  of  many 
oligopolists  than  does  profit maximization); R.  MARRIS,  THE ECONOMIC  THEORY  OF 'MANA- 
GERIAL'  CAPITALISM  46-6I  (i 964) (discussing noneconomic motives beyond profit maximization); 
0.  WILLIAMSON,  THE  ECONOMICS  OF DISCRETIONARY  BEHAVIOR 79-8I  (I967)  (discussing 
Baumol's sales-maximization  model); Bailey  & Boyle,  Sales Revenue Maximization: An Empir- 
ical  Vindication,  5  INDUS. ORG. REV. 46  (I977)  (finding sales  maximization  to  be  a  serious 
motivation  for  corporate  managers  in  70%  of  the  firms analyzed); Hirschey  & Werden,  An 
Empirical Analysis of Managerial Incentives,  7 INDUS.  ORG.  REv. 66 (I980)  (presenting empirical 
evidence of dual profit and sales incentives for managers of large industrial corporations).  This 
theory is controversial, see,  e.g.,  F.  SCHERER, supra note  2I,  at  37-41,  and its merits will  not 
be considered further here. 
150 Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at  318. i858  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
The rationale for this position is unclear in light of Baxter's concession 
that economic harm might result.  Although it might be true that the 
antitrust laws  were  not  enacted  for this  purpose,  there seems  little 
sense  in  avoiding  their  application  in  circumstances in  which  such 
application would  be  beneficial.  This  argument becomes even  more 
forceful if one concludes,  based on the analysis to follow in Sections 
B  and  C,  that  the  most  plausible  alternative explanation for price- 
restricted licensing in many instances is that it disguises cartelization. 
In  that  event,  the  fact  that  the  practices might not  be  causing  the 
targeted harms, but other harms instead, is not a sufficient reason for 
withholding the antitrust proscription. 
It  is  not  obvious,  however,  that  the  net  effect  of  antitrust pro- 
scription will  always  be  beneficial.  To  the extent that firms pursue 
noneconomic objectives  or misperceive their interests, allowing firms 
to  act  on  these  motivations  can  be  considered to  be  as  much  of  a 
reward  as  additional  profits would  be  to  a  profit-maximizing firm. 
Permitting price-restricted licensing would therefore serve the purpose 
of  rewarding  patentees  and  thus  encouraging inventive  activity,  al- 
though measuring the incentive induced would be even more difficult 
than  it  proved  to  be  in  the  profit-maximization scenario discussed 
previously.151  If  one  believes  that  non-profit-maximizing behavior 
frequently explains price-restricted licensing,  and that price-restricted 
licensing can have a sufficiently high ratio of reward to loss from this 
perspective,  one must consider the feasibility of determining whether 
this  theory,  rather than  that  of  disguised cartelization,  explains  the 
behavior  observed  in  any  given  case.  The  analysis relevant to  this 
question is undertaken in Section C. 
B.  Disguised  Cartelization 
i.  Price Restrictions  in Direct Licensing Arrangements.  -  If there 
were  no  limits  on  price-restricted licensing,  even  the  most  trivial 
patent could become the centerpiece of a price-fixing cartel.  Consider 
the following example, which is simply a more detailed version of the 
one  discussed  previously.152 Before the licensing arrangement, mar- 
ginal  costs  and  prices in  the  industry are $ioo.  The  new  patented 
process reduces production costs by $o.oi.  The patentee licenses each 
firm in the industry to use its new process for a royalty of $o.oi  per 
unit, subject to the restriction that the firms must sell at prices estab- 
lished  by  the  patentee,  which  also  produces the  product.  After  all 
firms in the industry have accepted such licenses, the patentee sets a 
price of  $I50,  which  is  its  best guess of the profit-maximizing price 
for the industry.  The result is essentially a price-fixing cartel that can 
151 See supra subsection  II.B.2(c). 
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both openly  set a price and enforce its agreement.153 Note  that this 
result  could  follow  even  if  the  patent  had  substantial  value,  or  no 
value  at all.154 
The  conclusion  that  such  practices  should  not  be  permitted  is 
slightly less obvious  than it may first appear.  After all,  the patentee 
does  benefit  from  the  scheme,  and  prospective  inventors  would  no 
doubt  be  encouraged if  they  knew  that  their invention  could  be  re- 
warded not only by a royalty payment covering its value,  but also by 
a slice of the potential monopoly profits for the entire market to which 
the patent is relevant.  The typical response is that this reward might 
be totally out of proportion to the value of the patent, as the illustra- 
tion suggests. 155  As demonstrated in subsection II.A.3,  disproportion- 
ate reward may well  be a sufficient condition for prohibiting a prac- 
tice.156 But if courts deemed it a necessary condition, they would be 
obliged  to  undertake the  monumental  task  of  establishing  the  value 
of the patent in every such case.  Such determinations may be unnec- 
essary, however,  because it seems fairly clear that the grossly dispro- 
portionate reward typically generated by a cartel will provide incentive 
far  above  the  optimal  level  and  thus  result  in  a  misallocation  of 
inventive  resources. 
Moreover,  even  if  the  reward were  not  that  substantial  because 
the  potential  for monopoly  profit in the  industry were limited,  or if 
153  The enforcement aspect is perhaps the less important of the two because individual firms 
can upset the scheme simply by refusing to join in the first place, or perhaps by cancelling their 
licenses  (to the extent  that this is permitted or would  be a possible remedy in an enforcement 
suit).  The  degree to which an individual firm would be able to engage in such practices would 
depend upon its market share, production costs at different levels of output,  and other market 
conditions.  See  generally Landes  & Posner, supra note  49  (discussing the  factors relevant  to 
market power,  including  factors determining the  strength of competing firms).  This  fact  does 
not rob this aspect of the agreement of all its force, however,  for cheating on the cartel would 
at least be much easier for the firms to detect and thus less effective. 
154  The  price could be set equally high,  even if the new process were no more efficient or a 
new  product were deemed no more desirable by consumers, as long as end-product prices were 
controlled  or  there  was  an  implicit  agreement  to  confine  production  to  the  new  process  or 
product.  Such  an agreement might  be easy  to  monitor, especially  because the  patentee  could 
inspect operations under the guise of ensuring royalty compliance. 
155 See,  e.g.,  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  103,  at 63 (stating,  in discussing collusion  through 
combination,  that  the  "output restriction .  .  .  is  unrelated to  the  reward  attributable to  the 
patent"); L.  SULLIVAN,  supra note 99,  at 554 (profit from the arrangement "cannot be said to 
be  'reasonably' within  the  patentee's reward"); Baxter,  supra note  ioi,  at  339 ("[Sjharing the 
monopoly profits . . . suggests restraint unwarranted by the value of the invention."); cf. McGee, 
Patent  Exploitation:  Some Economic  and Legal Problems, g J.L.  & ECON. 135,  I36-37  (I966) 
(arguing that a patent system,  by sanctifying collusive pricing, might "increase expected values 
of private return from patents without  increasing social value" and thereby lead to overinvest- 
ment in inventive  activity). 
Bowman's  objective  test  for  determining whether  reward is  in  excess  of  the  value  of  the 
patent,  a test that simply looks to whether licensees or buyers have accepted the condition, fails 
to prohibit the restrictive practice even  in this case.  See supra subsection III.C.i. 
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there were uncertainty or disagreement over how much reward is too 
much,  one would probably still want to disallow this practice for the 
reasons suggested  by  the  ratio test.  Only a  portion of  the  resulting 
profit accrues to the patentee.157 Unless  the patentee's market share 
is very large,158 the numerator is likely to be small in relation to the 
denominator.  The ratio test would therefore indicate that the practice 
is relatively undesirable regardless of the magnitude of the effect upon 
market  price. 159 
2.  Price  Restrictions  in  Cross-Licensing Arrangements. -  When 
the  parties have  entered into  arrangements providing for the  cross- 
licensing of patents, there is an especially acute danger that patentees 
are actually motivated  by a desire to create a disguised cartel.  This 
danger suggests that such price restrictions should be prohibited unless 
alternative  justifications  are both  important and  readily identifiable 
by  courts.  The  problem  is  most  straightforward when  prices  are 
restricted among firms that cross-license competing patents.160 In this 
situation,  courts  face  greater  difficulty  in  determining  whether  an 
arrangement involving  cross-licensing is  a  disguised  cartel,  because 
the royalties paid will not reflect the actual values of the patents, but 
only the differences among the values.  Two firms could, for example, 
cross-license  patents  of  similar  value  with  little  or  no  transfer  of 
royalties.  If,  however,  nonmembers of  the cross-licensing group are 
licensed,  the  royalties paid by such nonmembers can  be analyzed in 
the same way that one draws inferences from the payment of royalties 
to a single patentee. 161 
With complementary patents, just as with competing patents, there 
is  a  significant danger that  cross-licensing schemes will  mask  price- 
157  See supra subsection II.B.2(b). 
158  If  the  patentee  does  have  a  very large market share,  it  probably has  almost as  much 
market power even  without resorting to the restrictive license or even without the patent itself. 
See supra note 49. 
159  This  conclusion  would  have  somewhat  less  force to  the  extent  that,  in  such  a  cartel 
arrangement, the patentee imposed a royalty substantially in excess of the value of the patent 
and  kept the proceeds, rather than redistributing them to the licensees.  The greater the excess 
royalty, the  greater the slice of the reward that would go to the patentee,  and the higher the 
ratio.  Of course,  the  problem of  proportionality between reward and the value  of the patent 
could become quite severe at this point.  Essentially, there would be great incentives to encourage 
even the most trivial of inventions -  resulting in great social costs.  One might doubt that such 
a degree of excessive  royalties would occur frequently or that it would be significant.  It arises 
from granting to one member of the cartel -  the patentee -  a disproportionately large share 
of the profits, even  after accounting for the value,  if any, of the patent -  a condition unlikely 
to be tolerated by other members of the cartel. 
160  When competing patents are cross-licensed, the dangers discussed in Part V also arise. 
161  See  Priest, supra note  iI8,  at 329-30;  id.  at 347-49  (using such analysis to interpret the 
arrangement in United States v.  General Elec.  Co.,  272 U.S.  476 (I926),  under the assumption 
that Westinghouse also held valuable patents); id.  at 357. I 984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  i86i 
fixing conspiracies.162  In this context,  Priest advances the contention 
that 
[w]here firms have  cross-licensed  complementary patents  .  .  .  some 
form of price restriction  is essential  for the firms  to take advantage  of 
licensing efficiencies  and still gain the full monopoly  return  for their 
inventions.  .  .  But  since  the  cross-licensing  makes  each  firm  a 
competitor  of the other, the two must agree to restrain  sales to avoid 
competing  away the patent rents.  163 
It  seems,  however,  that  if  each  licensor charges the  other a  royalty 
that  reflects the  value  of  the  licensed  patent,164  profits will  be  pre- 
served without  resort to price restrictions.  An example is offered in 
the margin. 165 
Firms  can  nevertheless  accomplish price-fixing indirectly through 
such royalty schemes.  As  the example in the footnote demonstrates, 
the price resulting from such a system will be the producers' cost plus 
the  total  of  their  per-unit  royalty  obligations.  One  might  therefore 
argue that  prohibiting price restrictions would  be futile  because  the 
same results could be achieved through royalty arrangements.166 
162 
Some of the most egregious price-fixing schemes in American economic history were 
erected  on  a  foundation  of  agreements  to  cross-license  complementary  and  competing 
patents.  .  .  .  Typically,  such  arrangements have  been  implemented  by  adding  to  the 
patent exchange  agreement  provisions specifying prices,  market quotas,  membership in 
the industry, and other aspects of conduct and structure. 
F.  SCHERER, supra note  2 I,  at 45 2. 
163 Priest, supra note  iI8,  at 357. 
164 There is, of course, a conceptual problem in placing values on each patent independently 
when  some or all of the benefit can be achieved only when both patents are used together. 
165 Consider the  following  example: The  cost of production for firms A and B  is $6  when 
both patents are exploited.  A's patent is worth $2  per unit,  and B's is worth $i.  A charges a 
royalty of  $2,  and B  charges $i.  Thus,  A's cost is $7 ($6 plus the $i  royalty owed  to B).  B's 
cost is $8 ($6 plus the  $2  royalty owed  to A).  Under these circumstances, a price of $9 would 
prevail,  and A and B would each earn a profit equal to the value of its invention on every unit 
sold,  either directly in the case of its own  production or through royalty payments in the case 
of production by its competitor.  To see that this price results, consider the result if, for example, 
the price were to equal $8.  At that price, B can make no profit on its own production, because 
its costs are $8,  and B  makes $i  on A's production from royalties; hence B  would  not produce 
at that price.  Similarly, A makes only $i  per unit on its own production (its costs are $7), but 
$2  on B's through royalties; hence A would also prefer not to produce at this price and, in any 
event,  would  be able to  charge more.  One would  thus expect prices to rise.  Alternatively,  if 
the  price were  $io,  B  would  make  $2  on  its  own  production and only $i  on A's, whereas A 
would make $3 on its own  production and only $2  on B's.  Thus,  each would try to sell more, 
which would compete the price downward.  Equilibrium is achieved at $9, because at that price 
each  firm makes  the  same  profit regardless of  which  firm produces the  output,  and  there is 
therefore no further upward or downward  pressure on the price. 
166 One  limit  on  such  schemes  is that other firms could  undercut the  conspirators' price if 
the patents were not worth the royalty payments.  Of course, the same can be said for a price- 
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This  argument  fails,  however,  because  royalty schemes  used  to 
facilitate  collusion can easily be detected.  If the cross-payments are 
not of the same magnitude,  firms receiving larger per-unit payments 
will  benefit  by  a  correspondingly  greater  amount,  and  one  might 
expect firms, especially if the numbers are not very small, to be unable 
to  agree  on  such  a  disparate  sharing  of  the  spoils.  Attempts  at 
equalization167 should  be  detectable  because substantial rebates will 
be  difficult to  hide.168  The  only  alternative would  be to  set all the 
cross-royalty obligations at the same levels.  But such an arrangement, 
particularly if  it  involves  more than  a  very  few  firms, would  most 
likely take on the appearance of a sham -  the firms' defense would 
have to be that every firm in the group possesses one or more patents 
that, if each firm's patent holdings are taken as a unit, have the same 
value.  Moreover,  the  firms would  have  to  find patents  that  could 
plausibly support such claims,169 that are all valid,  and that include 
among them no patent due to expire during the course of the agree- 
ment.  Thus,  the justification for tolerating price restrictions among 
patentees that  hold  complementary patents seems unpersuasive,  and 
attempts  to  circumvent  a  prohibition on  such  restrictions would  be 
relatively easy to detect. 170 
C. Alleged Justification for Price Restrictions: 
Resale Price Maintenance 
If price restrictions can be justified on grounds other than disguised 
cartelization, further analysis is required.  This  Section will focus on 
the  most  common  alternative  justification  -  that  such  restrictions 
entail resale price maintenance.  The structure of the argument, how- 
ever, is also applicable to other areas. 
Price restrictions are often defended on the ground that, in essence, 
they  permit the  patentee  to  practice resale price maintenance.  Pro- 
ponents of this explanation claim that resale price maintenance is both 
a  generally beneficial arrangement and a  necessary condition to  the 
patentee's securing an appropriate reward.171 From this perspective, 
167 In this context,  "equalization" might mean, for example, reward in proportion to market 
share. 
168 See  infra note  I82. 
169 Another necessary condition for the claims to be plausible is that the value of each firm's 
patent(s) is also equal to the group royalty rate that is chosen. 
170  An  additional  difficulty  with  permitting  price  restrictions in  licensing  complementary 
patents is that  it  may  be difficult to distinguish competing from complementary patents.  See 
Priest, supra note  ii8,  at 358.  Thus,  a more relaxed approach toward the latter may have  to 
be abandoned to prevent abuse in cases involving  the former. 
171  See,  e.g.,  W.  BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at  I32-35;  Priest, supra note  ii8,  at  324-25. 
See  generally R.  BORK,  supra note  II5,  at  280-98  (defending resale price maintenance); W. 
BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at  I20-39  (same); R.  POSNER, supra note I25,  at I47-66  (same).  But 
see  F.  SCHERER, supra  note  2I,  at  59I-93  (arguing that  resale price  maintenance  is  overly 
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one  could  conclude  that  this  practice not  only  produces no  net  mo- 
nopoly  loss,  but  that  it  might  actually  produce  some  gain.  Three 
problems must  be  overcome,  however,  before the  resale price main- 
tenance justification  can  be  accepted in this  context.  First,  it is de- 
batable  whether  the  alleged  effects  of  resale  price maintenance  are 
desirable.  But  because  that  issue  has  no  unique  application  in  the 
patent-antitrust  context,  it  will  not  be  the  focus  of  analysis  here.172 
Second,  proponents of  the  resale price maintenance justification  im- 
properly dismiss the  possibility that traditional horizontal conspiracy 
might better explain  the observed behavior.  Finally,  once both pos- 
sibilities are recognized, it is necessary to consider whether courts can 
172 In presenting the typical justifications for resale price maintenance, insufficient attention 
is generally given  to whether alternatives exist that could achieve the benefits attributed to this 
practice.  One example in which alternative practices might be possible is the need to maintain 
the quality of repair and service after purchase.  Presumably such activities would or could be 
limited to  purchases from the outlet offering the service; alternatively, there could be separate 
charges, either directly to the customer or to the dealer that originally sold the product.  If no 
such  arrangements were  possible,  there  would  still  be  a  free-rider problem even  with  resale 
price maintenance because retailers providing repairs and service bear all of those costs whereas 
retailers providing nothing share in the benefits.  When the free-rider problem is serious, as in 
the  case  of  advertising  the  manufacturer's or  patentee's  product,  alternatives  such  as  direct 
provision of advertising,  targeted subsidies,  sales quotas,  or direct advertising requirements are 
possible.  See,  e.g.,  Priest, supra note  ii8,  at 325 n.56.  But  see White,  Vertical Restraints  in 
Antitrust Law: A Coherent Model,  26  ANTITRUST  BULL.  327,  333,  338 (I98I). 
In  addition,  in the  patent-antitrust context,  restrictions on the number of licensees may  be 
equally  effective  and  far  less  dangerous.  Restricting  the  number  of  licensees  will  drive  up 
margins in  much  the  same  manner as  will  resale price maintenance or territorial restrictions. 
The  key difference is that this technique can be successful only to the extent that the patent is 
valuable.  Licensing  a  patent  of  little  or  no  value  to  a  limited  number of  licensees  will  not 
increase prices because other firms, operating without a patent license,  can still compete.  This 
analysis draws  on  the fact  that proportionality -  reward's being less than total value  -  is  a 
necessary condition for a given practice to be desirable.  See supra subsection II.A.3  and Section 
IV.B.  The  ratio test could in principle dictate that patentees should not be permitted even  to 
limit  the  number  of  licensees.  Cf.  infra p.  I879  (territorial and  field restrictions limiting  the 
number of licensees in each territory or field).  This question will not be considered further here. 
To  the extent  that  these alternatives were not fully adequate,  the loss would  be limited  to 
the degree to which  they fell short of creating the incentives  provided by resale price mainte- 
nance.  How  much they  might fall short,  if at all,  is unclear because resale price maintenance 
alone is not an absolute cure for the free-rider problem.  See,  e.g.,  Advising Clients on Vertical 
Restraints:  Panel  Discussion,  5I  ANTITRUST  L.J.  50,  52  (I982)  (remarks of  Robert Pitofsky). 
The  mechanism  can  be  circumvented  if  discounters  can,  for  example,  tie  to  the  sale  of  the 
product in  question  a  good  or service  sold  below  cost.  Moreover, in  the  case of  advertising, 
substantial free riding is still possible.  There is also no guarantee that promotional efforts will 
be directed primarily at other brands, rather than at other distributors of the same brand -  a 
circumstance  that  is  of  little  help  to  the  manufacturer or  patentee.  See  Caves,  Crookell  & 
Killing, supra note 62,  at 263 (observing that licensors granting exclusive licenses often request 
performance clauses,  minimum royalty payments, and sometimes downpayments for protection). 
In sum,  the argument that resale price maintenance is justified because it eliminates free riders 
is frequently advanced  but rarely analyzed in much detail. i864  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
reasonably be  expected  to  determine which  theory best explains the 
behavior in a particular case. 
The theory of resale price maintenance might not accurately reflect 
the circumstances surrounding many price-restricted licenses.  For ex- 
ample,  although  price-restricted licensing is often characterized as  a 
vertical rather than a horizontal restraint, the accuracy of this char- 
acterization  is  not  obvious.  If  one  assumes  that  the  patentee  is  in 
competition  with  its  licensees,  as  has  been  the  case  in  most  of  the 
leading  Supreme Court decisions  on  the  subject,173  it  is  quite  clear 
that the  patentee's self-interest is  hardly inconsistent with  its propa- 
gation of a cartel.  Despite this fact,  Bowman,  a leading promoter of 
the  resale  price  maintenance  justification,  repeatedly  characterizes 
price-restricted licensing  as  a  vertical  arrangement.174  Although  he 
admits the possibility that a collusion theory might conceivably explain 
the arrangement in General Electric,  he emphasizes that such a theory 
"was not the basis for the decision in the case."  175  This,  of course, 
is hardly surprising, considering that General Electric was decided in 
favor of the patentee.176 
But simply recognizing that price-restricted licensing is horizontal 
as well  as  vertical  in  all cases in which  the patentee competes with 
its licensees does not dispose of the resale price maintenance rationale, 
because the arrangement might still have  vertical effects that should 
be taken into account.  To the degree that the patentee derives some 
of its profit through royalties, it does have an incentive for its licensees 
to maximize sales.  Licensees can be both distributors of the patentee's 
invention and competitors with the patentee's production.  Thus,  it is 
173  See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  New  Wrinkle, Inc.,  342  U.S.  37I  (I952);  United  States v. 
United States Gypsum Co.,  333 U.S.  364 (I948); United States v.  General Elec.  Co.,  272 U.S. 
476 (I926). 
174  See,  e.g.,  W. BOWMAN,  supra  note  I03,  at  I2I;  id.  at  I29  (referring  to  Furth's  suspicions 
of  collusion  in  General  Electric);  id.  at  I30,  I38. 
175  Id.  at  I38 n.38  (emphasis in original). 
176  As  noted  previously,  Bowman  himself  criticized the  rationale offered  by  the  General 
Electric  Court to explain the arrangement.  See supra p.  i856  & note I46.  The Court did not 
address the collusion theory. 
Bowman  further suggests that the evidence required for determining, for example,  whether 
collusive  behavior is present "is not different from that required in the usual cartel case."  W. 
BOWMAN,  supra  note  I03,  at  I38.  At  first glance,  it  might  appear that  Bowman  has  just 
reversed his  position  on  price-restricted licenses,  for proof of a  written price-fixing agreement 
-a  price-restricted licensing scheme being such an agreement -  would typically be more than 
sufficient.  The  reversal,  however,  is  only  apparent; Bowman  goes  on  to  suggest  that  "the 
appropriate restriction to  look  for  is  restriction of  the  nonpatented,  or  the  competing  other 
patent."  Id.  If that were the test, the simple cartelization scheme described in Section B would 
be legal.  But Bowman  does not seem to go this far, for when reviewing cases decided prior to 
the  passage  of the  Clayton Act,  he notes that the Court in Bement v.  National  Harrow Co., 
i86  U.S.  70 (I902),  may have overlooked an "industrywide horizontal price agreement" lurking 
beneath the patent arrangement.  W. BOWMAN, supra  note  I03,  at  I50-5I.  For a discussion of 
Bowman's approach in the context of collusion, see subsection III.C.i. 1984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I865 
not clear, a priori, whether the vertical or horizontal characterization 
best  captures the  primary motivations  for and effects of  a given  ar- 
rangement of this  type and thus whether a high or low  ratio should 
be ascribed to this restrictive practice.177 
Because  the resale price maintenance explanation can be asserted 
in  defense  of  virtually  any  price  restriction scheme,178 and  because 
the  dangers  of  disguised  cartelization  in  wholly  unregulated  price- 
restricted licensing  are substantial,  it  is  desirable to  permit such  re- 
strictions  only  under  those  circumstances in  which  cartelization can 
readily be detected if present.'79  Priest, who has examined this prob- 
lem extensively,  has reached the conclusion that detection is generally 
feasible.'80  His  analysis represents a substantial advance.  Nonethe- 
less,  it is still  difficult to know  whether courts in most cases can  be 
sufficiently certain whether a cartel exists.  The problem will be great- 
est  when  agreements  are  of  short  duration  and  thus  provide  little 
opportunity for observation of their effects, as would be the case when 
a proposed licensing scheme is challenged before or immediately after 
it takes effect.  The evidence presented by Priest appears unambiguous 
in  many  instances  precisely because the  offenses  had been egregious 
and there had  been  ample time to observe  their effects.'81  In  other 
177  In the  case in  which  there is a patent with  nontrivial value  coupled with  a price-fixing 
scheme,  both motives  could conceivably  be at work. 
178  As  suggested  by  the discussion  in  note  I79,  this is  true even  in the case  of  traditional 
horizontal price-fixing.  The parties can argue that, because of free-rider problems, the industry's 
product cannot  best  be  promoted in  the  absence  of  restrictions; hence  it  is  necessary for  the 
industry to fix a price above  that yielded by unfettered competition in order to give  each firm 
an incentive  to advertise the product and provide pre-sale information. 
179  An analogy to the relationship between the rules in United States v.  Topco Assocs.,  405 
U.S.  596  (I972),  and  Continental  T.V.,  Inc.  v.  GTE  Sylvania,  Inc.,  433  U.S.  36  (I977),  is 
instructive.  Sylvania  dealt  with  vertical  territorial restrictions, which  are similar in  effect  to 
vertical  price  restrictions,  and  Topco dealt  with  horizontal  territorial restrictions,  which  are 
similar in effect to horizontal price restrictions in that market division is one way of cartelizing 
an  industry.  Part  of  the  justification  offered as  a  defense  in  Topco -  the  encouragement of 
local  advertising  -  was  essentially the same as the free-rider argument offered in justification 
of resale price maintenance.  Had  the Court accepted the defense,  it would either have  had to 
permit  all  territorial agreements  or  be  faced  with  the  task  of  determining  the  effects  of  the 
arrangement in every case (and if Topco had been decided the other way, there may have been 
many  such  cases).  Without  resolving  whether Sylvania  or Topco were correctly decided,  one 
can  well  understand  why  the  Court reached opposite results in  the  two  cases.  See  Sylvania, 
433 U.S.  at 57 n.27,  58 n.28 (discussing horizontal-vertical distinction and applying it to Topco). 
Similarly,  one  could  imagine  the  Court's overruling its  decision  in  Dr.  Miles  Medical  Co.  v. 
John D.  Park & Sons Co.,  220  U.S.  373 (I9II),  which held that resale price maintenance is per 
se  unlawful,  much  more readily than  one  could imagine  the  Court's changing its  mind about 
United States v.  Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,  3Io U.S.  I50  (I940),  which held that horizontal price- 
fixing is per se unlawful.  Although the Court usually does not find it impossible to distinguish 
horizontal and vertical arrangements, but see supra note  178,  the option of simply maintaining 
different rules for each is far more problematic in the patent context described in text,  because 
the arrangement is both horizontal and vertical,  see supra p.  I864. 
180 See  Priest, supra note  ii8. 
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cases,  his  conclusions  are based upon an analysis of the  agreements 
themselves.  This  approach is  somewhat  different from the  general 
tests he proposes and may lose its utility if firms begin to write their 
agreements with  particular legal tests in mind.182  Moreover, Priest's 
conclusion  that  in  some  cases  there  was  no  cartelization  rests  on 
evidence that seems more ambiguous than he admits.183  Thus,  even 
Co.,  I42  F.  53I  (C.C.E.D.  Wis.  I906),  rev'd,  I54  F.  358  (7th  Cir.  I907),  cert.  denied,  2Io  U.S. 
439  (I9o8),  in  which  the  royalty was  4% and  prices increased  30  to  37.5%); id.  at  346-47 
(noting,  in  discussing  General Electric,  that  General Electric set only  a  2%  royalty and  that 
Westinghouse had the ability to survive massive price drops). 
182 See  id.  at 33I  (in discussing Bement v.  National  Harrow Co.,  i86  U.S.  7 (I902),  noting 
that  the  holding  company  admitted  that its  royalty was  merely an  administrative fee); id.  at 
334-40  (in discussing Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226  U.S.  20  (I9I2),  empha- 
sizing evidence that the firms agreed to restrict the production of seconds). 
Priest apparently suggests that courts should consider market data to the exclusion of other 
evidence.  See  id.  at 326-30.  Such an approach is unwise.  For example,  internal documents 
might aid in the discovery of royalty rebates.  Such documents might also help in the determi- 
nation of whether such rebates constitute payments for promotional services or the distribution 
of  cartel  proceeds.  In  general,  the  analysis  a  firm would  undertake before instituting  resale 
price maintenance would  differ substantially from that necessary for gauging the feasibility of 
a cartelization scheme,  and the process of determining what price should be set for each of the 
two  purposes would  be  based  upon  very different factors.  Thus,  an examination of  internal 
documents could prove very useful in determining a patentee's true motives. 
183 For instance, in discussing United States v. Masonite Corp.,  3i6  U.S.  265 (I942),  Priest 
notes the decline in market share of the largest licensee from 20%  in  I935 to less than  I2%  in 
I940,  see id.  at 353, yet this hardly seems conclusive of lack of conspiracy.  Priest also argues 
that the failure of one licensee during a time of stiff competition from firms selling other building 
materials disproves  the  cartel  hypothesis.  See  id.  at  354.  But  a  licensee's failure does  not 
negate market power altogether, because, under any theory, the licensee must have had higher 
costs  than  others.  Priest is  critical of the  government's approach in  Ethyl  Gasoline Corp.  v. 
United  States,  309  U.S.  436  (I940),  see  Priest,  supra  note  ii8,  at'349-5o,  but  his  inference  that 
cartelization was  unlikely  is  not  based  upon  market data  -  which  he  properly criticizes the 
Justice Department for not gathering -  but rather derives from his belief that the government's 
theory was simply implausible. 
Priest also argues that there is no choice but to undertake the sort of inquiry he proposes in 
every  case because a per se prohibition on price restrictions could readily be circumvented by 
resort to territorial restrictions, which are protected by the patent statute.  See id. at 3I5.  This 
position is  flawed  for a  number of  reasons.  First,  the language of the patent statute,  see  35 
U.S.C.  ? 26i  (i982),  is hardly an unambiguous endorsement of the legality of territorial restric- 
tions.  See,  e.g.,  L.  SULLIVAN,  supra note  99,  at  535-38;  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at  348-52 
("Only by amateurish literalism or cynical distortion can it be argued that ? 26i  places a general 
imprimatur of legality on territorial restrictions."); Gibbons, Territorial Restrictions,  supra note 
I45,  at 895-900.  In any event,  if the statute does so require, it seems Priest should be arguing 
at least in part that Congress should amend the statute.  Second, Priest's argument assumes that 
territorial restrictions are fully  effective  substitutes for cartelizing an industry.  This  is  surely 
not the  case.  Absent  a  patent that  revolutionizes an industry, territorial division  of sufficient 
scope  to  isolate  each  producer may  substantially disrupt well-established  capital investments, 
customer relations,  and the  like.  Such is not the case with  a direct price-fixing arrangement. 
Finally,  if  territorial restraints were  in  fact  both  impervious  to  antitrust attack  and  perfect 
substitutes for price restrictions, Priest's efforts would  have  been in vain.  In the long run, it 
would do no good to apply Priest's analysis and detect those price restrictions that were disguises 
for cartelization, for patentees would know in advance that territorial restrictions represented a 
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if courts were to find that resale price maintenance offers a compelling 
justification for price restrictions, it is not clear whether courts could 
adequately distinguish situations in which price restrictions were being 
used for resale price maintenance from those in which price restrictions 
merely masked the monopoly loss due to cartelization.184 
In sum,  although legitimate justifications for price-restricted licen- 
sing might exist,  it seems likely that the motive behind such schemes 
is often to disguise cartelization.  The ratio test clearly indicates that 
cartelization should  be  prohibited.  As  a  result,  courts should  think 
twice  before  allowing  exceptions  to  an  otherwise flat prohibition on 
price-restricted licensing,  because  the  resulting  case-by-case  inquiry 
might simply have the effect of insulating cartelization from detection. 
V. APPLICATIONS:  ACQUISITIONS,  CROSs-LICENSING,  AND 
SETTLEMENTS  INVOLVING  COMPETING  PATENTS 
Acquisitions,  cross-licensing,  and settlements involving  competing 
patents  all  raise  the  problem  of  combining  patents  that  otherwise 
might  have  been  licensed  or  exploited  in  competition  with  one  an- 
other.  185  Bowman  analyzes this problem as follows: 
The problem of patent accumulation,  the aggregation  of several or 
numerous  patents under single ownership  or control, is conceptually 
indistinguishable  from the merger  problem  under antitrust  law. .  .. 
A pool of competing  patents can be more readily  analogized 
to a loose association  than to a horizontal  merger. This, of course, 
depends upon one's evaluation  of the pool's efficiency-creating  poten- 
184  In  addition  to  offering  ways  to  detect  disguised  cartelization,  Priest's article examines 
two additional reasons that patentees might justifiably employ price restrictions.  First, he argues, 
patentees might regulate price to "prevent[] licensees from disassembling the product to reduce 
royalty payments."  Priest, supra note  ii8,  at 323  (footnote omitted).  "[I]f the royalty charge is 
set as some function of the licensee's sales revenues,  the licensee may gain by disassembling the 
product to reduce royalties, notwithstanding some consequent diminution in product sales."  Id. 
Priest also offers a far more intricate justification based upon the desire of the patentee to take 
advantage  of future cost reductions by licensees.  Id.  at 3I8-23. 
Both  of Priest's arguments fail to consider fully the effects of alternative arrangements that 
might  mitigate  these  problems.  In  addition,  neither argument clearly applies  in  a  significant 
manner to a broad range of cases.  This latter weakness is suggested by the failure of defendants 
to advance  such claims in numerous prior antitrust challenges in which it would have  been to 
their  advantage  to  do  so  even  if  the  arguments did  not  clearly apply.  For  a  more  detailed 
explanation of these arguments, see L. Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal 
9I-96  (Harvard  Law  School  Program in  Law  and  Economics  Discussion  Paper No.  2,  Dec. 
I983)  (unpublished manuscript on file in Harvard Law School Library).  Of course, to the extent 
that these or other justifications are deemed important, the decisionmaking framework applied 
to  resale price  maintenance  would  be  applicable,  and  the  complexity  of  case-by-case  inquiry 
would  be increased. 
185  Difficulties that might arise when complementary patents are combined or cross-licensed 
are examined in subsection IV.B.2 and in note I70,  which discusses the problem of distinguishing 
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tial.  A pool of competing  patents is difficult  to distinguish  from the 
cartel in this respect.  186 
The courts,'87 as well as most other commentators,188  take essentially 
the same approach.  They reason that, if competing patents were held 
separately, competition  would  drive royalty rates down  to the point 
at  which  each  patentee  could  hope  to  charge a  royalty that  merely 
reflected the degree to which  its patent was  more valuable than any 
of the others.  Combination or collusion eliminates this competition. 
Although this  consensus approach may reach the appropriate re- 
sult,  the  explanation  typically offered is  incomplete.  This  approach 
fails to appreciate the significance of the diminution in reward to the 
patentee  that  results  from  prohibiting these  arrangements and  thus 
essentially ignores the question whether patent policy might dictate a 
different  result.  In  terms  of  the  ratio test,  the  denominator is  the 
focus and the numerator is ignored. 
Application of the ratio test does not by itself automatically resolve 
this  problem because  the  numerator, which  measures reward to  the 
patentee,  is quite substantial.  One suspects,  however, that the ratio 
test would indicate that these practices are undesirable because, as in 
the case of price-fixing, the reward to the patentee is only a fraction 
of the aggregate reward generated by the arrangement.  In addition, 
the  reward arising from such  combinations  seems to  exceed  greatly 
the  reward required to  provide the amount of incentive  appropriate 
under the circumstances.  189 
The true social worth of any one of the competing patents,  given 
that the others exist,  appears to be limited to the degree to which the 
patent exceeds the  others in value.190  Thus,  in the simple situation 
in which each patent is essentially a perfect substitute for the others, 
any one patent has no economic value -  if the invention it protects 
had never been created, the same cost reduction or product improve- 
ment  could  have  been  achieved  equally  well  by  one  of  the  other 
patented  inventions.191  The  reward of  zero and  the  accompanying 
186 W. BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at  200-OI.  Bowman  argues  that  the  combination  of  two 
competing patents raises costs to licensees "above that measured by the 'competitive superiority' 
of either of the patents."  Id.  at 20I.  This contention is inconsistent with his general use of the 
competitive superiority test, under which he infers from licensees' willingness to accept the terms 
of the agreement that monopoly has not been extended.  See supra subsection III.C.i. 
187 See,  e.g.,  United  States  v.  New  Wrinkle,  Inc.,  342  U.S.  37I  (I952). 
188 See,  e.g.,  3  P.  AREEDA  &  D.  TURNER,  ANTITRUST LAW  ?  705a,  at  II7  (I978);  R. 
POSNER, supra note  I25,  at  9I-92;  L.  SULLIVAN, supra note  99,  at  566-68. 
189  Cf. supra subsection IV.B  (discussing excessive rewards in the context of collusion). 
190  A good discussion concerning the appropriate reward for partially and completely redun- 
dant inventions is provided in Beck, Patents and Over-Investment in Process Inventions: Reply, 
45  S.  ECON. J.  289 (I978).  For a discussion of the resources consumed by inventing around, 
see  F.  SCHERER, supra note  2i,  at  446. 
191 See,  e.g.,  Wright, supra note 25,  at 694. I984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I869 
absence of incentive provided by the competitive process would there- 
fore be appropriate.  192 
This  analysis,  unfortunately,  is  incomplete.  Even  though  each 
competing patent is of no incremental value relative to the others, it 
is  still  true  that  without  any  of  the  patents  the  situation  would  be 
worse.  If combination is precluded and the competitive environment 
accordingly eliminates all reward to the competing patents, one might 
ask  whether  there  remains  any  incentive  to  come  up  with  the  first 
patent.  Moreover, given a situation in which one patent already exists 
and the patentee accordingly reaps due reward for its monopoly, one 
should also consider what the proscription on combination does to the 
incentives for others to enter into competition with the initial patentee 
by "inventing around" the  initial  patent.  Both  inquiries look  to  the 
future, when the competing patents do not yet exist, and ask whether 
the result arising from a competitive regime -  in which combinations 
are prohibited -  will be more socially beneficial than the result from 
a regime that allows  unrestricted combination. 
The  less  difficult of the two  issues concerns the incentive  for the 
patentee's rivals to invent around the initial patent. 193  Such invention 
provides  no social benefit if the new  invention  is no better than the 
first194  and if the two patentees are permitted to combine in  order to 
recover as though they were one.  In fact, the only effect of inventing 
around in  such  circumstances is  to  redistribute the reward from the 
original  patentee  to  others.  195  Because  inventing  around  does  not 
contribute to welfare when combinations are permitted, the resources 
devoted to the task are entirely wasted.  Such waste would be avoided 
to  the  extent  that  inventing  around  were  discouraged  by  requiring 
192  This is arguably Bowman's point,  see supra note  i86,  if one emphasizes in his language 
the  reference to  "the 'competitive  superiority' of  either of  the  patents," id.  (emphasis added). 
The  criticism in text is still valid,  however,  for if the patents are pooled,  licensees will  in fact 
be  willing  to  pay  the  premium  as  though  only  one  of  the  patents  existed.  In  this  instance, 
Bowman  essentially is requiring that one analyze the situation that would prevail in the absence 
of  the  restrictive  practice as  a  basis  for comparison,  rather than  make  decisive  the  licensees' 
choice when  the restriction is present. 
193 "[IJn  the new  product category, few  positions impregnable to the imitation of rivals are 
attainable; it is  possible  to 'invent  around' all  but the most  basic patents."  Scherer, Research 
and Development Resource Allocation  Under Rivalry,  8i  Q.J.  ECON.  359,  364 (I967). 
194  To the extent that the second patent is better than the first, that increment of value will 
be rewarded even  with  competition.  Allowing  for such cases does not affect the analysis that 
follows. 
195 See  Priest, supra note  ii8,  at 362,  373.  Priest concludes from this that "[a] cross-license 
in this context unambiguously diminishes welfare."  Id.  at 362.  He  fails,  however,  to consider 
the effect upon incentives for future inventive  activity.  See id.  at 373 (stating that expenditures 
on  inventing  around "can increase social welfare  if they lead to erosion of the  monopoly  rent 
and reduction of the deadweight  loss"). 
It  is  possible  that,  even  if  patentees  are not allowed  to combine,  they will  still  be able to 
collude.  Usually,  however,  the remaining aggregate reward tends to decrease as the number of 
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competition.  And  to  the  extent  that  requiring competition does  not 
completely eliminate  the incentive  to invent  around, there would  be 
an  additional  social  benefit  because  competition  among  patentees 
would lower prices and thus reduce the loss in social welfare. 196 
The more difficult issue concerns the incentive for the patentee to 
come up with the initial invention.  But for the possibility of potential 
competition (inventing around), the initial inventor faces the prospect 
of  securing  the  full  monopoly  reward  under either  regime.  Yet  if 
competitors do invent around, and if combination follows, this reward 
will  be diluted. 197  The  issue thus becomes whether preventing com- 
bination would  result in a greater or lesser dilution of the reward to 
the  patentee.  The  important point  to  note  is  that,  whether  combi- 
nation  is  prevented or not,  no  one will  have  an incentive  to invent 
around unless the anticipated profit is sufficiently large.198  Thus,  in 
a competitive regime, to the extent that a second patent would prompt 
the rival patentees to compete away much of the total reward,199  there 
would  be  only  a  modest incentive  to  develop  the competing patent. 
The incentive would nevertheless suffice in cases in which the cost of 
inventing around is sufficiently small.  It is quite true that if the initial 
patentee anticipated that the incentive to its rival would be sufficient 
to  induce  inventing  around,  there might  be  a  serious diminution in 
incentive to come up with the invention in the first place.  The crucial 
point, however,  is that the same diminution in incentive would occur 
if combination were permitted.  Under a regime allowing combination, 
if the cost of inventing around is relatively low, more and more firms 
will  procure their own  patents  -  a development that will  force the 
196  Kitch  advocates  permitting firms to  pool  "as a  way  to  stop  what  will  otherwise be  a 
wasteful  and continuing investment process."  Kitch, supra note 7I,  at  279  n.37.  His analysis 
is deficient in two respects.  First, Kitch relies on the questionable assumption that firms would 
be admitted to a pool before most of the resources necessary to complete the inventing-around 
process have  been  spent.  Second,  and  more decisively,  he  overlooks the  fact  that firms will 
have  a greater incentive  to  begin the inventing-around process if they know that pooling will 
be  permitted.  Applied  to  the  example in  note  200,  Kitch's implicit model simply envisions  a 
lower cost of inventing  around (because the process need not be completed for the subsequent 
inventors to be admitted into the pool), which  in general does not decrease the total resources 
wasted as a result of permitting pooling.  If Kitch's theory were right, there generally would be 
less waste per duplicative invention but a proportionately greater amount of duplication. 
197  This  general  connection  was  noted  by  Priest.  See  Priest, supra note  ii8,  at  360-6I. 
Priest  claims,  however,  that  such  a  reduction "is unlikely  [because]  .  .  .  the  return to  the 
innovation  is a function solely of the time-lag between the first commercial use of the process 
and its duplication."  Id.  at 363.  The flaw in this argument is that the time lag is not exogenous, 
but might depend upon the rules adopted.  By ignoring this connection, Priest fails to consider 
the potentially ruinous effects of inventing around upon incentives to invent in the first instance. 
198 See supra subsection  II.B.2(c). 
199  It is difficult to predict how much competition might generally result from the existence 
of just  two  patents.  As  the  number of  patents increases, however,  the  remaining amount of 
aggregate  reward  will  tend  to  be  less.  The  analysis  in  text  holds  regardless of  the  precise 
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existing combination either to sacrifice its profits or to admit the new 
patentees.  In  general,  this  process would  continue until the original 
patentee  suffered  the  same  diminution  of  profit that  it  would  have 
suffered under a competitive  system.200 
200  The following example illustrates the analysis in the text.  Let C be the cost of inventing 
around -  that  is,  the  cost  of  developing  an  equivalent  invention  for all later inventors  after 
the first invention  has been made.  Consider the effects under two regimes: 
(i)  Invent and Combine: It is assumed for this illustration that the share of reward going to 
a later inventor is simply its market share divided  by the total market shares of all firms that 
are in the pool -  that is,  all firms that have come up with the invention.  To further simplify 
the  example,  assume  that  all  firms are the  same  size  and thus  have  the  same  market share. 
Additional firms will develop  the invention  if their share of the profits is greater than or equal 
to the cost.  Thus,  the equilibrium condition is 
(i/N)  X  P  =  C. 
N  denotes the  number of firms in the pool (that have  developed  the invention) and P  denotes 
the maximum total profits that can be achieved with  the invention.  This implies 
N =  PIC. 
Of course, the total expenditure of resources in this regime is simply N  x  C, which equals P. 
(2)  Invent  and Compete: Here it is necessary to specify how industry profits decrease as the 
number of firms with  the invention  increases.  Any formulation will  have the same qualitative 
result.  For illustrative purposes, assume that industry profits equal (i/N)  X P (where P denotes 
the maximum profits that could be achieved  without  competition) and that each firm with  the 
invention  realizes the  same  share of the industry profits as any other firm with  the invention. 
Then  the equilibrium condition is 
[(i/N)  x  P]IN  =  C, 
which implies that 
N  =  (P/C)112. 
The  total expenditure of resources under this regime is N  x  C, which equals (P  x  C)"2.  This 
is less than the total cost of P  under the first regime unless C is greater than or equal to P,  but 
in  that  case  no  firm would  have  an  incentive  to  invent  around under either regime,  and  the 
issue addressed here would  never arise. 
The  basic difference between  the two systems is that,  under the competitive regime, profits 
erode faster than under the regime allowing combination; therefore, equilibrium is reached with 
fewer firms having invented around and thus with less waste of resources.  There is, moreover, 
an  additional  benefit under the  competitive  regime.  Because  profits are eroded through com- 
petition,  the monopoly cost of the patent system is also less.  This savings has no cost in terms 
of the total reward to the initial invention by comparison to the regime that allows later copiers 
to combine.  Under both regimes,  the share of the remaining reward that accrues to the initial 
inventor is simply C.  It should be noted that these results are not dependent upon the particular 
formulation of the example  presented.  Essentially,  this is an example of how  potential  excess 
profits are translated  into  social  costs  when  no  barriers prevent competitors from eroding the 
profits.  Cf. Dasgupta  & Stiglitz,  Uncertainty, Industrial  Structure,  and the Speed  of R  & D, 
ii  BELL J. ECON.  I,  I3  (I980)  (noting dissipation of monopoly profits in race to arrive at patent 
first).  See  generally Posner, supra note  20  (noting general tendency of monopoly profits to  be 
converted into social costs). 
This erosion of profits under either regime may result in insufficient incentive for anyone to 
develop the initial patent.  Cf. F. SCHERER, THE  ECONOMIC  EFFECTS OF COMPULSORY  PATENT 
LICENSING 24  (Center for the Study of Fin. Inst.,  New  York Univ.  Graduate School of Business 
Admin.,  Monograph  Series in  Finance  and  Economics  No.  1977-2,  I977)  ("If small  potential 
innovators come to expect that their innovative thrusts will be promptly countered by established 
firm defensive  moves,  they  may  be  discouraged from trying.").  In  this example,  the  problem 
would  exist  whenever  the  cost  to  the  initial  inventor  was  greater than  the  cost  of  inventing 
around, and it seems plausible that this condition would often be satisfied.  There are, of course, i872  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  97:I8I3 
The  preceding  analysis  suggests  a  preference for requiring com- 
petition.  Although  forcing  competition  diminishes  the  reward  and 
thus the incentive for invention in the first instance, permitting com- 
bination  has  been  shown  to  entail  a  similar result.  Thus,  the  net 
other benefits that go to the first inventor, such as receiving the full industry profit until others 
begin to  invent  around and  retaining various benefits that often accrue to the first to offer a 
new  product,  such  as  an  advantage  in  building a  reputation.  See,  e.g.,  id.  at  2I,  23.  The 
potentially ruinous effects of inventing around upon incentives for the initial invention are here 
demonstrated to plague  the  patent system generally.  Indeed,  inventing around is just  a more 
involved  type of copying,  which it was the very purpose of the patent system to prevent.  The 
issue arises because of the difficulty in defining the appropriate scope of the patent grant.  (Here, 
by  "scope" I  do  intend  to  refer  to  the  description  of  the  patent  found  in  the  documents 
constituting the patent grant.) 
One cannot be certain of the result described here in view  of the simplicity of the example. 
Delays  in the time it takes to invent  around a patent might affect the expected profits for the 
first inventor more under one regime than under the other.  Also, the simultaneity of competitors' 
research and  development  activities,  combined  with  technological uncertainty concerning the 
likelihood of success from any given endeavor, complicates the story.  Moreover, if the costs of 
inventing  around  rise  as  the  number  of  imitating  patents  increases,  the  regime  permitting 
combination would  offer a greater expected reward to the initial patentee, and the comparison 
of regimes would  thus  become more uncertain.  (The opposite relationship -  decreasing costs 
-  would  seem  to  favor  the  competitive  regime.)  At  present,  I  see  no  a  priori grounds for 
assuming  that  such  complications  bias  the  result in  one  direction or  another.  Yet  the  very 
complexity of the problem warns against overconfidence in drawing conclusions at this stage in 
the development of the analysis. 
There is one technical qualification to the results described in both regimes.  Because reward 
declines more rapidly under the competitive system, requiring competition might sometimes fare 
better than the results indicate.  An extreme example illustrates the point.  If prospective second 
patentees  anticipated  that  competition  would  reduce  rewards so  much  that  there  would  be 
insufficient reward left for them to recover their research and development costs, no one would 
have  a sufficient incentive  to develop  the second invention.  The original patentee would then 
be  left  with  a  more substantial  reward than  it would  have  gained under a  combination that 
involved  sharing of the aggregate profit; the resources that would have  been consumed by the 
duplicative invention  would also be saved. 
Finally,  it  is worth noting that,  under either regime, the largest firms in any industry will 
have the greatest incentive to invent around.  This is because the larger the firm's market share, 
the  greater its  share of  the  reward,  as long as  aggregate rewards (as opposed to rewards per 
unit of output) are positively correlated to the firm's market share -  an assumption that seems 
plausible.  One might thus expect the resulting pattern of development to be one in which the 
largest firms are the ones with  the patents.  In addition,  for similar reasons, they may be the 
most likely to invent in the first place. 
This  point does not support the view  that larger firm size is most conducive to innovation, 
which  is  a  highly  controversial  issue.  See  generally F.  SCIIERER,  supra note  2I,  at  407-38 
(discussing the literature); Kamien & Schwartz, Market Structure and Innovation: A Survey,  I3 
J.  ECON.  LIT.  I  (I975)  (same).  The  analysis  instead  seems  to  indicate  that,  in  any  given 
industry, it will be the firms with the greatest relative size that will be more likely to innovate, 
and to duplicate others' inventions,  when the costs of inventing around are low  relative to the 
value  of the invention.  This  perhaps suggests that the empirical literature on the relationship 
among market structure, firm size, and innovation, discussed in the sources cited supra, is biased 
toward the conclusion that larger market shares tend to produce more innovation in an industry. 
(In this  regard, it should  be noted that,  beyond intermediate levels  of size and concentration, 
the studies do not generally find a positive relationship between innovation and size or concen- 
tration.)  I  call  this  a  bias  because  a  positive  correlation is likely to  be found even  though it I 984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I873 
difference between  the  two  regimes is  that forcing firms that invent 
around to compete will tend both to decrease the resources wasted on 
duplicative  research and development  and to diminish the monopoly 
loss incurred in providing the original inventor with  a given level  of 
reward.  In  terms of the ratio test,  the competitive  regime results in 
a  similar numerator but  a lower  denominator than  does  the  regime 
permitting  combination  and  thus  is  a  relatively  more  desirable  ap- 
proach.  This  conclusion,  however,  is  subject  to  substantial  uncer- 
tainty in light of the present deficiencies in knowledge of the subject; 
in  some  circumstances,  the  first inventor might indeed have  less  in- 
centive to develop  a patent under a competitive regime than under a 
regime permitting combination.201 
This  Part has not compared the various contexts in which  patent 
combinations  arise.  Nor  has  it  attempted  to  address  many  of  the 
issues that might prove relevant in determining the rules appropriate 
in each of those contexts.  The application of the ratio test,  however, 
has  demonstrated that  the  prevalent  distrust of  patent combinations 
is probably justified,  notwithstanding the shortcomings in the current 
analysis of these practices. 
VI.  APPLICATIONS:  PRICE  DISCRIMINATION 
A.  The Desirability  of Permitting Price Discrimination  by Patentees 
The  analysis  of  the  benefits  of  allowing  price  discrimination  by 
patentees,  as  noted  in  subsection  II.B.2(a),202 focuses  primarily on 
how  much  of  the  patentee  reward  is  pure  transfer.  For  a  given 
numerator  (patentee  reward),  the  denominator  (monopoly  loss)  de- 
creases as the extent to which the patentee achieves its reward through 
transfers of  economic  surplus increases.203 Price discrimination was 
does not indicate that higher concentration or larger firm size will  increase innovative  activity. 
The  only  sense  in  which  higher  concentration or  larger firm size  might  in  fact  result  in  an 
increase is that the equilibrium level of copying activity would be higher for larger firms.  For 
the reasons suggested  in  the  text,  however,  this effect is socially undesirable and  thus adds  a 
further reason  to  question  whether  any  observed  positive  relationship between  firm size  and 
innovation  gives  appropriate guidance for policy formation. 
201 See supra note  200. 
202  See  also supra p.  I833  & note 50 (further discussion of price discrimination). 
203  Outside the  patent  context,  conferral of reward through transfers might be undesirable 
for a  number of  reasons.  One  reason,  explored by  Posner, see  Posner, supra note  20,  is that 
added rents induce rent-seeking behavior that eventually competes away the rents while wasting 
resources along the way.  It is precisely this process that the patent system attempts to convert 
to an advantage,  for it is the holding out of the patent reward that induces the "rent-seeking" 
behavior  that  in  this  context  constitutes  inventive  activity.  Unfortunately,  it  also  leads  to 
wasteful duplication,  see,  e.g.,  supra Part V, litigation costs,  and other losses as well. 
Outside  the  antitrust  context,  the  principle that  price discrimination can  be  used  to  raise 
needed revenues from consumers with different elasticities of demand while keeping losses to a i874  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  97:I8I3 
offered as  the  typical  situation  in  which  reward might be  achieved 
primarily through transfers. 
Although  many  commentators have  favored permitting patentees 
to  engage  in  restrictive practices that facilitate price discrimination, 
their  analyses  often  fail  to  recognize the  need  for simultaneous ex- 
amination of the numerator and the denominator of the ratio.  Bow- 
man,  for  example,  who  typically  concentrates solely  on  the  ratio's 
numerator,  finds  price  discrimination  acceptable  largely  because  it 
increases the patentee's reward.204 To bolster his position, he protests 
the unfairness that results when some patentees cannot engage in price 
discrimination because certain restrictive practices have been prohib- 
ited, whereas other patentees are in a position to discriminate without 
resorting to  such  practices.205 Bowman  correctly observes that  this 
situation  induces  inefficiency by  encouraging the  further integration 
of  some  firms  to  the  detriment  of  more  efficient  smaller  firms; to 
alleviate  this  problem,  he  advocates  permitting price discrimination 
by all patentees.206 His argument, however, would fail to justify his 
conclusion if the practices of the larger firms were themselves unde- 
sirable, particularly if those practices could be regulated.207 
Other  observers  overemphasize  the  denominator of  the  ratio  in 
assessing the  desirability of  price discrimination.  Many patent-anti- 
trust commentators tend  to  assume that the  desirability of  allowing 
patentees to practice price discrimination depends upon what the effect 
on output will be in various circumstances.208 Indeed, price discrim- 
minimum has arisen in a number of settings.  See,  e.g.,  A. ATKINSON & J. STIGLITZ, LECTURES 
ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS  366-93  (I980)  (taxation); Bailey & White, Reversals in Peak and Offpeak 
Prices,  5  BELL  J.  ECON.  & MGMT.  SCI.  75  (I974)  (utility rate-setting); Baumol  & Bradford, 
Optimal Departures From Marginal Cost Pricing,  6o  AM. ECON.  REV.  265  (I970)  (price regu- 
lation of monopoly). 
204  See  W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at  56.  Elsewhere,  he  refers to  the  effect  of  price 
discrimination as  "maximiz[ing] the  return ascribable to  the  differential advantage the  patent 
affords."  Id.  at  ioi. 
205 See  id.  at 56. 
206 See  id. 
207  Cf. supra note 33 (making same argument in proportionality context). 
208  See,  e.g.,  L.  SULLIVAN, supra note 99,  at  540-4I  (in discussing territorial restrictions, 
noting that "[t]he higher return to the  patent holder is,  from the vantage point of the public, 
unnecessary to  the  stimulation  of  any  socially  desired conduct"); id.  at  557 (taking a  similar 
position regarding use of field restrictions to facilitate price discrimination).  Williamson's criti- 
cism  of  Bowman  (whose  statement  is  quoted  later in  this footnote) also  relies heavily  on the 
efficiency consequences  -  although  Williamson considers transaction costs in  addition to  the 
output effect -  while attributing little significance to the effect on the patentee's reward.  See 
Williamson,  Book Review,  83 YALE  L.J.  647,  66o (I974). 
Bowman  avoids the error of focusing on output effects (although he makes a similar mistake 
in a related context, see infra Section VII.C) precisely because of his focus on only the numerator: 
[I]t has been suggested that price discrimination deserves proscription when it results in 
output  contraction.  But  evaluating  this  contention,  especially  in  the  patent  context, 
merely raises the question whether a patentee should receive the "full reward" provided 
by the superiority of his patent in some circumstances but not in others. I984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I875 
ination will  sometimes result in increased output and thus in a more 
efficient  allocation  of  resources.  But  contraction  of  output  is  also 
possible,  although  commentators  occasionally  argue  (without  much 
foundation) that expansion is more likely.209 
The  effect  on  output  is  certainly relevant  to  the  denominator of 
the ratio insofar as it increases or decreases monopoly loss.  But  this 
effect is not the only factor -  and indeed may not even be the major 
factor -  that bears upon the overall ratio.  For example,  if there is 
no  effect  on  output,  or even  a moderately adverse effect,  there will 
often  still  be  a  substantial  increase in  patentee  reward.  Thus,  it  is 
plausible that the net effect of discrimination will frequently be a high 
ratio: the  relatively  large transfer effect produces a large numerator, 
whereas  the  effect  on  output,  at  worst,  involves  a modest  loss  and 
thus  yields  a  small  denominator.  Because  the  transfer effect  might 
often dominate even  an adverse effect on output -  and thus increase 
the ratio despite an increase in the denominator -  general conclusions 
concerning the  benefits of price discrimination by patentees in many 
contexts are possible even if the specific effect on output is uncertain. 
Beyond its effects on the ratio, price discrimination also raises the 
problem  of  disproportionately high  rewards to  patentees,  which,  as 
discussed in subsection II.A.3,  can make for bad patent policy inde- 
pendent of how  such discrimination fares under antitrust analysis.210 
If patentees,  but not others, are permitted to engage in discriminatory 
practices, price discrimination might enable patentees to recover even 
more  than  the  total  economic  surplus  generated by  their  invention 
without  resorting to  any  disguised  cartelization.  A  patentee  would 
reap this  benefit if  its  price discrimination enabled it to capture not 
only the surplus generated by its invention,  but also the surplus that 
would  have  gone to  consumers or other producers in the  absence of 
the  patentee's  invention.  For  example,  a  firm that  had  substantial 
market power before developing  an invention may have been forbid- 
den from engaging in price discrimination.  With the patent, however, 
Why,  it  needs  to  be asked,  if  temporary monopoly (by nature restrictive) is what  a 
patent monopoly necessarily involves,  should it be more reprehensible to achieve it from 
several demand curves than from just one? 
W.  BOWMAN,  supra  note  103,  at  I  12. 
209  See,  e.g.,  F.  SCHERER, supra note  2I,  at  320-22  (noting that,  despite  the  tendency  to 
expect increased output,  "we really do not know,  and so it is impossible to determine whether 
on  balance  third-degree  discrimination  increases  output  and  improves  the  allocation  of  re- 
sources"). 
210 The  connection  between  the  possible  need for limiting the  patentee's total  reward and 
the  argument that  transfers are an efficient way  to reward licensees can  be seen by reviewing 
the analysis of the latter.  The  claim was  thatfor  a given numerator, the denominator will  be 
less when  the reward is achieved  through, for example,  price discrimination.  But  the decision 
to  permit restrictions or actions  that  facilitate  price discrimination is  not  made  in  a  world  in 
which  the  numerator is fixed  -  permitting price discrimination also  increases the  numerator. 
This  fact does not of course imply that the result will  be undesirable, but one must weigh  the 
impact of this effect when  reaching a decision. I876  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:1813 
this  firm may  be  able  to  discriminate in  a manner that allows  it to 
capture the  preexisting consumer surplus.  Thus,  because price dis- 
crimination is  one  of the most efficient means of patent exploitation 
-  it has  a high  ratio  -  a good  way  to reward  patentees  appropriately 
might be to permit price discrimination and to adjust the patent life 
accordingly.2  11 
In  evaluating  the  desirability of price discrimination, one  should 
also consider the distributional and equitable implications of this prac- 
tice  as well  as its  effects on efficiency.212 The  possible concerns are 
varied  and  complex.  These  issues,  however,  will  not be  considered 
here, because the relevant analysis is little affected by this discussion 
of patent policy, even if the possible positive effects of price discrim- 
ination noted in this Part influence one's ultimate conclusions. 
Finally,  price discrimination presents the usual antitrust concerns 
of potentially adverse primary- or secondary-line effects.  These effects 
are important because they bear on the denominator of the ratio.213 
To  begin with,  consider primary-line effects.214 Price discrimination 
will  not  permit  predatory  behavior  unless  others  hold  competing 
patents215 or the  predation has no  connection to  the patent.  If  one 
believes  that antitrust law's  general proscription of price discrimina- 
tion  is  an  important  deterrent  to  such  predation,  and  that  actual 
instances  of  predation  are  difficult to  detect,  then  permitting price 
discrimination would be problematic because it would be very difficult 
to  determine whether  a  patentee in  any particular case was  in  fact 
engaging  in  predatory pricing.  Yet  because the  usual classifications 
that form the bases for economic discrimination are fields of use and 
customer groupings, predation should in fact be easy to detect, unless 
211  Of  course,  even  if  more price discrimination were  allowed,  the  patent life  should not 
necessarily  be  shortened,  because it  might  already be  too  short.  See  generally supra Section 
II.C (describing the simultaneous process for determining optimal patent life and patent-antitrust 
doctrine). 
212  To the extent that price discrimination is deemed inappropriate, principles of the Robin- 
son-Patman  Act,  I5  U.S.C.  ? I3  (I982)  (? 2  of  the  Clayton Act,  amended by the  Robinson- 
Patman  Act  of  I936,  ch.  592,  49  Stat.  I526),  and  similar proscriptions deriving  from other 
antitrust statutes presumably would  be applied to  royalty structures, in which  case one  must 
face the problems Baxter raises concerning the difficulty of defining when royalties are discrim- 
inatory.  His analysis, see Baxter, supra note ioi,  at  28I-87,  is a significant contribution to the 
resolution of this problem. 
213  Many commentators have been hostile to the Robinson-Patman Act's proscriptions against 
price discrimination.  See,  e.g.,  R.  BORK,  supra note  II5,  at 382-40I  (calling the enactment of 
the proscriptions "antitrust's least glorious hour"); F.  SCHERER,  supra note  2I,  at 580-82  ("The 
.  .  .  Act  is  an  extremely  imperfect  instrument.  It  is  questionable whether  the  circle of  its 
beneficiaries extends  much  wider  than  the  attorneys  who  earn  sizeable  fees  interpreting its 
complex provisions.").  As a result, many commentators might not be greatly influenced by the 
primary and secondary effects regardless of how the effects might arise in the patent context. 
214  See generally Gibbons, Field Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at 433-35  (discussing primary- 
line effects of field restrictions). 
215  See generally supra Part V (discussing competing patents). I 984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I877 
competitors' businesses  are  divided  along  the  same  lines  separating 
users that value the patent differently.  For example, if the patentee's 
competitors sell  competing  patented  products in  different regions of 
the country and the patentee-defendant sells nationwide, royalties that 
discriminate on the basis of fields of use would aid little in targeting 
individual  competitors  -  unless,  by  chance,  the  demand  in  each 
competitor's region were  concentrated in  one  or a few  fields of  use. 
By  contrast,  a territorial discrimination would  pose a danger in this 
context. 
Secondary-line price discrimination might pose less of a risk than 
the primary-line discrimination if,  for example,  discrimination across 
different  fields  of  use  would  not  have  the  effect  of  offering  more 
favorable treatment to one direct competitor than to another.216 Sec- 
ondary-line injury only results if different rates are charged to firms 
in  direct  competition,  a  circumstance that  could  have  the  effect  of 
"bring[ing] about  structural changes  in  that  industry which  at  best 
will be artificial."217 Baxter applies this analysis to Grand Caillou,218 
but he  does not fully  recognize the relevance of patent policy to the 
analysis.219 Although  he is correct that "[t]he optimum allocation  is 
that  which  would  prevail  if  the  [invention] were  available  to  each 
segment royalty-free,  "220  his analysis ignores the effect on incentives. 
By emphasizing that the primary objective should be to minimize any 
distortion in  the  allocation of production among firms,221 Baxter es- 
sentially preoccupies himself with  monopoly loss (the denominator of 
the ratio) and fails to consider whether the overall effect on the ratio 
would  be  desirable.222 Thus,  two  steps are involved  in judging  the 
effects of secondary-line price discrimination.  First,  one must deter- 
mine  whether  there  are  any  adverse  secondary-line  effects,  which 
might be inferred from, or negated by, the nature of the discriminatory 
structure and the sales patterns of competing firms.  Second,  if there 
are such  effects,  one  must  then  determine the  net  effect  of  the  dis- 
216  See  Gibbons,  Field  Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at 433.  If  competing licensees  do in 
part sell in  the  same field,  they would  pay the same royalty rate for that use,  if one  assumes 
that  there  was  no  further discrimination among  individual  licensees  of,  or  buyers from,  the 
patentee. 
217  Baxter, supra note  iOi,  at 283. 
218  Grand  Caillou  Packing  Co.,  [I963-I965  Transfer Binder] TRADE  REG.  REP.  (CCH) ? 
i6,927  (June 4,  i964) (barring patentee of shrimp-peeling machine from charging different rental 
rates  in  different  regions  of  the  country),  aff'd  in  relevant part and  rev'd  in  part sub  nom. 
LaPeyre v.  FTC,  366 F.2d  II7  (5th Cir. i966). 
219  See supra p.  i847  (criticizing Baxter for stating that the "legality of the seller's monopoly 
is irrelevant" in this context,  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at 297). 
220  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at  29I. 
221  See  id.  at  29I-93. 
222  This  error is very similar to the one Baxter makes in analyzing royalties based upon an 
unpatented end product.  See  infra Section VII.B. i878  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I813 
criminatory practice on the  ratio -  a task that will  probably prove 
much more difficult. 
B.  Permissibility  of Practices  that Facilitate  Price Discrimination 
If one concludes from Section A that price discrimination is desir- 
able,  one must then determine whether the entire range of restrictive 
practices that can be  used to  accomplish price discrimination should 
be  permitted.  This  Section  briefly presents  and  analyzes  the  most 
frequently discussed practices.  The analysis is confined to examining 
the use of the various practices as mechanisms for price discrimination; 
it does not deal with the complex issues that each restrictive practice 
raises, independent of patent considerations, in the antitrust context. 
Discriminatory  royalty  rates  are  the  most  direct  mechanism  for 
price discrimination.  For instance,  when a patentee feels that heavy 
users derive more value than do light users, it often will set the royalty 
as  a function  of the  amount of the  patent's use.  Another technique 
for  charging higher  prices  to  heavy  users is  to  tie  the  use  of  some 
related  product  sold  by  the  patentee  to  the  use  of  the  patent  and 
charge a price in excess  of cost for the tied product.223 This  excess 
serves the function of a royalty.  Alternatively, if a patentee thinks it 
possible  to  recover  a  greater  return  on  some  types  of  uses  of  its 
invention  than  on  others,  it  can  charge  a  higher  royalty for  those 
uses.224  Field-of-use  restrictions might  be  helpful  in  accomplishing 
this kind of discrimination;225  such restrictions make it easier to keep 
track  of  how  much  of  each  licensee's  output  is  produced  in  each 
possible  field  of  use,  because  each  licensee  is  confined to  only  one 
field. 
The  ratio test does not clearly indicate whether generally prohib- 
ited practices -  such as tying arrangements and the division of fields 
among  competitors  -  should  be  permitted  in  the  patent-antitrust 
context simply because they might be used in conjunction with a price 
discrimination scheme.  If discriminatory royalties alone could achieve 
the  desired  purpose,  the  ratio  test  would  suggest  prohibiting  any 
additional restrictions because their use as a vehicle for price discrim- 
ination simply increases the denominator and thus decreases the ratio. 
Yet to the extent that such restrictions are profitable, they also increase 
223  Tying restrictions were held illegal in Motion Picture Patents Co. v.  Universal Film Mfg. 
Co.,  243  U.S.  502  (I9I7). 
224  Defining when a royalty is discriminatory is a serious problem in this and related contexts. 
Baxter analyzes this issue at great length.  See  Baxter, supra note ioi,  at  28I-87.  If discrimi- 
natory  royalties  are  to  be  permitted,  however,  there  is  no  operational  need  for  a  precise, 
nonarbitrary definition. 
225 The legality of field-of-use restrictions in the patent context was originally established in 
General Talking Pictures Corp. v. Western Elec. Co.,  304  U.S.  I75  (1938),  but has since become 
a more ambiguous question.  See  L.  SULLIVAN,  supra note 99, at 558. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  I879 
the  patentee's  reward.  The  overall  effect  on  the  ratio  is  therefore 
ambiguous. 
Because  of  their potential  harm,  one  must  be  cautious about  al- 
lowing  additional  restrictions.  The  greatest  danger  accompanying 
field-of-use restrictions,226 for example,  is that such restrictions could 
operate  to  divide  the  market and  thus  to  facilitate  cartelization,  as 
discussed  in  subsection IV.B. I.227  The  same danger exists with  ter- 
ritorial  restrictions  purportedly  used  to  facilitate  price  discrimina- 
tion.228 As  suggested  by the analysis in subsection IV.B.i  -  which 
was directed at price restrictions but which largely applies to territorial 
restrictions as  well  -  it  is  quite  possible  that  the  denominator will 
increase to reflect the full loss,  whereas the numerator might increase 
more moderately because the patentee will often receive only a portion 
of the monopoly profits.229 
In  many  circumstances,  however,  the  danger  of  cartelization 
through field and territorial restrictions might well  be less significant 
than  the  danger  of  cartelization through price restrictions.  Because 
the  first two  methods  result in  market divisions,  they  are not likely 
to  be  used  for cartelization in  established  industries in which  stable 
investments,  customer relations,  and  the  like  would  tend  to  be  dis- 
rupted.  230  But  in  instances  in  which  fields  of  use  are  first  being 
developed,  or  in  which  lines  of  specialization231 or  regions  of 
operation232  are already largely established, the danger of cartelization 
is greater. 
When  the  danger  of  collusion  is  significant,  one  might  consider 
Baxter's general proposal that the patentee be required to offer non- 
226  For  tying  restrictions,  and  for field  restrictions motivated  by  reasons other than  price 
discrimination,  some  of  the  same  analysis  would  apply,  depending  upon how  it  was  claimed 
that the patentee profits from the practice. 
227  See,  e.g.,  Gibbons,  Field  Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at  46I-62.  Baxter's analysis of 
this point,  see Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at 34I,  is excellent. 
228  The  use of territorial restrictions as a disguise for cartelization is noted by L.  SULLIVAN, 
supra note 99, at 534-35,  and Gibbons, Teritorial  Restrictions,  supra note I45,  at 905,  although 
not in the context of discussing their possible use to facilitate price discrimination. 
229  Field  restrictions, like  territorial restrictions, might be defended in some circumstances 
as  provisions  that  facilitate  product development  and promotion along the  lines  suggested  by 
the argument in favor of resale price maintenance.  See supra pp.  I862-63  & note  I72.  To the 
extent  that  such  a defense  was  plausible,  one would  again confront the question of  how  well 
courts can distinguish good uses from bad uses, which raises the related issues discussed in the 
context of resale price maintenance.  See supra Section IV.C. 
230  See  Gibbons,  Field  Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at 462;  supra note  I83. 
231  See  Gibbons,  Field  Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at  462.  The  fact  that  specialization 
already exists does not imply that field restrictions would not reinforce such divisions when,  for 
example, firms in each field would fear entry from firms in related fields if not for the restrictive 
arrangement. 
232  The  analysis  from  the  preceding  footnote  is  equally  applicable  here,  except  that  the 
reference to "related fields" would be changed to "neighboring territories.' i88o  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
exclusive licenses on the same terms that it offered all prior licenses.233 
In any field in which it offered a license,  the patentee would have to 
offer all comers a license at the same royalty rate.234 This  approach 
seeks  simultaneously  to  permit  field  restrictions when  necessary  in 
order to accomplish price discrimination, and to avoid the danger of 
market division.235 It fails, however, to eliminate the danger, because 
firms can tacitly agree not to demand a license in each other's field. 
Such an agreement could be quite effective, because firms can credibly 
threaten to seek retaliatory licenses in the field of any firm that violates 
the agreement.  Thus,  the danger of cartelization, although more lim- 
ited,  would still exist even  under Baxter's scheme. 
Some might  argue that  we  should permit restrictions in  addition 
to discriminatory royalty rates because such restrictions can help pa- 
tentees monitor the activities of licensees.236 Such monitoring is pre- 
sumably desirable because it helps ensure that the patentee will obtain 
its desired reward under its discriminatory royalty scheme.  In most 
circumstances, however,  this purported aid to monitoring is likely to 
be  superfluous.  The  enforcement of  discriminatory royalty rates by 
monitoring the licensee's sales of different products typically will  not 
be  difficult,  especially  with  privileged  access  to  the  licensee's  rec- 
ords.237 Moreover, other restrictions pose many of the same monitor- 
233 See  Baxter, supra note ioi,  at 345-47.  Gibbons concurs in this proposal, but he would 
also require that the patentee offer licenses in its own field or fields of use.  See Gibbons, Field 
Restrictions,  supra note  I02,  at 427.  This  proposal, unlike Baxter's, would  require courts to 
regulate royalty levels,  because  no  benchmark would  be  readily available.  Gibbons does  not 
explain the patentee's motivation for keeping certain fields to itself in the first place.  See  id.  at 
473  (evidencing  a  misunderstanding  of  the  patentee's  self-interest in  permitting  licensees  to 
achieve  monopoly profits).  Nor  does he explain why such a result would be inconsistent with 
either  patent  policy  or  a  proper  resolution of  any  patent-antitrust conflict.  As  long  as  the 
patentee  can  control  the  royalty  level  for licensees  operating in  its  own  field,  no  significant 
reason exists for the patentee to keep sales to itself.  See generally supra Section IV.A (discussing 
market-protection  theory  for  price-restricted licensing).  On  the  other  hand,  aside  from  the 
substantial  administrative  difficulties,  Gibbons' addition to  Baxter's proposal might pose little 
danger. 
234  Because it requires licensing only in instances in which the terms are already established 
by the patentee, Baxter's proposal avoids the need to engage courts in valuations that they may 
find difficult or distasteful. 
Unless the patentee were attempting to create a cartel, or to encourage product development, 
see  supra note  229,  licensing  a number of firms in each field would  be in its interest because 
the  firms would  then  maximize  sales.  See  Turner, supra note  67,  at  471  (making this  point 
without  noting  the  possibility  of  product development).  Thus,  as  in  Part IV,  observation  of 
particular behavior,  in  this case  exclusive  field or territorial licensing,  does limit the  range of 
possible explanations but does not necessarily lead to an automatic resolution of the issue. 
235  This  compromise does  not  preserve the  possibility of  achieving  the  benefits similar to 
those  attributed  to  resale  price  maintenance,  see  supra  note  229,  which  depend  upon  the 
exclusivity  of the license. 
236  See,  e.g.,  L.  SULLIVAN,  supra note 99,  at 557-58;  Markovits,  Tie-Ins and Reciprocity: 
A Functional,  Legal, and Policy  Analysis,  58 TEX. L.  REv.  I363,  I379-80  (i980). 
237  See generally L.  Kaplow, supra note  I25,  at 44-49  (examining general tendency of many I984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST  INTERSECTION  i88i 
ing problems that arise with  a simple discriminatory royalty scheme. 
With field restrictions, for example, one must still monitor the output 
in  the  authorized  fields  if  one  assumes  -  as  is  often  the  case  -  that 
royalties are a function of output.238 With customer restrictions, one 
must again measure quantity, and the patentee must also ensure that 
the restriction is not violated.  With a tying arrangement, the patentee 
must  ensure  that  the  licensee  is  not  buying  the  tied  product  from 
others.  239  The  easiest  way  to  gain  such  assurance will  often  be  to 
compare purchases with  production and sales records; such compari- 
sons would  have  been sufficient to allow  the patentee to monitor the 
royalty directly. 
If  additional  restrictions are prohibited,  firms might still  attempt 
to  impose  them  covertly  by  incorporating  them  into  their  royalty 
structure.  Such attempts, however, should generally be easy to detect. 
For  example,  the  patentee  might  charge each licensee  an  exorbitant 
royalty in  all  but  one  field of  use,  a  field that  could differ for each 
licensee.  Such a scheme would accomplish the same result as a field- 
restricted license.  The  result would  be easy  to detect,  however,  be- 
cause if all the patentee truly had in mind were price discrimination, 
it would  have  set the royalty rate in each field at the same level  for 
each licensee. 
In sum, one can argue that restrictive practices other than discrim- 
inatory  royalties  should  not  be  permitted  on  the  theory  that  they 
facilitate price discrimination,  because they increase the denominator 
without  affecting  the  numerator, and  thus  yield  a  lower  ratio.  Al- 
though  there  might  be  some  cases  in  which  monitoring  would  be 
difficult  without  restrictive  practices,  such  practices are usually  not 
essential to the monitoring function.  On the other hand, if one agrees 
with Bowman  that restrictive practices rarely if ever cause any harm, 
or  if  one  believes  that  discriminatory  royalty  schemes  are  in  fact 
difficult to  enforce without  restrictive practices, one might allow  the 
restrictions in some  instances.  Under this latter approach,  however, 
one must deal with the increased danger of disguised cartelization.240 
commentators to ignore or underestimate less restrictive alternatives).  Such information is also 
publicly available  in many instances.  Of course, the added incentive  to cheat might affect the 
reliability of such statistics. 
238  If  royalties  were  a  function  of  profits,  field  restrictions would  eliminate  the  need  for 
careful accounting checks only if the licensee produced nothing other than the licensed product. 
Otherwise,  profits  would  still  have  to  be  accounted  for  and  traced  to  the  licensed  product. 
Thus,  the manipulability of the accounting measures of profits also presents a problem. 
239  In  the  case  of  a  tying  arrangement for which  it  is  optimal  to  set  a  high  price on  the 
patented  product and  a  below-market price on  the  tied  product -  that  is,  when  heavy  users 
are the low-value  users -  there would  be no need to fear such evasion,  although there would 
arise the  opposite  problem of  excessive  purchases of  the  subsidized  tied  product for resale to 
others. 
240  There  is  also the  danger that  monitoring the  sales  activities  of competitors,  directly or 
indirectly, will  facilitate collusive  behavior.  See  generally Stigler, A Theolry  of Oligopoly,  72  J. i882  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
VII.  APPLICATIONS:  PATENTEE  CONTROL OF UNPATENTED 
END  PRODUCTS 
A  frequent issue  in  patent-antitrust litigation involves  the degree 
to which  restrictions imposed by the patentee may be related to un- 
patented processes,  products, or services.  For example, the patentee 
might  attempt  to  tie  unpatented products to the sale of its patented 
product or to control the unpatented output produced by its patented 
process.  The  most  typical  arguments  offered  are  either  that  such 
restrictions should be prohibited because they go beyond the scope of 
the patent -  a view  that has prevailed in some contexts241  -  or that 
they  should  be permitted because they allow  the patentee merely to 
receive  the  full  reward  attributable  to  its  invention.242  This  Part 
focuses  upon  one  particular arrangement: the  charging of  royalties 
based upon sales of an unpatented end product when the patent covers 
only one particular input.  This  arrangement is described more fully 
in Section A.  I emphasize this example primarily because it has been 
the  subject  of  extensive  commentary.  The  analysis,  however,  is  di- 
rectly applicable to the use of other restrictions that are employed for 
the same purposes.  The arguments for and against the prohibition of 
such  restrictions  are  associated  with  Baxter  and  Bowman,  respec- 
tively.  Sections B and C consider their justifications in turn and show 
how  each  has  concentrated  primarily on  one  portion  of  the  ratio. 
Section D  shows that when the numerator and denominator are con- 
sidered simultaneously, the problem is clarified, although its resolution 
becomes more complex. 
A.  The Example: Royalties Based on Sales of an  Unpatented 
End Product 
Consider a situation in which a patentee's invention is used by its 
licensees243 in the manufacture of one or more end products that are 
not themselves  subject to patent protection.244 If the patented input 
can be used only in a fixed proportion to output -  for example, one 
and  only  one  patented  bottom can  be  attached to each  bucket pro- 
duced  -  the  choice  between  an  input-based  and  an  output-based 
royalty is  immaterial  because  there is  a  one-to-one  relationship be- 
POL. ECON.  44,  46 (I964)  (discussing how the inability to detect cheating makes cartel enforce- 
ment more difficult). 
241  See,  e.g.,  Brulotte  v.  Thys  Co.,  379  U.S.  29,  33  (I964)  (royalty obligation extending 
beyond life of patent); Motion Picture Patents Co.  v.  Universal Film Mfg.  Co.,  243  U.S.  502, 
5i6-i8  (I9I7)  (tying arrangements). 
242  This view  is similar to Bowman's position.  See  infra Section VII.C. 
243  A  sale  (assignment) in  which  payments depend upon the future business of  the  buyer 
would raise precisely the same issue as would a similar licensing arrangement. 
244  If the patentee also had a patent covering the end product, there would be no question 
that the patentee would  be permitted to charge a royalty based upon sales of that product. i984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I883 
tween the two.245 The analysis therefore focuses on the more frequent 
case in which  there is some potential for varying the amount of  the 
patented input.246  For example,  if the royalty for use of a patented 
fertilizer were increased, farmers might be able to substitute additional 
land,  other  fertilizers,  different  crop-rotation practices,  or increased 
pesticide use for some of the patented fertilizer. 
The  potential  for  substitution  by  users  of  the  patent  gives  the 
patentee an incentive  to base royalties directly on the sales of the end 
product.  When the royalty is based upon use of the patented input, 
the  user of the  input  can decrease royalty payments by changing  its 
production mix to decrease reliance on the input.247 If,  however,  the 
royalty is  based  upon  the  amount of output produced,  regardless of 
how  much  or how  little  of the  patented input is used,  the  producer 
will determine its input mix based upon the actual cost of each input 
and  avoid  the  possible  distortion resulting from the  royalty charged 
for  the  input. 248  Thus,  an  output-based  royalty  avoids  inefficient 
substitution  away  from  the  patented  input249 and  generally permits 
245 See  W. BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at  72; F.  SCHERER,  supra note  2I,  at 30I-02  & n.I2 
(noting that this conclusion depends on the assumption that the end-product market is compet- 
itive). 
246  Such  potential  almost  always  exists,  although  changes  in  the  amount  of  the  patented 
input may alter the end product somewhat.  For example,  if the inside coating for a television 
screen were patented and the price per unit of the coating (or the royalty on its use) increased, 
one would expect smaller screens to be produced.  The analysis in text would then be applicable. 
247  The  response of  increasing the  royalty rate does  not fully avoid  this  problem,  because 
any  increase in  the  royalty based  on use of the input  will  cause a further reduction in  use of 
the  input.  The  patentee  can always  profit more if it can base its royalty on the end product, 
as long as there is some degree of input substitutability.  This  proposition can be demonstrated 
in two steps: (i)  for any given royalty based on the input, the corresponding output-based royalty 
(the  existing  input  royalty  multiplied  by  the  average  amount  of  input  used  for  each  unit  of 
output) would,  by definition, earn the same profit for each unit of output; (2)  the producer will 
change its production mix to a more efficient combination of inputs,  which will lower its costs 
and thereby result in an increase in output,  which in turn will increase total royalty payments. 
248  Because  royalty  levels  will  affect  the  amount  of  output,  there could  be  some  indirect 
influence upon the input mix resulting from possible variations in the optimal input combination 
as output changes.  Such variations are not, however,  distortions in production efficiency. 
249 Other mechanisms could be used to accomplish similar purposes.  See,  e.g.,  Baxter, supra 
note  ioi,  at  30I  (identifying  tying  arrangements and vertical integration as alternatives  to an 
output-based  royalty).  A  tying  arrangement that  required the  producer to  buy  all  its  inputs 
from the  patentee,  in  predetermined proportions, would  have  the  same effect.  This  practice, 
however,  might  be more cumbersome for the  patentee  to arrange and  would  require that  the 
patentee  be  intimately  familiar with  each  licensee's  production technology,  including  how  the 
licensee  should  respond to  short-term fluctuations.  Thus,  as  discussed in the  context  of price 
discrimination,  see supra Section VIB,  the less restrictive alternative of end-product royalties 
might  be  preferable,  especially  because  this  alternative  seems  even  better suited  to  the  task. 
Vertical integration is another way to prevent input substitution. Yet it too seems more restrictive 
than  output-based  royalties,  and  it  might  be  an  option  for only  a  few  patentees  because  the 
problem of substitution is fully avoided only if the integration covers all end-product producers 
that  would  otherwise  be  licensed.  See  generally  Blair  &  Kaserman,  Vertical Control  with 
Variable Proportions: Ownership Integration and Contractual Equivalents,  46 S. ECON. J.  III8, i884  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I813 
the  patentee  to  derive  more profit from the transaction, just  as any 
firm's market  power  increases  if  substitution  is  not  an  option  for 
buyers.  Furthermore, the producer using the patented product pro- 
duces  with  a  more  efficient  input  mix.  On  the  other  hand,  it  is 
possible  that  an  end-product royalty will  result in  a  greater net  re- 
striction of  output of  the end product.  The  dispute between  Baxter 
and Bowman  centers largely on how  one should evaluate this set of 
effects. 
B.  Baxter's Argument 
Baxter characterizes end-product restriction as a situation in which 
the patentee has extended its monopoly of the patented input to the 
unpatented end product.250 Baxter believes that permitting the end- 
product royalty will  further restrict output  and  thus  produce a  net 
monopoly loss.  He  also believes  that,  because all inputs are under- 
utilized when output is diminished, this loss in efficiency will outweigh 
any  benefit  arising  from  a  more  efficient input  mix.  He  therefore 
concludes that end-product restrictions should be prohibited.251 
Baxter's analysis of the economic effects of end-product restrictions 
is questionable.252 But even if the analysis is accepted, his argument 
is  troubling  because  -  as  is  true  of  his  comparability  approach 
generally253  -  he focuses only on the ratio's denominator.  His point 
is simply that the monopoly loss will be greater if royalties are based 
on end products rather than on inputs.  Yet because Baxter concedes 
that the reward to the patentee will also be greater,254  his perspective 
does not rule out the possibility that the ratio will  be greater, or at 
least about the same,  if the restriction is permitted. 
C. Bowman's Argument 
Bowman's analysis emphasizes that permitting the patentee to base 
its royalty on the end product avoids the inefficient use of inputs by 
licensees.255  In  addition,  he  explicitly notes -  and proves  through 
examples -  that the output under an output-based royalty might be 
either higher or lower  than when  royalties can  be  based only  upon 
II20-23  (I980)  (illustrating the similar effects of vertical integration and royalties when used for 
such purposes); Blair & Kaserman,  Vertical Integration,  Tying, and Antitrust Policy,  68 AM. 
ECON.  REV. 397 (I978)  (demonstrating the similar effects of tying and vertical integration when 
used for such purposes).  Baxter applies his analysis of output-based royalties to price and output 
restrictions as well.  See  Baxter, supra note  IOI,  at 330-3I. 
250 See,  e.g.,  Baxter, supra note ioi,  at 302-03,  353. 
251 See  id.  at 303-o6. 
252  The actual effects are described in Section VII.D. 
253  See supra Section III.D. 
254 See  Baxter, supra note  ioi,  at 30I. 
255 See W.  BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at 76-88. I  984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I 885 
use of the patented input.256 Of course, if output were higher, Baxter's 
argument  based  upon  net  inefficiency would  turn against  him,  and 
Bowman's  position would  be strengthened.257 Yet for those cases in 
which  output would  indeed  be  curtailed,  Bowman  does  not attempt 
to contradict Baxter's claim that the net effect on economic efficiency 
would be adverse when the input and output effects are compared.258 
Bowman's  attack  on  Baxter  comes  from  a  somewhat  different 
angle.  He  emphasizes  that  "no  payment  can  be  extracted  by  the 
patentee which is not ascribable to the competitive superiority afforded 
by the patented resources without which the consumers would be even 
worse off."259 But  this application of Bowman's competitive  superi- 
ority approach is subject to the same criticisms developed in subsection 
III.C.2  -  the  argument  focuses  solely  on  the  numerator, patentee 
reward.  Although  Bowman's  other arguments do  bear on  the  mag- 
nitude  of  the  denominator,  he  does  not  advance  any  argument that 
would  support the inference that the denominator generally would be 
small enough  to  make one confident that the overall ratio would  be 
high.  Moreover,  Bowman  is  making  the  wrong  comparison.  The 
quoted argument demonstrates only that allowing the patentee to base 
royalties on  the  end  product is  preferable to  the  situation  in  which 
the patentee had never developed the invention in the first place,  not 
that  allowing  end-product  royalties  is  better  than  prohibiting  such 
royalties and allowing input-based royalties instead.260 
Bowman's  argument is,  however,  responsive to some of the spirit 
of Baxter's critique.  Bowman's analysis demonstrates that the paten- 
tee has not really gained a monopoly over the unpatented end product, 
for the patentee cannot charge royalties that are higher than the value 
its invention contributes.  If the patentee attempted to set its royalties 
above this level,  producers would simply manufacture the end product 
without  the patented input.261 
256  See  id. 
257  Yet  the  general objection  that  the  reward might  be excessive  must still  be considered. 
See  infra p.  I887  & note 269. 
258  Baxter,  however,  cannot  be  correct in every  case; if the output effect  were zero,  there 
would  be a net gain through reduction in input inefficiency, and that gain could not be offset 
for at least some small range of output reduction. 
259  W.  BOWMAN, supra note  I03,  at 88; see id.  at  ioo  (discussing patentee's "exploiting the 
full advantage his patent affords users"). 
260  See  also supra note  I27  (making similar criticism of Bowman's approach in general); cf. 
W.  BOWMAN,  supra note  I03,  at  iio-ii  (criticizing Baxter for ignoring the question whether 
apportionment of production is less efficient,  "not compared with  competition after the patent 
has  expired,  but  compared  with  [the]  single  monopoly  price  while  the  patent  is  in  force"). 
Bowman is correct that Baxter errs in comparing end-product royalties to the competitive result, 
but Bowman  himself errs in making the comparison to the situation in which  the patent does 
not even exist.  Thfese errors parallel their tendencies to favor the antitrust and patent sides of 
the conflict. 
261  See W. BOWMAN, supra  note I03,  at 89-93. i886  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
D.  Applying the Ratio  Test 
The examination of end-product royalties well illustrates the anal- 
ysis  developed  in  Sections  III.C  and  III.D  in  which  Baxter's and 
Bowman's  general positions were  compared to  each other and were 
contrasted  with  the  ratio  test.  Once  again,  Baxter  and  Bowman 
emphasize  different halves  of  the  analysis.  The  ratio test,  by  inte- 
grating both halves,  provides a more complete understanding. 
Much of the analysis necessary for applying the ratio test to output- 
based royalties has already been provided.  Section VII.C noted that, 
if output-based  royalties increased output,  there would be an unam- 
biguously  positive  effect.262  Yet  the  more frequent result of  direct 
output-based royalties will probably be that the price paid by consum- 
ers will increase and output will fall.263 In that event,  the net effect 
on economic efficiency depends upon the particular circumstances.264 
Despite  the  uncertainty  over  whether  the  denominator of  the  ratio 
increases or  decreases,  however,  the  fact  that  end-product royalties 
unambiguously lead  to  an increase in the numerator265  (patentee re- 
ward) makes  it  more plausible that the ratio would increase if  such 
royalty  schemes  were  permitted.266 Although  one  can  neither state 
262  When the denominator is less than zero -  for example, when there is a net increase in 
output (that is,  less deadweight  loss,  so that loss is reduced) -  the ratio could be considered 
infinite because there are gains in terms of both patent and antitrust policy.  But  see  infra p. 
I887  & note 269. 
263  This  proposition can be  demonstrated by examining the somewhat analogous action of 
vertical  integration from the  input  supply stage to the  final product stage.  See  F.  SCHERER, 
supra note 2I,  at 302;  Hay, An Economic Analysis of Vertical Integration,  I  INDUS.  ORG.  REV. 
i88  (I973);  Warren-Boulton, Vertical Control with  Variable Proportions, 82 J. POL. ECON.  783, 
784, 788-90  (I974).  These articles analyze vertical integration, which has characteristics similar 
to  those  of  end-product  royalties.  Both  mechanisms transfer control from a  single  input  (or 
group of  inputs) to the end  product.  Thus,  there will  be similar effects in terms of the price 
and output of the end product as well  as the incentives in choosing the input mix.  See supra 
note  249.  Nevertheless,  in his criticism of Baxter for characterizing end product royalties as a 
mechanism  for  achieving  a  monopoly  over  the  end  product,  Bowman  notes  an  important 
difference.  See supra p.  I885.  If a firm with a monopoly over one input achieved full forward 
integration,  it  would  have  a  monopoly. at  that  downstream level  and  would  thus  be  able  to 
charge the  full  monopoly price.  In  contrast, the  patentee charging royalties based upon end- 
product sales faces the constraint that if the royalty is too high,  its patented input will not be 
used  at  all.  Conceivably,  this  added  constraint  is  sufficient to  make  the  net  welfare  effect 
positive,  but I do not now see any way of proving that would be the result.  Moreover, as long 
as  vertical  integration did  not  achieve  a  monopoly at  the  downstream level,  the  other firms 
would provide the same constraint upon the patentee because if it raised its price too far, those 
other firms could profitably operate without using the patented input. 
264 See Warren-Boulton, supra note 263,  at  784,  792-96,  799-800. 
265  Cf. Mallela & Nahata,  Theory of Vertical Control with  Variable Proportions, 88 J.  POL. 
ECON.  I009,  I02I-23  (I980)  (noting such an increase in context of vertical integration); Vernon 
& Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 79 J. POL.  ECON.  924  (I97I) 
(same). 
266  Scherer's discussion in the vertical integration context is instructive: 
Integration  increases  the  input  monopolist's  profit  both  by  permitting  lower  cost 
production  and  by  broadening  its  control  over  prices.  Since  these  two  effects  have I  984]  PATENT-ANTITRUST INTERSECTION  I887 
with  certainty that permitting end-product royalty schemes improves 
the  ratio,  nor confidently  identify  the  range of  circumstances under 
which  it  might  not,267 the  argument for permitting them  does  seem 
stronger than that for disallowing  them.268 Of course, as previously 
noted,  there is the additional question whether the overall increase in 
reward  would  provide  a  disproportionately large  incentive  in  such 
instances. 269 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
One might attempt to formulate a rough approach to patent-anti- 
trust doctrine by drawing together some recurring themes that emerge 
from the various  applications.  The  first step would  be to determine 
whether the observed patentee practices are in reality a subterfuge for 
collusion or other exclusionary conduct.  Such practices probably will 
fail under the ratio test.  If a practice did not fall into the subterfuge 
category, one  would  have  to  engage in  a second and far more com- 
plicated stage of analysis in order to apply the ratio test.  In light of 
the deficiencies in  our understanding of the patent system,  decisions 
derived at this stage would arguably have to be limited to the sort of 
cost-effectiveness  analysis  described  in  subsection  II.B. i(c),  under 
which some prohibitions are traded for others in an attempt to achieve 
the  current level  of  patentee  reward at  the  minimum  possible  cost. 
opposite  welfare  implications,  no  simple  conclusions  can  be  drawn  as  to  whether  on 
balance the vertical extension of monopoly power into a competitive stage makes society 
better or worse off. 
F.  SCHERER, supra note  2I,  at  302.  In  the patent-antitrust context,  the increase in the  profit 
of  the  input  monopolist  (the  patentee)  resulting  from  lower  production  costs  is  additionally 
valuable to the overall welfare of society because of the incentive effect.  In addition, broadened 
control  is  not  an  unambiguous  evil,  as  in  the  typical  antitrust  context,  because  the  added 
monopoly  profit from this effect  rewards the  patentee as  well.  Overall,  the effect of  the first 
component,  lower production costs,  is doubly good,  and that of the second,  broadened control, 
is  ambiguous. 
267 If it could be supposed that the adverse output effect has a ratio of reward to monopoly 
loss similar to the ratio implicit in the patent life,  there is a strong argument that the ratio for 
this  practice  is  high  because  the  efficiency  in  input  effect  would  add  to  the  numerator and 
subtract from the denominator; the ratio would  thus be unambiguously greater than the  ratio 
implicit in the patent life. 
268  With this argument,  compare the discussion of the desirability of price discrimination in 
the patent context in light of uncertainty concerning the output effect.  See supra pp.  I874-75. 
269 Cf. sUpra pp.  I875-76  (discussing price discrimination).  See  generally supra subsection 
II.A.3  (discussing proportionality of  reward and  value  of the  patent); Section II.C  (discussing 
need  to  adjust  patent  life  if  patent-antitrust doctrine is  modified).  If  this were  thought to  be 
the  case,  one  could shorten the  patent life  accordingly and permit this practice if  it is  indeed 
more efficient  than  other  ways  in  which  patentees  recoup rewards.  See  supra note  267.  If, 
alternatively,  one prohibits output-based royalties, there arises the problem that many firms do 
not need such schemes  to accomplish the same results.  Integrated firms are an example.  For 
a  parallel discussion  in the  context of price discrimination, see the analysis at p.  i874  of how 
to  treat  patentees  that  can  accomplish  the  undesirable result without  resort to  the  forbidden 
practices. i888  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 97:I8I3 
But any other configuration of doctrine -  including one that provided 
far more or far less aggregate reward, even to the extent of permitting 
all restrictive practices or permitting none -  could not be decisively 
criticized  because  there  is  no  way  of  knowing  whether  the  current 
level of reward provided by the combination of the patent system and 
patent-antitrust doctrine is anywhere near the optimal level.270 If one 
emerges  from  all  this  without  losing  hope,  an  approach  must  be 
developed  for  those  cases  (which  may  be  all  cases)  in  which  the 
practice in question may have any number of effects, some leading to 
far lower ratios than others.  Unless one has confidence in our ability 
to determine at moderate cost which of the many possible effects are 
relevant in any particular instance, the best that we can probably do 
is to  prohibit at least those practices that exhibit a serious potential 
for substantial loss. 
Although the patent-antitrust intersection has long been acknowl- 
edged to be a most difficult area, the applications discussed in Parts 
IV through VII,  as well  as the summary approach just offered, reaf- 
firm the  indications  in  Part  II  that  any  careful attempt  to  resolve 
patent-antitrust issues will  be far more complex than has previously 
been  realized.  The  fact  that  most  of the  issues demonstrated to  be 
essential  in  Part II  have  been altogether ignored reveals the insuffi- 
ciency of prior formulations by courts and commentators.  What re- 
mains  uncertain  is  why  the  basic  assumptions  underlying previous 
approaches have  never been examined sufficiently even to reveal the 
indeterminacy  problem that  was  discussed  in  Part I.  It  is  possible 
that  prior  students  of  the  patent-antitrust intersection simply  have 
been too complacent in analyzing the conflict, or that they have been 
afraid of what they might have found had they asked all the necessary 
questions. 
Now  that the magnitude of the problem has been revealed, a new 
range  of  solutions  might  seem  more  attractive.  In  particular, the 
technical  complexity of  the patent-antitrust conflict and the insepar- 
able  need  for  political  choice  in  resolving  it  may  spur the  urge to 
transfer responsibility for resolving this issue from the courts to either 
Congress or an administrative agency.  On the other hand, it is unclear 
whether  this  issue  is  significantly more problematic in  any  of  these 
respects than  many  other  issues  the  courts face.  In  particular, the 
tension between  the patent and antitrust statutes hardly renders this 
conflict unique.  The  antitrust laws  have  come  into  conflict with  a 
variety of other laws,  with varying results,271 although these conflicts 
270  This  assumes  that  the  alternative  patent-antitrust doctrine would  not  violate  the  ratio 
test.  Of course, the extreme regimes that either permit all practices or prohibit them meet this 
caveat  by default. 
271  See,  e.g.,  Broadcast  Music,  Inc.  v.  Columbia  Broadcasting  Sys.,  44I  U.S.  I  (I979) 
(copyright  law);  Parker  v. Brown,  3I7  U.S.  34I  (i943)  (state  regulatory  law);  Fashion  Originators' 
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have  received  far  less  attention.  There  are  often  conflicts  among 
statutes, and always conflicts among various policies, the latter raising 
the  same  sorts  of  problems  as  those  encountered  with  the  former. 
Moreover, the conflict between  patent and antitrust policies that has 
been analyzed in this Article should,  if anything,  be easier to resolve 
than virtually all other conflicts because the primary competing issues 
can be translated into a "common denominator" -  economic welfare 
loss -  to a far greater degree than one could hope for in most other 
areas  of  the  law.272  Finally,  although  the  state  of  the  art  in  the 
economics of antitrust and patent policies seems primitive, it is prob- 
ably more developed at both the theoretical and empirical levels than 
is the analysis of a vast array of other issues that the courts regularly 
confront.  In the end,  the problematic nature of existing patent-anti- 
trust policy cannot readily be dismissed as exceptional, but rather may 
be  seen  to  suggest  the  existence  of  a  wide  range of  deeper conflicts 
that lie hidden beneath other legal doctrines. 
APPENDIX:  DERIVATION  OF THE  OPTIMAL  PATENT  LIFE 
AND  PATENT-ANTITRUST  DOCTRINE 
This  Appendix  briefly sketches  a  more formal  derivation  of  the 
results  reached  in  Sections  II.A  through  II.C  of  the  Article.  The 
benefits of  the  patent  system  net of the direct costs of invention  (B) 
are a  function  of  inventive  activity.  Inventive  activity  is  in  turn  a 
function  of  the  reward or profit (P) provided  by the  patent  system. 
The system consists of two  components: a patent life (L) and a set of 
restrictions on exploitation  practices (R).  These  relationships can  be 
expressed as follows: 
(I)  P  =  P(L,R),  and 
(2)  B  =  B(P(L,R)). 
For  convenience  of  notation,  R  can  be  thought  of  as  a  vector  with 
each element (Ri) corresponding to each possible restriction on patent 
exploitation that might be imposed.  The magnitude of Ri denotes the 
tightness  of a restriction in effect.  It takes on a value  of zero if the 
practice upon which the restriction might operate is not at all restricted 
-  for  example,  if  price-restricted licensing  is  permitted,  the  corre- 
sponding Ri equals zero.  Similarly, it takes on a value  of one in the 
event  of complete  prohibition.  For present purposes, it is helpful to 
272  This  massive  simplification  was  accomplished  in  this  Article only  by  ignoring a  large 
portion of the most important considerations.  See Kaplow, supra note 20,  at  I82I-26  (sketching 
some of the reasons that antitrust law  cannot be viewed  in the simple manner suggested in this 
Article and citing additional sources); supra note  23  (indicating another set of such reservations 
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think  of  the  Ri's  as  continuous  variables.273  Although  there  are 
grounds  on  which  this  assumption  could  be  defended,274 I  offer it 
here only to simplify the exposition for the moment.  The results will 
be interpreted explicitly only for those cases in which Ri =  o or Ri= 
I. 
In  a  similar  fashion,  the  cost  of  the  patent  system  (C) can  be 
expressed as follows: 
(3) C  =  C(L,R). 
The  goal  is  to  maximize  benefits less  costs of the patent system,  as 
expressed by the formula: 
(4) B(P(L,R))  -  C(L,R). 
An interior solution275  implies that the following first-order conditions 
must be satisfied: 
(5) B'PL  -  CL  =  o,  which  implies: 
(5A) PL= -  =  rL; and 
(6) B'PRi  -  CRi  =  o,  fo r  a I  i,  which implies: 
(6A)  Ri= 
I 
=  ri,  for all i.276 
CRi  B 
PL,  CL,  PRi,  and  CRi  denote the partial derivatives of P  and C with 
respect to L and Ri.  B'  denotes the derivative of B  with  respect to 
P.  The  term rL in equation (5A) corresponds to the ratio implicit in 
the patent life,  referred to in subsection II.B.i,277  and the term ri in 
equation  (6A) is  the  ratio for each restriction Ri.  Interpreting these 
expressions is  sufficient to  yield  most  of  the  results in  sections II.A 
through  IJ.C. 
From  equation  (5), the  optimal patent life  satisfies the condition 
that  B'PL=  CL,  which  simply  means  that  the  marginal benefit of 
changing the patent life must equal the marginal cost.  These expres- 
273  This  means that any of these variables in principle could have any value  between zero 
and one,  in addition to the extreme values. 
274  The  most persuasive reason is that courts could permit many practices to intermediate 
degrees.  Another is that the courts could employ a random strategy under which each of two 
outcomes was chosen with a predetermined probability.  See supra note 88. 
275  In addition to the restrictions on the values of the Ri's, it can be assumed that L must 
be greater than or equal to zero. 
276  Equation  (5) is derived by setting the derivative of (4) with  respect to L equal to zero, 
and equation (6) by setting the derivative of (4) with respect to Ri equal to zero, for all i. 
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sions must be evaluated for some vector R because both P  and C are 
functions of R,  which  indicates the dependence of the optimal patent 
life  on  the  existing  patent-antitrust regime regulating exploitation  of 
the patent. 
Similarly, from equations  (5A) and  (6A), it  can  be seen  that  the 
ratio implicit in the patent life (rL)  should be equated with  the ratios 
for each  possible  restriction (ri's), because all ratios must equal  i/B' 
at the optimum.278  But  this conclusion must be reconciled with  the 
notion that the ratios for various restrictions differ.  The resolution of 
this apparent contradiction derives from the fact that each Ri is con- 
strained to be between zero and one.  (One cannot have more restric- 
tion in any dimension than total restriction (Ri =  i)  or less restriction 
than none at all (Ri =  o).)  Thus,  ratios may well  be quite different 
from each  other at  the  optimum.  If  it  is reasonable to  assume that 
the ratio for a given restrictive practice does not vary substantially as 
one  moves  from  partial to  total  restriction, it  would  be  most  likely 
that there would  be a corner solution for that practice -  that is, Ri 
would equal either one or zero.279 Alternatively, if for administrative 
reasons or limitations  of  feasibility,  only  the  all-or-nothing choice  is 
available,  one would  also examine corner solutions.280 
The  ratio test described in  Section II.B,  which  implicitly applied 
to such corner solutions because an all-or-nothing approach to restric- 
tions was taken,  can be derived as follows.  Consider the case where 
ri is less than rL.  From equations (5A) and (6A), this implies 
(7)  <I 
CRi  Bl 
Rearranging terms,  and  recalling that B'  is  positive  (more profit in- 
creases  benefit  when  at  the  optimum281)  and  CRi  is  negative  (more 
restriction decreases social cost of exploitation), yields 
(7A) B'PRi  -  CRi  >  0. 
This  inequality  indicates  a  positive  derivative  of  (4) with  respect to 
Ri  (compare the  expression  in  (7A) with  equation  (6)); hence  (4) is 
278  Similarly,  PLB'IC  =  i,  which  is  the  direct  implication  of  marginal  benefit  equaling 
marginal cost at the optimum.  The  B'  term in the numerator differentiates this ratio from rL, 
as described  supra p.  I83I. 
279  Of course, if there is an interior solution,  it is characterized by the equality of ri and rL. 
If  the  patent  life  is  viewed  simply  as  one  of  the  restrictions, the  same results follow.  At  the 
optimum,  all ratios equal  ilB'.  Because the ratio for the patent life presumably varies substan- 
tially  depending  on  the  length  of  the  patent  life,  it  is  quite  possible that  an  interior solution 
exists and that some patent system is therefore justified.  Yet if a corner solution still results 
that is,  if L equals o -  the patent system should be abolished. 
280  The case in which only a few intermediate values are feasible would lead to an analogous 
comparison among those points. 
281 See  supra note 45. I892  HARVARD LAW REVIEW  [Vol.  97:I8I3 
maximized by setting Ri as high as possible.  The optimal solution is 
thus Ri  =  i;  in other words, the practice should be prohibited.  Sim- 
ilarly, if ri is greater than rL, the optimal solution is Ri  =  o; that is, 
the  practice should  be  permitted.  These  two  conclusions taken  to- 
gether constitute the test that compares the ratio for each restriction 
with the ratio implicit in the patent life.282 
The  cost-effectiveness  analysis  described in  Section  II.B  can  be 
derived by examining equation (4).  Because the procedure in subsec- 
tion IL  B. i(c) holds P constant, B is constant.  But exchanging restric- 
tions  on  practices with  low  ratios for restrictions on  practices with 
high  ratios decreases the total cost (C); hence net social benefits are 
increased. 
This  derivation  also  yields  some  insight  into  the  reason for  the 
incorrectness of the proposition that reward should be proportional to 
the value of the patent,  an issue discussed in subsection II.A.3.  The 
value  of  the  patent,  as traditionally understood, does not appear in 
the optimization equations directly.  The total value of all patents in 
the system can  be implicitly determined as follows.  Given the opti- 
mum,  we  must know the value of B',  and that value corresponds to 
some particular value for B.  The  value of B  in turn corresponds to 
a given quantity of inventive  activity, which has an aggregate value. 
That aggregate value can be compared with total reward, which can 
be determined from the specification of the prevailing system, L and 
R (see equation (i)).  These totals for value and reward could then be 
converted to averages.  Thus,  the raw comparison of reward to value 
for any given  patent is many steps removed from the marginal con- 
ditions  for  optimality  (equations (5) and  (6)) and  the  corresponding 
ratios of marginal reward to marginal loss (equations (5A) and (6A)) 
that  have  been  emphasized  as  the  foundation  for  analysis  in  this 
Article. 
282 There still remains the reservation that stems from the fact that changing from Ri  =  o 
to Ri =  i,  or vice versa,  is a discrete rather than an infinitesimal change.  It might be that for 
Ri  =  i,  the ratio exceeds  i/B'  and that for Ri  =  o,  the ratio is less than i/B'.  This result can 
occur because relaxing the restriction -  that is, moving from Ri =  i  to Ri =  o -  increases B; 
if  B"  is  less  than  o  (the  diminishing  marginal  returns assumption),  increasing B  implies  a 
decrease in B'  and hence an increase in i/B'.  Thus ri is compared to a higher rL when Ri =  o 
than when Ri =  i.  If intermediate values for Ri are not possible, then it is necessary to compare 
the overall net social benefits for each configuration of possibilities and to choose the one that 
is best. 